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Essays on spatial and vertical price transmission 
Lodovico Muratori 
 
Vorwort 
 
Diese Promotionsarbeit setzt sich mit der Preisübertragung entlang der inländischen Value Chain 
(“vertical price transmission“) und zwischen dem internationalen und den nationalen Märkten („spatial 
price transmission“) auseinander. Sie entwickelt sowohl mikro- als auch makroökonomische Ansätze 
und besteht aus drei empirischen Papers: 
 
1. Vertical price transmission, geographical dispersion and the structure of the Ugandan coffee market  
2. Spatial price transmission and trade policies: new evidence from selected sub-Saharan African 
countries and crops with high frequency data  
3. Shocks, price transmission and Food consumption with changes in Price risk aversion.  
 
Diese Promotionsarbeit trägt zur vorherigen Literatur in verschiedenen Hinsichten bei:  
 
1. im Bezug auf „vertical price transmission“ entwickelt der erste Kapitel der Promotionsarbeit 
ein strukturelles Model und schätzt die empirische Beziehung zwischen geographischer 
Ausstreuung und räumlichem Oligopson auf dem ugandischen Kaffeemarkt. Dieses Paper 
verbessert den Ansatz von (Sexton, 1990), weil (Sexton, 1990) nur eine “spatial price gap 
equation” benutzt, während diese Studie ein „system of well-founded behavioural equations“ 
verwendet. Darüber hinaus ermöglicht die Anwendung in dieser Studie von der Methodologie 
von „Seemingly Unrelated Regression“, einige empirischen Hypothesen zu testen. Die 
Ergebnisse der Analyse bestätigen, dass geographische Ausstreuung die Verdienstspanne der 
Traders bestimmt, dass Traders ihre Markmacht ausbeuten und sie den Landwirten zu viel 
Transport- und Transaktionskosten berechnen.  
Ein Regime vom räumlichen Oligopson entwickelt sich in diesem Kontext, weil 
Informationsasymmetrie auf dem ugandischen Kaffeemarkt vorhanden ist und weil die 
Landwirten der Transportkosten, die von den Traders wirklich getragenen werden, nicht völlig 
bewusst sind. 
 
2. im Bezug auf „spatial price transmission“ untersucht der zweite Kapitel der Promotionsarbeit 
die kurzfristige Auswirkung von „price insulating policies“ auf die Preisübertragung zwischen 
dem internationalen und den nationalen Märkten für ausgewählte Sub-Sahara afrikanische 
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Länder und landwirtschaftliche Hauptgüter, indem die Studie sich auf hohe-Frequenz 
(monatliche) Daten fokussiert.  
Die Anwendung von ökonometrischen Methodologien, die nicht-Linearitäten und Regime-
Wechsel im “data generating process“ berücksichtigen, ermöglicht, unterschiedliche 
Erkenntnisse aus dieser Studie als aus der vorherigen Literatur (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012b) 
(Anderson and Nelgen, 2012c) zu gewinnen. 
Diese Arbeit schätzt insbesondere die kurzfristige Auswirkung von „price insulating policies“, 
indem die empirische Analyse zwei Verhaltensregime der Zeitreihen von inländischen Preisen 
identifiziert: in einem Regime weisen inländische Preise einen aufsteigenden Trend auf, 
während sie im anderen Regime einen absteigendem Trend aufweisen. „Price insulating 
policies“ haben eine Auswirkung in beiden Fällen, aber ihre Relevanz ist viel größer, wenn 
Preise steigern. Deswegen waren „price insulating policies“ hilfreich, das jeweilige Land von 
„price shocks“ auf dem internationalen Markt abzutrennen, wenn diese Politiken eher 
notwendig waren. 
 
3. letztendlich untersucht der dritte Kapitel der Promotionsarbeit die Frage vom zeitabhängigen 
Risikoaversion-Parameter bezüglich der Lebensmittelverbrauchsentscheidungen von den 
„farm households“, die gleichzeitig landwirtschaftliche Güter produzieren und verbrauchen. 
Die Ergebnisse der Analyse bestätigen, dass der Risikoaversion-Parameter zeitabhängig ist 
und dass die „farm households“ eher risikoavers werden können, wenn sie widrigen 
Marktbedingungen entgegentreten. Darüber hinaus erbringt diese Studie Nachweis, dass die 
Landwirten nicht nur auf die unmittelbare Befriedung ihres Bedarfs zielen, sondern sie 
verhalten sich optimal und sich versichern mittelfristig ihrer Ernährungssicherheit. Die „farm 
households“ bevorzugen ihre Einkünfte zu erhöhen als die landwirtschaftliche Güter, die sie 
ernten, direkt zu verbrauchen. Die Reduzierung vom „dietary energy consumption“, den der 
Verkauf der Ernte auf dem Markt mit sich bringt, wird tatsächlich durch die Steigerung der 
Kaufkraft, die höhere Verkaufsprofiten zur Folge haben, völlig ausgeglichen. 
 
Diese Arbeit ist das Ergebnis von einem dreijährigen dualen Promotionsstudiengang, der an der 
Universität Sapienza von Rom, Italien und der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Jena, Deutschland im 
Rahmen eines co-Tutelle-Abkommens zwischen den zwei Hochschulen durchgeführt wurde. 
Das zweite Paper „Spatial price transmission and trade policies: new evidence from selected sub-
Saharan African countries and crops with high frequency data” wurde in Ko-Autorschaft mit Frau 
Susanne Fricke verfasst. Eine Erklärung über den Beitrag jedes Autors wird in dieser Promotionsarbeit 
beigelegt. 
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Essays on spatial and vertical price transmission 
Lodovico Muratori 
Preface 
 
This PhD thesis deals with the analysis of spatial and vertical price transmission. The main 
contribution to previous literature are the following: i) on the vertical dimension, it models and 
estimates empirically the issue of geographical dispersion and spatial oligopsony in the Ugandan 
coffee market; ii) on the spatial dimension it investigates the impact of trade policies for selected SSA 
and main crops on price transmission looking at high-frequency (monthly) data, given non-linearities 
and regime switching in the data generating process; iii) finally, it investigates the correlated issue of 
time-varying household risk aversion parameters in the household food consumption decisions. This 
thesis develops both microeconomic and macroeconomic approaches and it is articulated in the 
following three empirical essays: 
1. Vertical price transmission, geographical dispersion and the structure of the Ugandan coffee 
market 
2. Spatial price transmission and trade policies: new evidence from selected sub-Saharan African 
countries and crops with high frequency data 
3. Shocks, price transmission and Food consumption with changes in Price risk aversion. 
This is the final outcome of a three-year joint PhD programme carried out at the Sapienza University 
of Rome, Italy, and at the Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena, Germany, within the framework of a 
co-tutelle agreement between the two universities. 
The first essay (“Vertical price transmission, geographical dispersion and the structure of the Ugandan 
coffee market”) extends the vertical price transmission analysis through a structural approach, which 
evaluates whether spatial oligopsony power is prevailing in Ugandan coffee market and in case how 
strong it is. The first paper tests whether in markets, such as Uganda, where infrastructure quality is 
poor and transport costs are relevant, geographic dispersion of smallholder farmers allows traders to 
exploit their market power against farmers with a large impact on market structure and reduction of 
farmers' welfare. By building upon (Sexton, 1990), the study brings an original contribution to the 
literature, since (Sexton, 1990) develops just a theoretical model and it is not interested to do any 
econometric exercise. (Sexton, 1990) employs a single spatial price gap equation instead of a system 
of well-founded behavioural equations in agricultural markets, which is indeed a major improvement 
delivered by this essay. Moreover, in this analysis the approach to spatial price gap determination is 
combined with the oligopsony modelling and SUR technique in order to produce empirically testable 
hypotheses. Without such transformations the approach by (Sexton, 1990) cannot be employed for any 
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empirical exercise. Indeed, the idea of the role of distance is taken from (Sexton, 1990) and introduced 
in an original way in a more sophisticated model, which is micro-founded at three levels, i.e. demand 
and supply of agricultural commodities by traders and farmers as well as conditional demand of inputs 
by farmers. 
Since the wholesale-farmgate price spread is net of transport costs, results confirm that geographic 
dispersion of smallholder farmers plays a significant role on price margin and that there is room for 
local oligopsony, because traders exploit their market power and overcharge transport and transaction 
costs to farmers. Indeed, farmers are not able to skip traders in the value chain, because a significant 
information asymmetry is prevailing in the market. Traders exploit farmers' ignorance because the 
latter are small and dispersed as well as they lack information about current market prices because of 
villages remoteness and poor communications with marketplaces (Courtois and Subervie, 2015). 
Moreover, farmers are not aware of actual transport costs faced by traders, which carry larger 
quantities of coffee than single smallholder farmers and spread fixed costs over a larger amount of 
crop. 
The second essay (“Spatial price transmission and trade policies: new evidence from selected sub-
Saharan African countries and crops with high frequency data”) assesses the impact of trade policies 
on spatial price transmission of maize, rice and wheat in Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania. This paper 
improves the existing literature in the field (see, inter alia, Anderson and Nelgen, 2012a, Anderson and 
Nelgen, 2012b and Anderson and Nelgen, 2012c), because it estimates the impact of tariff and non-
tariff trade policies on spatial price transmission in the agricultural markets using monthly data. 
Employment of monthly data allows assessing more precisely short-lived movements of the analysed 
series, which could disappear because of aggregation bias at lower yearly frequency, thus providing a 
better identification of insulation policies. Furthermore, this essay focuses on the impact of both tariff 
and non-tariff barriers on spatial price transmission by taking advantage of the combination of the 
FAO-GIEWS (Global Information and early warning system) database and trade policies information 
from the FAO-FADPA (Food and Agriculture Policy Decision Analysis) with the recent release of the 
World Bank World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) Database (UNCTAD, 2016) (FAO, 2016) 
(FAO, 2016b) (World Bank, 2016). This latest WITS release provides monthly ad-valorem equivalent 
tariff rates consist of tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff measures. In particular, non-tariff barriers 
comprises technical measures, such as sanitary or environmental protection measures, as well as others 
traditionally used as instruments of commercial policy, e.g. quotas, price control, exports restrictions, 
or contingent trade protective measures, and also other behind-the-border measures, such as 
competition, trade-related investment measures, government procurement or distribution restrictions 
(UNCTAD, 2015).  
The empirical methodologies of this study, like threshold, fractional integration and panel estimation, 
allow to separately estimate the confounding factors and clean the estimates of the variables of interest 
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from them. In particular, while the confounders cannot be identified, the coefficients of the variables 
of interest are consistent and they can be properly identified, conditional on the estimate of the 
confounders. An additional value added of this work is the possibility to separately estimate the impact 
of trade policies within the two regimes of behaviour of the domestic price series: in the first regime 
the trend of domestic prices is increasing, in the second one the trend is decreasing. It highlights that 
trade policies play a role both in case of increasing and decreasing domestic prices, but their relevance 
is much larger, if prices are increasing. The policy implication is that trade policies were able to 
insulate the country from the price shocks on the international markets during the food price spike 
crisis, when it was mostly needed. By presenting high frequency analyses and techniques able to 
detect non-linearities in the data generating process we thus provide results which are different from 
the standard literature (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012b and Anderson and Nelgen, 2012c). Note however 
that although the impact of these instruments is proved to be relevant in the short term during the food 
price spike crisis, these policies could not be regarded as long term solutions. 
The third essay ("Shocks, price transmission and Food consumption with changes in Price risk 
aversion) looks seriously at the issue of time variant price risk aversion parameters. This is a 
fundamental question to address in the investigation of both spatial and vertical price transmission in a 
risky environment. To this end, the essay assesses the behaviour of farm households, which consume 
and produce crops at the same time, and answers the following key research questions: i) whether the 
occurrence of exogenous shocks induces a change of price risk aversion over time and then ii) how the 
time-varying risk aversion parameter affects production and consumption pattern by the farm 
households. This research employs the risk aversion parameter introduced by (Bellemare et al., 2013), 
which takes into account not just the household psychological risk attitudes, but also the market 
imperfections and availability of institutions which facilitate risk-bearing (Mendola, 2007) (de Janvry 
et al., 1991). Nevertheless, unlike (Bellemare et al., 2013) the essay develops a microfounded 
empirical model, where the risk aversion parameter is allowed to change over time and not just across 
households. This empirical model is estimated within a two-stage structural approach. The results of 
the empirical analysis suggest that the risk aversion parameter is not constant over time and that 
households can become more risk averse, if they face adverse market conditions in the previous 
periods. Furthermore, this paper provides evidence that peasants do not aim just at need satisfaction, 
but they behave in an optimal way and make sure their food security in the medium term. Indeed, they 
prefer to increase their income instead of directly consuming the harvested crop, because the reduction 
of dietary energy consumption derived from the giving up the harvest for sale is more than offset by 
the rise of food purchasing power due to the larger profits obtained. 
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Vertical price transmission,
geographical dispersion and the structure of
the Ugandan coﬀee market
Lodovico Muratori
Relation between price transmission and structure of agricultural markets is strongly de-
bated in the literature and no consensus has been reached about symmetry, degree of such
transmission and its mechanisms, so that further research is needed.
This paper tests whether in markets where infrastructure quality is poor and distance-
related costs are relevant, geographic dispersion of smallholder farmers allows traders to
exploit their market power against farmers with a large impact on market structure and
reduction of farmers' welfare.
Following the intuition of Fafchamps et al. (2005), Sexton (2013) and Swinnen and Van-
deplas (2014), the study provides a structural approach based on a set of well-founded
behavioural equations to evaluate whether spatial oligopsony power is prevailing in agricul-
tural markets and in case how strong it is. The paper designs also a far-reaching empirical
test of the hypotheses through the seemingly unrelated regression technique. Moreover, it
provides a strong empirical base to value chain studies, by exploiting the database of the
Living Standard Measurement Study. The paper addresses the issue of transportation in-
frastructure as hindering factor of development in Uganda as outlined in several reports by
World Bank, FAO and MAFAP and assesses the costs of such bottleneck, which are larger
than transport expenditures.
Results conﬁrm that geographic dispersion of smallholder farmers plays a signiﬁcant role
on price margin and that there is room for local oligopsony, because traders overcharge
transport and distance-related costs to farmers.
Keywords: coﬀee value chain, wholesale-farm gate price spread, spatial dispersion, revenue distribution,
traders' market power
JEL codes: O13, Q12, Q13
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Introduction
Coﬀee, after petroleum, is the commodity with the highest turnover in international trade. Annual value
of export revenues exceeds US$10 billion while annual retail sales of coﬀee are estimated at approximately
US$50 billion. It is a highly labour intensive industry employing an estimated 100 million people in over
60 developing countries. It is particularly important to African economies, which represent a large share
of exporting countries and is often a vital source of export revenues and income to producers, many of
whom are smallholders (Collinson et al., 2005, 13).
The attempt of some governments to liberalize in the last few decades at least partially domestic agri-
cultural markets, to integrate and upgrade their status in the global value chain is relevant for impact
assessment of the structure of agricultural value chain on social welfare and development perspectives of
developing countries. Due to this process the role of state-owned enterprises shrank and it was allowed to
national and international private companies to participate in production, distribution, export of several
agricultural products. Nevertheless, in many cases transition was not well managed: previously state-
controlled markets did not turn in competitive ones, but in oligopsonistic markets with a large number
of farmers and very small numbers of private or public traders (Fafchamps and Hill, 2008, 2).
Distribution of revenues along the value chain is of key interest for policy-makers, since modalities of par-
ticipation of smallholder farmers in the value chain can be important in terms of poverty reduction and
welfare and for regional food security. i.e. quantity and price of food supplied on the markets (Fafchamps
and Hill, 2008, 2). Indeed, a larger or smaller spread can provide diﬀerent incentives to farmers to culti-
vate some crops, to invest in order to increase productivity and yields as well as to market agricultural
products.
In particular, coﬀee plays a signiﬁcant role in the economy of Uganda in spite of several attempts by the
government to diversify the national productive structure. This sector has a signiﬁcant impact in terms
of ﬁght against poverty and income security, because coﬀee production is almost entirely dependent on
about 500,000 smallholder farmers, 90 % of whose average farm size ranges from less than 0.5 to 2.5
hectares (MAFAP, 2012a, 5-6) (UCDA, 2015).
The paper tests whether in markets where infrastructure quality is poor and distance-related costs are
relevant, geographic dispersion of smallholder farmers allows traders to exploit their market power against
farmers with a large impact on market structure and reduction of farmers' welfare. Distance-related costs
capture the expenditures of all services provided by traders to farmers, which are signiﬁcantly correlated
with distance: the main of which is trasportation of crops to the exporter yard. In this context, in-
vestments in infrastructure quality can foster competition, by reducing traders' market power, and curb
poverty of rural areas.
The response variable which was chosen in order to assess the existence and the degree of spatial oligop-
sony is the wholesale-farm gate price spread, i.e. the diﬀerence between the wholesale export or domestic
price net of marginal distance-related costs and the farm gate price. Several factors as small plot size
hold by farmers, shortage of inputs, distance can aﬀect such a spread. The paper disentangles the impact
of such components.
Following the intuition of Fafchamps et al. (2005), Sexton (2013) and Swinnen and Vandeplas (2014), the
study provides a structural approach to evaluate whether spatial oligopsony power is prevailing in the
market and how intense it is.
By building upon Sexton (1990), the study brings an original contribution to the literature, since Sexton
(1990) develops just a theoretical model and it is not interessed to do any econometric exercise. Sexton
(1990) employs a single spatial price gap equation instead of a system of well-founded behavioural equa-
tions in agricultural markets, which is indeed a major improvement delivered by this paper.
Moreover, in this analysis the approach to spatial price gap determination is combined with the oligop-
sony modelling and SUR technique in order to produce empirically testable hypotheses. Without such
transformations the approach by Sexton (1990) cannot be employed for any empirical exercise. Indeed,
the idea of the role of distance is taken from Sexton (1990) and introduced in an original way in a more
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sophisticated model, which is micro-founded at three levels, i.e. demand and supply of agricultural com-
modities by traders and farmers as well as conditional demand of inputs by farmers.
At the same time, the SUR estimation technique is not applied in the same way like in other oligopoly or
oligopsony analyses. Indeed these previous articles ignore completely the issue of distance, which implies
diﬀerent problems of derivation and interpretation to be tackled. Seemingly unrelated regression frame-
work is useful, in order to exploit simultaneity between equations and increase eﬃciency. Tests give proof
that there is a signiﬁcant correlation among the equations and that the empirical approach is justiﬁed.
Moreover, in this work there is a contribution in terms of empirical methodology, since SUR technique
is run on a panel dataset, which is an econometrically sound, but a rarely employed approach. This
work exploits a rich microeconomic database and provides a strong empirical base to value chain studies
(World Bank, 2015).
Finally, the paper addresses the issue of transportation infrastructure as hindering factor of development
in Uganda as outlined in Gollin and Rogerson (2010), MAFAP (2012a), MAFAP (2012b) and Ran-
ganathan and Foster (2012) and assesses the costs of such bottleneck, which are larger than transport
expenditures. Results conﬁrm that geographic dispersion of smallholder farmers plays a signiﬁcant role
on price margin and that there is room for local oligopsony based on transport and distance-related costs.
Literature review
Relation between price transmission and structure of agricultural markets is strongly debated in the
literature and no consensus has been reached about symmetry, degree of such transmission and its mech-
anisms (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005) (Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 2004).
Transmission between international and domestic prices and vice versa is referred as spatial price trans-
mission, while transmission of price from consumers, triggered from demand shocks, to producers and
vice versa is deﬁned as vertical price transmission (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2014).
A ﬁrst contrast among researchers is about symmetry of price transmission. On the one hand, a branch
of literature points out that symmetry is prevailing in the market (Ben-Kaabia and Gil, 2007) (Serra and
Goodwin, 2003). On the other hand, some authors support the view that agents in the market pass more
likely downstream price decreases than increases and pass on changes with delay (Vavra and Goodwin,
2005) (Zachariasse and Bunte, 2003) (Abdulai, 2000) (Abdulai, 2002) (Abdulai, 2000) (Frey and Manera,
2007). A further point of conﬂict among economists who show signiﬁcant asymmetry and imperfection
in the market concerns the mechanisms of price transmission.
Imperfect spatial transmission has been attributed to government intervention as tariﬀs and price stabi-
lization measures, transport and marketing costs, degree of processing, market structure and consumer
preferences (Rapsomanikis and Mugera, 2011), while imperfect vertical transmission is determined by the
presence of asymmetric information along the value chain, the prevalence of "sticky prices", existence
of labelling and advertising as well as of reputation costs due to the frequent price changes, inventory
or selling strategies, exercise of market power by processing companies or retailers (Wohlgenant, 2001)
(Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 2004) (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005).
For instance, in the EU prices increase in 2007/2008 was passed on to consumers, but decrease in
2008/2009 was not fully transmitted, hindering demand recovery and exacerbating negative impact of de-
clining producer prices on farm household (European Commission, 2009). European Commission stressed
that such discrepancies in price transmission were due to an excessive number of intermediaries along
the value chain and inequalities in bargaining power between contracting parties (European Commission,
2009).
Nevertheless, this point cannot be always generalized, since the fact that producer prices vary more than
consumer prices does not necessarily imply asymmetric changes (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2014) (Buke-
viciute et al., 2009).
Existing literatures focuses on consumer welfare and assumes a positive correlation between degree of
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downstream vertical price transmission and consumer welfare. Indeed, a lower degree of price transmis-
sion can be exploited strategically by powerful intermediaries in the chain, who can capture a large share
of the rents (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2014, 3-4).
In particular, ﬁrms exploit the diﬀerent responses by consumers to price increases or decreases and they
trasmit more quickly to them the price upwards than the downwards adjustments (Bonnet and Villas-
Boas, 2016). Indeed, consumers adapt to the new level of prices and do not react quickly to price
reductions: they perceive the discount, but they do not increase strongly the demand, because they
expect better deals (Kalyanaram and Little, 1994).
Consumers face also limits in purchasing, transporting and stockpiling products and they cannot demand
as much as they would like because of such constraints (Gupta and Cooper, 1992). Furthermore, if the
preference for a given brand is strong enough, the consumers can also remain loyal to its product, altough
its price increases: consumers change their behaviour, only if the loss goes beyond a given threshold
(Jacoby and Chestnut, 1978).
A branch of the literature comes to the conclusion that traders are eﬃcient and provide a valuable service
to smallholder farmers.
For instance, Sitko and Jayne (2014) analyse the maize value chain in Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, Mozam-
bique and ﬁnd that the reliance by the farmers on traders is not the only one alternative for remote
farmers and that several producers, who can exploit other market channels, choose deliberately this sell-
ing strategy. Farmers opt for the service of intermediaries, because their activity provides to farmers
some advantages.
Firstly, traders buy the harvest directly in the village: this is a signiﬁcant gain for farmers located in the
remote regions, which face high incidence of transport costs, without any possibility to exploit economies
of scale in production or to lower the unit cost of transport.
Secondly, traders pay cash unlike parastatal marketing boards and processing ﬁrms, which issue check
after a long lag period. Thirdly, traders purchase maize immediately after the harvest unlike marketing
boards and processing ﬁrms, which wait that the crop is partially dry. Cash payment and early entry
into the rural markets by traders release the capital constraints of farmers, which have strong ﬁnancial
needs at the harvest time (Sitko and Jayne, 2014).
Montalbano et al. (2017) conclude also from the analysis of the Ugandan maize value chain that the
intermediaries are eﬃcient: they do not exploit smallholder farmers and do not oﬀer to farmers price
below the prevailing market prices.
Sexton (2013) points out that increasing concentration, vertical coordination in food industry worldwide
and growing relevance of diﬀerentiated products in terms of taste, appearance, brand appeal, fairness
of production process and environment sustainability make easier to support the view that monopolistic
competition is prevailing in the market. In this environment some ﬁrms are able to exert some market
power and set prices with a signiﬁcant impact on welfare and rent distribution among the actors involved
in the value chain (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2014) (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2010) (Kikuchi et al., 2015)
(Mesa and Gómez, 2011) (Faªkowski, 2010) (Osborne, 2005). According to this branch of literature several
agricultural markets are oligopolistic or oligopsonistic and concentrated processors capture welfare against
small and dispersed farmers.
Moreover, other authors express the view that asymmetry in price transmission is not due to exploitation
of market power, but to vertical coordination, increasing returns to scale, risk-mitigating behaviour of
agents and degree of processing (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2014) (Wohlgenant, 2001) (Weldegebriel, 2004)
(McCorriston et al., 2001) (Wang et al., 2006). In particular, the more stages in vertical market structure,
the lower the pass-through of price changes along the value chain, independently from exploitation of
market power by agents (Peltzman, 2000) (McCorriston and Sheldon, 1996) (Wang et al., 2006).
Disruptions in price transmission can also occur when there are large menu costs as advertising and
labelling, information asymmetries and uncertainty about whether the shock is transitory or permanent
(Ball and Mankiw, 1994) (Zachariasse and Bunte, 2003) (Owen and Trzepacz, 2002) (Levy et al., 1997)
(Levy et al., 2002) (Blinder et al., 1998).
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Ball and Mankiw (1994) point out that ﬁrms increase prices more quickly than decrease them, because
they react to accumulated and anticipated inﬂation, particularly relevant in case of positive shocks.
Furthermore, actors can be reluctant to change prices because of reputation costs, inventory or selling
strategies. Indeed, they are not sure whether competitors will do the same. Moreover, frequent price
changes can reduce reputation and actors can postpone such adjustment to be sure that the shock is
permanent (Blinder, 1994).
Such delays in price transmission could also come from risk minimization in inventory management. If
prices reduce much and quickly, traders or retailers can run out of stock; if they increase suddenly, agents
can be left with much unsold spoiled product (Ward, 1982) (Reagan and Weitzman, 1982).
Interpretation of the link between price transmission and market structure is ambiguous according to
some researchers. For instance, Wang et al. stress that the interaction between industry technology and
market power is puzzling and that in case of economies of scale price transmission can be stronger, weaker
or identical to the competitive case (Wang et al., 2006).
Moreover, in most of countries agricultural markets are subject to large public intervention. If agents have
expectation that government will more likely intervene if shocks reduce producer price rather than they
increase it, expectation-induced price transmission could be asymmetric (Kinnucan and Forker, 1987).
A relevant role is played in small and open economies by external shocks which determine prices at the
wholesale level (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005). Such disruptions are more relevant in developing countries
than advanced economies, given higher adjustment and transaction costs in the former group and that
external shocks play a key role in small producer countries (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005). Some authors
argued that both consumers and producers in developing countries were hurt by food price spikes over
the period 2007-2011, because farmers did not get signiﬁcant beneﬁts from high prices. Nevertheless, in
this context empirical results of the eﬀect of price volatility on consumers and farmers welfare as well as
food security are mixed (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2014).
In some industries oligopolistic or oligopsonistic structure can be oﬀset by economies of scale with higher
price transmission than expected (McCorriston et al., 2001).
Sexton (2013) and Crespi et al. (2012) emphasize that in today's agricultural markets to guarantee
consistency and strict adherence of products and production processes to quality and safety standards
is crucial. Therefore, exploitation of short-run oligopsony power by buyers against farmers could be
detrimental to their long-run interests because such strategy reduces resources available in production
and prevent enforcement of adequate standards (Crespi et al., 2012).
Sexton (2013) expresses the view that in high-quality supply chain, where buyer sunk and transaction
costs for ﬁnding new suppliers are high, such buyers can opt for vertical integration or pay farmers as
much and even more than in a competitive market.
Swinnen and Vandeplas (2014) show also that buyers can pay to farmers eﬃciency premia to ensure quality
standards in environments with unequal bargaining power and market imperfections. Price transmission
depends then on nature of vertical coordination and diﬀerent types of transaction costs in the supply chain
(Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2014). Moreover, partial price transmission can also take place in competitive
markets due to intertemporal optimizing behaviour by agents, who respond more quickly to price increase
than decrease (Azzam, 1999).
In general, empirical evidence about the process of price transmission along the value chain seems to
be inconclusive and varies widely across countries and commodities, so that further research is needed
(Vavra and Goodwin, 2005) (Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 2004).
In particular, some robustness analysis is necessary, because in some industries the functional form of
costs determines the level of price transmission, unless there is a relevant knowledge about cost formation
(Weldegebriel, 2004). This paper aims at testing the empirical hypothesis whether, in markets where
infrastructure quality is poor and distance-related costs are relevant, geographic dispersion of smallholder
farmers allows traders to exploit their market power against farmers with a large impact on market
structure and reduction of farmers' welfare. In particular, the model studies the causes which contribute
to the spread between the price obtained by traders at the point of competition (domestic market or
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borders for exports), net of marginal distance-related costs, and the farm gate price, wholesale-farmgate
price spread. Such indicator assesses the degree of competition and revenue distribution between farmers
and traders.
This spread will be positive in some cases, since traders can exploit their market power against spatially
dispersed farmers. Indeed, traders will not increase the farm gate price, even if they are able to receive
higher consumer or export price.
This paper is thematically close to the branch of literature which deals with exploitation of market power
by some actors in complex value chains like Peltzman (2000), McCorriston and Sheldon (1996), Sexton
(2013), Vavra and Goodwin (2005) and Swinnen and Vandeplas (2014) as well as it addresses the coﬀee
sector in Uganda, which is the main cash crop for Ugandan farmers.
Ugandan coﬀee value chain analysis
Coﬀe is an important cash crop for Ugandan smallholder farmers.
Both Arabica and Robusta are produced in Uganda in the ratio of 1:4 and coﬀee plants are inter-cropped
with food crops like bananas and beans. Robusta is used as a "ﬁller" in roasted and ground blends, and
in instant coﬀee, while Arabica is sold as specialty or fair trade product (Collinson et al., 2005, 14).
Mostly, family labour is employed with a minimal use of agrochemicals (fertilizers, pesticides and fungi-
cides), since part of production comes from wild forest coﬀee, which does not require any large human
intervention (MAFAP, 2012a, 6).
Domestic consumption of coﬀee is small and it was around 4-10% of production in the period 2004-2010,
in spite of some attempts by the authority to increase this value (MAFAP, 2012a, 8) (ICO, 2015).
Uganda ranks fourth after Burundi, Ethiopia and Honduras in terms of contribution of coﬀee exports in
total export earnings in the period 2000-2010 with an average share of 18% during this time (ICO, 2015).
In spite of that, ability of Uganda to increase international price by restricting exports or increasing
domestic consumption is very limited, because its share in the global coﬀee market is small (MAFAP,
2012a, 8). Main export destination of Ugandan coﬀee is the European Union (over 70% of total exports)
followed by Sudan (over 10%) and USA (about 3%). Remaining 15% of coﬀee exports is delivered in
other 13 countries. Export market is very concentrated with 10 exporters making up 85% of exports. In
particular, the leading company Ugacof Ltd. controls 15% of trade (MAFAP, 2012a, 8).
After coﬀee harvest of Robusta species, farmers usually sun-dry red cherries on the farm and sell their
coﬀee as Kiboko (dry cherries). Most coﬀee sales are made at the farm gate to the traders who tour the
countryside on bicycles or motorcycles. These Kibobo traders act as aggregators of very small amount
of coﬀee: they do not enjoy large autonomy in setting the price and can be regarded as agents of either
for bigger independent traders or for exporters. Generally, Kibobo traders dehull the cherries and sell
occasionally the rough hulled green bean (referred to as "FAQ" or fair average quality) directly to ex-
porters but more often to FAQ traders. The FAQ traders sell then to exporters' district depots or to
exporters' yards in Kampala (Hill, 2010, 437) (MAFAP, 2012a, 10). After cleaning, sorting, grading, and
drying of rough-hulled beans exporters or freight companies carry coﬀee by train, ferry or truck to the
port of Mombasa, which it is the main sea outlet for Ugandan exports. From there, coﬀee is transported
by sea to export destinations in 60 kilogram bags, which are stuﬀed into 20 feet or occasionally 40 feet
containers (MAFAP, 2012a, 10).
Ugandan Arabica coﬀee is mostly grown in the districts of Kapchorwa and Mbale. Its value chain is
similar to the one of Robusta, but in generally shorter, with more direct overseas marketing links than
that for the latter variety (Collinson et al., 2005, 20). In the following ﬁgures the value chains for Robusta
and Arabica are illustrated.
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made through bank transfers. Apart from not having bank accounts in the majority of 
cases, kiboko traders currently operate on small profi t margins and consequently wish to 
turn over their working capital as quickly as possible in order to maximize their season’s 
profi ts. Delays in payment at the exporter depot would decrease the rate of turnover. 
Secondly, and perhaps more tellingly, in order to reduce their transaction costs, most 
exporters have a minimum buying quantity, which is usually 300 to 500 kg of rough-
hulled coffee. Most kiboko traders are very unlikely to be able to collect this minimum 
quantity. “FAQ” traders are able both to assemble suffi cient quantities to sell to exporters 
and to wait for payment.
Once a suffi cient quantity of green bean has been bought at the depot, the exporting 
company dispatches a truck to take it to Kampala. The rough-hulled coffee then undergoes 
export processing which involves cleaning, sorting, grading, and drying. Usually, where 
exporters do not have their own export transport, freight companies are contracted to 
send the export green bean by truck or ferry/rail to Mombasa and thence by sea to export 
destinations. 
Most coffee is exported in 60 kg bags, which are stuffed into 20 ft or occasionally 40 
ft containers. Some exporters have bulk handling facilities, which they use to blow coffee 
into lined containers. The cost advantages of exporting coffee in this way are signifi cant 
because of the greater quantity that can be stuffed into a container and the reduced 
expenditure on packaging material.
Competition at all levels of the supply chain is intense. We could see no instances 
of where supply chain participants were not playing a crucial role in at least one of the 
following essential activities: bulking, transporting, product transformation, fi nancing, 
and risk taking.
Figure 2.3. Robusta coffee supply chain.
Farmers
Coffee mill
Rough-hulled green 
bean trader
Exporter district 
buying center
Exporter’s 
Kampala yard
Freight company
Importer
Dried cherry trader
Fi 1: usta Value Chain i Uganda (Collinson et al., 2005, 19)
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Arabica
Whilst the arabica coffee marketing chain is generally similar to the robusta wet processing 
procedure, the different market orientation for arabica gives it special features. For 
example, in the case of speciality and fair trade arabica coffees, the chain tends to be 
shorter, with more direct overseas marketing links than that for robusta. The chain is 
illustrated in Figure 2.4 and is based on that in the major arabica growing districts of 
Kapchorwa and Mbale. 
The various stages shown in diagrammatic representation of the marketing chain may 
be defi ned as follows:
Producer: The farmer who produces and sells ripe cherry and/or parchment. Parchment 
is often produced at the farm level in small-scale pulperies, where the cherry is washed, the 
pulp removed, and the resulting parchment sun dried.
Pulperies: These are larger-scale pulperies, located in rural areas, often operated by 
traders or groups of traders. They sell parchment usually direct to “dry” millers, but 
sometimes to other traders.
Figure 2.4. The arabica marketing chain.
Producers
Coffee cherry Parchment
Pulperies
Traders Traders
Millers
Overseas importers Kampala traders Merchants
Figure 2: Arabica Value Chain in Uganda (Collinson et al., 2005, 20)
Model
Consider an agricultural market, where traders and farmers negotiate for quantity and price. The hypoth-
esis to be veriﬁed is that, in markets where infrastructure quality is poor and distance-related costs are
relevant, geographic dispersion of smallholder farmers allows traders to exploit their market power against
farmers with a large impact on market structure and reduction of farmers' welfare. Distance-related costs
capture the expenditures of all services provided by traders to farmers, which are signiﬁcantly correlated
with distance: the main of which is trasportation of crops to the outlet market. All other services, which
are independent from the distance, like provision of credit, cannot be studied with the model developed
in this paper.
To reasonably investigate the Uganda coﬀee sector, several stages in the value chain are aggregated. In
particular, for simplicity's sake farmers are implementing within the farm the entire production process
before sale to domestic consumers or export, even if more actors of the value chain are involved in the
actual process.
Collection of agricultural products and marketing services are core business of traders, who do not trans-
form at all any agricultural products. Traders are homogeneous in behaviour and available technology;
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therefore the market area, where they compete, extends in n identical directions and is measured by a
radius L.
Traders are willing to expand their supply markets to provide domestic consumers or exporters with
larger amount of agricultural products.
Without loss of generality it is assumed that farmers produce and sell a quantity R of a single homoge-
neous crop. The farmer supply function is conditional on available technology T and a vector E of some
exogenous factors, like climate, plot size and price received for the sold quantity:
R = f(T;E) (1)
As conﬁrmed by LSMS-ISA data and reports by MAFAP, fertilizers and pesticides are little used and
coﬀee production is mainly a very labour intensive activity in a very labour-abundant country, where
there is little incentive to substitute labour with more expensive inputs (MAFAP, 2012a, 6). Therefore,
in Ugandan coﬀee production process there is low substitution between processing inputs. Moreover, a
ﬁxed ratio between inputs and agricultural output is prevailing, given the limited labour productivity
increase in picking coﬀee cherries. Based on the analysed production process, Leontief production function
seems to be the most suitable one (Sexton, 1990) (MAFAP, 2012a) (Collinson et al., 2005) (Wohlgenant,
2001).
Therefore, technology T can be described by the following Leontief production function (Diewert, 1971):
R = Mini

xi
bi
: i = 1; :::;K
ﬀ
(2)
where xi is the conditional factor demand by the farmers and bi is the relative technological conversion
factor between inputs xi and output R. In this functional form no substitution between the processing
inputs is possible. According to the standard microeconomic theory the Leontief production function
corresponds to the Leontief Cost function, which can be expressed in the following Gorman polar form:
C(R; pxi ) =
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where pxi and p
x
j are the prices of the i-th and j-th processing input and b the relative coeﬃcient, given
that bi;j = bj;i (Appelbaum, 1982, 289). Gorman polar form has several advantages for empirical studies
and estimation, given its aggregation properties, then it is used implicitly in many production studies.
In particular, such a functional form allows diﬀerent ﬁrms to have diﬀerent cost curves but all of them
are linear and parallel (Appelbaum, 1982, 291).
By applying Shephard's Lemma to equation 3, it is possible to derive conditional factor demand of
processing inputs by farmers, xi (Diewert, 1971):
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
@C(R; pxi )
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(4)
Traders face variable and ﬁxed costs for delivery and marketing services:
C(R) = wR+ t(R) + f if R > 0 (5)
where w is the farm gate price of agricultural products, t(R) variable distance-related costs paid by
traders due to f.o.b pricing and f set-up ﬁxed costs of delivery and marketing service. In this framework,
the main distance-related cost is due to the trasportation of the crops to the outlet market.
In particular, cost function of processing inputs is negative exponential. By assumption, transport tech-
nology available to traders exhibits constant returns to scale and marginal variable costs t0 can be taken
as constant and not dependent on R. Nevertheless, some economies of scale occur over some R >0,
because strictly positive ﬁxed set-up costs are spread over increasing inputs. Moreover, w is a function
of agricultural product R and distance L (Sexton, 1990, 711).
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In a competitive market traders maximize proﬁt and equilibrium condition is reached when marginal
revenues are equal to marginal costs, under the constraint of costs and quantity demanded of R:
Max [ = PR  t(R)  wR  f ]!
d
dR
= 0 (6)
where P is wholesale domestic or export price for agricultural products. By taking the ﬁrst-order deriva-
tive:
d
dR
= P   t0   w  R(
dw
dR
) (7)
At this point, it is possible to take in account distance L, which introduces a wedge between price obtained
by farmers and the one paid by traders. In spite of such wedge, positive distance-related costs do not
necessarily imply imperfect competition, if distance-related costs, which are charged to farmers by traders,
are equal to actual distance-related expenditures. In this case, distance-related costs play a similar role
to expenditures for production factors.
When all markets are served, equilibrium condition is reached, if farm gate price net of distance-related
costs is equal for all rival farmers at common borders:
wi + tLij = wj   tLji (8)
where t is distance-related costs for unit of geographical distance, Lij and Lji represent geographical
distance. Since distance is ﬁxed in the short run as well as rival traders are symmetric, the radius of
market area for each trader is symmetric in all n directions, i.e. Lij = Lji. This assumption corresponds
to the one of standard oligopsony theory that the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed in the market in the short run
(Sexton, 1990, 712).
By assumption, technology available to traders exhibits constant returns to scale and t can be taken as
constant and not dependent on R. Solve equation 8 for L:
L =
1
2t
[wi   wj ] (9)
Take ﬁrst-order derivative of 9 with respect to R:
dL
dR
=
1
2t

dwi
dR
 
dwj
dR

(10)
By applying total derivative theorem, (dwdR ) can be written as:
dw
dR
=
@w
@R
+
@w
@L
dL
dR
(11)
Given that ﬁrms are symmetric, in equilibrium wi = wj = w.
Let deﬁne dLdR =  (@w=@R) as a general conjecture and introduce it in equation 11 in order to get the
following result:
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dR
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+
@w
@L
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(12)
By plugging 12 in equation 7 and re-ordering members, it is possible to get:
(P   t0   w) = R
@w
@R
+R
@w
@L

@w
@R
(13)
After some manipulation, previous equation becomes:
(P   t0   w) = R
@w
@R
[1 +
@w
@L
] (14)
which is an equivalent expression to the mark-up pricing policy with respect to the spread between the
wholesale domestic or export price net of marginal distance-related costs and the farm gate price.
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i is the sum of the costs paid by farmers for all production
inputs. Therefore equation 14 can be expanded taking in account all three market levels, although the
market of agricultural products, where the traders and the farmers negotiate for quantity and price, is
the main focus of the study:
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given that 
 
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@L

= L. Under the assumption of f.o.b. pricing, distance-related costs are transferred
from exporters entirely to traders and at least partially to farmers. This price transmission process has
also an impact in terms of production. If traders exploit their market power overcharging distance-related
costs between farm and exporter yard in Kampala to farmers, the latter are willing to supply less coﬀee
for a given price.
The sketched model can be empirically tested in order to assess whether traders exploit their market
power against farmers, based on geographical dispersion of the latter.
Data
The model can be applied to data collected by the Ugandan Statistical Oﬃce and the World Bank team
within the framework of the Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS). This database is integrated
with data coming from Doing business and World Development Indicator database. A panel dataset is
build for the waves 2010-2011 and 2011-2012.
The Agriculture survey of the LSMS concerns agricultural ﬁrms of small and middle size and it is very
valuable for the analysis entailed in this paper. Indeed, coﬀee production is almost entirely dependent
on about 500,000 smallholder farmers, 90 % of whose average farm size ranges from less than 0.5 to
2.5 hectares (MAFAP, 2012a, 5-6) (UCDA, 2015). The database contains information about employed
production factors, i.e. organic and inorganic fertilizers, pesticides, hired and family labour. Such
variables are taken as production inputs xi.
For each factor the quantity purchased and the expenditure are provided. Factors for which a price
cannot be recorded were probably obtained by the farmer for free and then they will be not regarded as
cost in the production function.
Indeed, it is very likely, that not all inputs are bought by farmers on the market, since some of them are
easily obtained by animal dung, which are raised within the farm, or saved from the previous seasons,
like seeds, or exchanged with fellow farmers, like some chemical fertilizer or pesticides. Inability to record
use of such inputs would bias a productivity estimate. Nevertheless, in this work the focus is on cost
structure and price formation and not on productivity. Therefore, as long as farmers have not used or
used, but not purchased such production factors, setting the relative costs to zero seems not be wrong,
since these farmers did not pay out any money for them. Moreover, limited use of agrochemicals, as
documented by the MAFAP, makes not surprising that many farmers report no employment of some of
the mentioned inputs (MAFAP, 2012a, 6).
In a similar way, reported non-hired labour other than family work, provided by neighbours as exchange
or for social reasons, is not going to be taken in account, since it does not contribute to costs.
For each household total costs of hired labour and workdays are available. On the basis of these values,
it is possible to compute an average daily wage for each household across the diﬀerent tasks, gender and
age of the workers (men, women and children). This daily wage is applied for person-workdays for family
members to get total opportunity cost of family labour. For some hired jobs, no workdays are available,
since it was possibly a piecework, to which the average daily wage across all households is assigned. This
information available at the household level enables to take in account regional wage diﬀerentials.
The model takes also in account spatial dimension of the market. In this insight, distance-related costs
play a role in determination of the spread between wholesale domestic or export price and farm gate
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price. The bulk of distance-related costs is due to the trasportation of crops to the outlet market: from
the LSMS database it seems that there are several ways to deliver agricultural products, which lead to
diﬀerent transport costs. Very frequently, dry cherries are collected at the farm gate by kiboko traders
who tour the country by motorcycle or bicycle, which leads to zero or low transport costs for farmers.
Uganda is a landlocked country and its main sea outlet for exports is the port of Mombasa in Kenya.
This aspect represents a major constraint to transaction cost eﬃciency, since transport costs between
Kampala and Mombasa are a burden on the industry and reduce net prices to producers, as Uganda
must remain competitive on world markets in relation to other origins which do not have to bear high
internal costs of this kind (Collinson et al., 2005, 26).
Therefore, transaction costs for Ugandan coﬀee are quite high and made of transport costs between the
farm and the exports' yard in Kampala, costs to export, i.e. for inland transportation between Kampala
and the port of Mombasa and for loading and customs procedures there, which cannot be identiﬁed
separately from each other.
Costs of export can be taken for the year of the LSMS survey from the Doing Business Database. They
are expressed in deﬂated US Dollars for a 20 feet container of a weight of 10 tonnes, it is possible to
obtain the average costs to export per kilo and to convert it to Ugandan Shillings like the other variables
in the LSMS with the PPP Conversion Factor to Market Rate (World Bank, 2014) (World Bank, 2015).
Costs to export are paid by exporters, who are not able to increase export price to take in account such
expenses, because international demand is exogenous. Such costs to export correspond to the variable t in
the equations 5, 6 and they are reasonably variable within a given range. Marginal cost t0 as in equation
7 are constant by assumption and therefore equal to the average costs to export per kilogram given in the
Doing Business Database. It can be assumed that costs to export are transferred by exporters to traders
and by the latter to farmers, based on the experience that historically low prices have squeezed trader
margins to an average of less than 1% of revenue, and grower price levels to close to, or less than, the
cost of production (Collinson et al., 2005, 24). Wholesale export price net of marginal distance-related
costs (P   t0) is equivalent in this sense to the f.o.b. price at the port of Mombasa.
Moreover, distance-related costs between the farm and Kampala are sometimes carried by farmers, some-
times by traders. It is expected that traders who collect the kiboko at the farm gate will pay lower farm
gate price on average (Fafchamps et al., 2005).
Through these operations it is possible to get a database of 1041 households which harvested coﬀee during
the LSMS-ISA survey wave 2010-2011 or 2011-2012 or during both.
Uganda LSMS sampling design warrants representativeness at national and sub-national level, like for
agro-ecological zones (Himelein, 2012). Such sampling algorithm implies that the selected sub-sample
of 1041 households is representative of the population of coﬀee producers, because coﬀee production
is regionally concentrated in few districts (Bundibugyo, parts of Hoima, Kabarole, Mbarara, Bushenyi,
Mubende, Luweero, Mukono, Masaka, Iganga, Jinja, Kalangala, Mpigi and Kampala) which make up a
speciﬁc agro-ecological zone (Mwebaze, 2006).
Empirical Strategy
In the speciﬁc case of the Ugandan coﬀee value chain, domestic price spread can be ignored, because
domestic consumption of coﬀee is negligible. Indeed, from the ICO data it is possible to compute that
domestic consumption was around 4-10% of production in the period 2004-2010 (MAFAP, 2012a, 8)
(ICO, 2015). Therefore, just demand for exports and international price spread are taken in account. In
particular, international demand is taken as exogenous, given that Uganda has a small share of world
coﬀee market.
The following model is run for empirical estimation:
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where t' are distance-related costs between the exporter yard and the border paid by traders (f.o.b. pric-
ing), C are climatic control variables for rainfall estimates, L distance variables, S is the implicit GDP
deﬂator, Pint the international price and r is the disturbance term of the r-th equation of the system.
All other variables have been already deﬁned.
Since it is assumed that technology available to traders exhibits constant returns to scale, marginal and
average distance-related costs are equal and correspond to parameter t'.
C consists of C1, the average 12-month total rainfall (mm) for the time 2001-2010, and C2, 12-month
total rainfall (mm) between January and December for the survey year (2010 or 2011).
L is made of L1, distance from Kampala (km), and L2, remoteness index. L1 is calculated as the ge-
ographic distance between the GPS co-ordinates of the plot and the city of Kampala, while L2 is an
average of distance of the village centre from some facilities of primary importance for the community.
Other control variables in (a) like parcel size were tested, but they are not signiﬁcant. Main reason for
this insigniﬁcance is that much coﬀee is wild and collected by farmers in the forest and on common land.
Variables t', Pint, p
x
i=j , C, w and L are exogenous, because farmers are small and dispersed.
Equation (a) describes microeconomic supply function by farmers, given farm gate price, exogenous
climatic variables and the prevailing market structure. Equations (b) and (c) describe behavioural mi-
croeconomic relations, i.e. optimal substitution strategy between production factors, given exogenous
prices of inputs, and pricing behaviour of farmers, given production function and the prevailing market
structure.
Equation b corresponds to conditional factor demand, equation 4, and consists of two sub-equations b.1
and b.2 for two groups of inputs employed in production process, respectively other inputs (fertilizer,
pesticides, etc.) and labour. Equation (c) corresponds to equation 15 and is the focal point of analysis,
since the wholesale-farmgate price spread assesses market competition degree and revenue distribution
between farmers and traders.
Availability of panel data for the waves 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 increases quality of estimation and
allows to take in account household heterogeneity. If the model is run on the unbalanced panel instead
of the balanced one there will be an eﬃciency increase, therefore no balanced panel is extracted from the
unbalanced one (Baltagi, 2006).
Given the panel structure of the database, all previous equations should be indexed by h (household ID)
and t (year). In order to simplify notation, indexes h and t were not introduced in the equations, but
the two dimensions are taken in account in the estimation.
Microeconomic supply, substitution between production factors and pricing behaviour cannot be regarded
as contemporaneously uncorrelated with each other. Indeed, farmers decide at the same time how much
coﬀee they supply and which inputs they employ in production, given exogenous factor prices, distance-
related costs for unit of geographical distance and farm gate price oﬀered by traders.
The empirical approach is data-driven. In particular, the alternative between SUR, which implies cor-
relation between the equations in the system through the disturbance term, and equation-by-equation
OLS, which means that there is no correlation between such equations, is checked through the likelihood
ratio and Breusch-Pagan test for indipendent errors. Both tests conclude that SUR is the most adeguate
technique. In particular, likelihood ratio test conﬁrms that the null hypothesis, that correlation between
the equations is zero, is easily rejected as shown in table 3.
Breusch-Pagan test for independent errors informs that several correlation coeﬃcients between the resid-
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uals of equations in regarded speciﬁcations are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, as it can be easily seen
in tables 4 and 5. Therefore, to employ a seemingly unrelated equations (SUR) model seems to be fully
justiﬁed. This methodology allows to exploit simultaneity between equations and to increase eﬃciency
(Zellner, 1962).
Due to signiﬁcant correlation of disturbance terms across the diﬀerent equations, an equation-by-equation
OLS produces consistent, but ineﬃcient estimates. Therefore, a GLS- SUR estimation is required because
of its sizeable advantages in terms of eﬃciency over an OLS estimation (Greene, 2008, 254-257). Although
the number of observation units is much larger than the time periods, the system can be successfully
estimated. Indeed, by means of a pre-multiplied matrix, which maps the unrestricted coeﬃcients into
the restriction set by the sketched model, the dimension of the covariance matrix is reduced and its
generalized inverse can be easily computed (Henningsen and Hamann, 2007, 7-8).
There could be endogeneity due to household unobserved heterogeneity in the database. Equation-wise
Hausman test between ﬁxed and random eﬀect estimators produces mixed results as shown in table 6
and does not fully support random eﬀect speciﬁcation. In order to carry out some robustness analysis, a
seemingly unrelated regression - least square dummy variables (SUR-LSDV) and a seemingly unrelated
regression - random eﬀect (SUR-RE) are estimated.
SUR-LSDV accounts for household ﬁxed eﬀects: from results in table 7 it is possible to see that share of
household eﬀects, which are signiﬁcant at least at 5 %, amounts to 75.6 % in equation c, but barely to
23.3% in equation a, to 0.6% in equation b.1 and to 4% in equation b.2.
Both speciﬁcations control for cross-equation correlation through residuals and for household heterogene-
ity, but they are based on diﬀerent assumptions. While SUR-LSDV leaves the relation between household
heterogeneity and covariates in all equations unconstrained as well as allows to estimate and test house-
hold eﬀects, SUR-RE assumes that household heterogeneity and covariates in all equations are orthogonal
and that household heterogeneity behaves like idiosyncratic error term.
From this output it is possible to conclude that entrepreneurial ability of farmers is not very relevant, if
production of green coﬀee is achieved without employment of advanced techniques or by collecting coﬀee
cherries in forests as it is the case in Uganda. On the contrary, given the impact of distance-related
costs on raw agricultural commodity ﬁnal price, distance plays an important role. In this sense, distance
represents a large part of heterogeneity among farm household. Indeed, distance aﬀects very likely farm
gate price in equation c, but not other inputs and labour requirement in equations b.1 and b.2 or supplied
quantity in equation a. Distance inﬂuences supplied quantity only through farm gate price.
Therefore, endogeneity due to household unobserved heterogeneity is very attenuated, since farmers are
small, dispersed and accept the farm gate price oﬀered by traders as well as production of coﬀee in
Uganda does not require very relevant level of ability. In this case, an IV approach will not produce any
signiﬁcant improvement, given that instruments are weak. Moreover, estimated simultaneous equation
model SUR controls for residual minor endogeneity.
While SUR-RE introduces some bias since the orthogonality assumption is not fully supported, this distor-
tion is little since farmer heterogeneity comes mostly from distance and not from farmers' entrepreneurial
ability or other omitted variables. Moreover, SUR-LSDV does not make possible an appropriate iden-
tiﬁcation strategy, because it does not allow to identify separately distance as explanatory variable.
Therefore, a SUR-RE model is also estimated with four diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
System F is the most general version of the model. For robustness analysis, the model is run with ﬁve
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Speciﬁcation 1 is estimated as SUR-LSDV. Speciﬁcations 2, 3, 4, 5 are SUR-RE
models. In particular, in speciﬁcation 1 there are neither L nor C, but household dummy variables are
separately identiﬁed, speciﬁcation 2 is run with L and C. Speciﬁcation 3 is estimated with C, but without
L. Speciﬁcation 4 includes L, but not C. Speciﬁcation 5 does not entail neither C nor L.
Speciﬁcations 1, 2 and 3 are reference approaches for the analysis carried out in this paper. Nevertheless,
speciﬁcations 4 and 5 were also estimated in order to provide a complete picture. Indeed, variables C
and L have many missing data which cannot be otherwise imputed, therefore their introduction results
in a signiﬁcant reduction in sample size. In spite of these shortcomings, asymptotic validity of the
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speciﬁcations 1, 2 and 3 is not undermined and their evaluation can be regarded as main contribution to
the analysis of the topic dealt with in this paper.
Estimation results
The output of all speciﬁcations is reported in tables 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
Goodness-of-ﬁt of speciﬁcation 1 (SUR-LSDV) is high because Mc Elroy R2 is 0.68. Goodness-of-ﬁt of
speciﬁcations 2, 3, 4, 5 (SUR-RE) decreases, but it is still good. In particular, for speciﬁcations 2 and 3
the Mc Elroy R2 is between 0.29 and 0.341.
In all speciﬁcations, all variables in the second equation on other input requirement are not signiﬁcant,
while in the third equation on labour requirement the reciprocal of coﬀee supply is large and highly
signiﬁcant. This result conﬁrms that coﬀee production is a labour-intensive process and that Ugandan
farmers employ small quantity of fertilizers and pesticides. In general, low levels of wages in agricultural
sector fosters a substitution of other inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, etc.) with labour. The most interesting
result is given in the fourth equation. Only in speciﬁcation 5 the marginal eﬀect of labour costs is
signiﬁcant, but still quite small. In all other speciﬁcations any input costs variable is not signiﬁcant.
Regression output is able to conﬁrm also the hypothesis made in the ﬁrst part of the paper, i.e. that
traders exploit their market power overcharging distance-related costs between farm and exporter yard
in Kampala to farmers. In speciﬁcation 2 only D1, distance from Kampala (km), is signiﬁcant and its
magnitude is between 104 and 105 times the value of the coeﬃcients of the factor costs in all speciﬁcations.
As shown in table 12 marginal eﬀect of distance on wholesale-farm gate price spread is between 2.3 and
2.4 Ugandan Shillings (UGX) each kilogram of coﬀee and kilometre of distance. Since wholesale-farm gate
price spread is deﬁned as (Pint   t
0   w) and t' and Pint are exogenous and constant across households,
the mentioned marginal eﬀect implies a reduction of the farm gate price by 2.3 and 2.4 Ugandan Shillings
(UGX) each kilogram of coﬀee for each kilometre far away from Kampala. This value corresponds to an
average decrease between 6% and 7 % of the farm gate price each kilometre, because the average farm
gate price is about 35 UGX each kilogram. This result conﬁrms that traders exploit their market power
overcharging distance-related costs between farm and exporter yard in Kampala to farmers.
The remoteness index is not signiﬁcant in all models. Only actual distance from the export yard in
Kampala and not accessibility to primary community services, e.g. outlet markets, is relevant for coﬀee
revenue distribution.
At the same time, distance from Kampala and the remoteness index are negatively correlated ( =
 0:62), which can give a hint that some primary services in the surroundings of Kampala could be
less accessible to citizens because of city size and higher population density. In spite of that, farmers
could regard as more convenient to own a plot in the surroundings of Kampala, in order to overcome
more easily distance barriers and take on a larger share of coﬀee price.
To have a better insight in the impact of distance on market structure, direct eﬀect of supply on price
and the one of price on supply as well indirect eﬀect of distance on both can be computed and compared.
From results of speciﬁcation 2 relevant partial elasticity parameters are calculated and reported in table
12.
From this computation it is evident that direct eﬀect of supply on price and of price on supply is smaller
than indirect eﬀect of distance on both. In this context, geographical distance determines market structure
and plays a signiﬁcant role for farmers' welfare, since this cash crop provides a large part of income for
over 500,000 households.
Due to this empirical relevance, any policies should take in account such aspect as a barrier to competitive
1Mc Elroy R2 is computed in the following way: R2McE = 1  
^0
^ 1 ^
y0
^ 1y
where 
^ 1 is the estimated
positive deﬁnite contemporaneous covariance matrix, ^ the error vector and y the dependent variable
(McElroy, 1977). This measure of goodness-of-ﬁt should be evaluated with caution, because some doubts
on its reliability were cast (Srivastava and Giles, 1987, 346-351) (Jitthavech, 2010).
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coﬀee market and to poverty reduction of rural areas. On the basis of the output analysed, in the last
part of this work some policy implications are discussed in order to design a strategy to foster a structure
of the agricultural value chain which maximizes social welfare and increase competitiveness of the sector.
Policy implications
Empirical analysis proved the relevance of distance as disincentives to farmers in supplying larger quantity
of coﬀee. Indeed, traders exploit their market power overcharging distance-related costs between farm
and exporter yard in Kampala to farmers.
Farmers are not able to skip traders in the value chain, because a signiﬁcant information asymmetry is
prevailing in the market. In particular, traders exploit farmers' ignorance because the latter are small
and dispersed as well as they lack information about current market prices because of villages remoteness
and poor communications with marketplaces (Courtois and Subervie, 2015). Moreover, farmers are not
aware of actual distance-related costs faced by traders, which carry larger quantities of coﬀee than single
smallholder farmers and spread ﬁxed costs over a larger amount of crop.
The market share in world coﬀee export of Uganda is quite small, therefore an increase in coﬀee supply
could have a positive impact on the available income of households without worsening the international
coﬀee price.
This paper shows that costs increase more quickly because of bottlenecks in transportation infrastructure
than of expenditures for production factors.
Improvement of transportation network can lead to larger production and higher eﬃciency of the coﬀee
value chain, by reducing traders' market power. Indeed, there are no other major constraint in increasing
coﬀee supply by farmers (Gollin and Rogerson, 2010) (Ranganathan and Foster, 2012). Labour is indeed
largely available in a country with fast-growing and young population (World Bank, 2014). Other fac-
tors like small parcel size do not seem to represent a signiﬁcant barrier to increase in supply, as long as
competition for wild coﬀee or common land does not become too ﬁerce. This perspective is not probably
immediate, because population density in Uganda is not very high (World Bank, 2014).
Geographical distance is obviously a physical constraint which cannot be easily overcome. Proposals to
provide incentives to farmers to move closer to Kampala cannot be regarded as a reasonable policy recom-
mendation. Indeed, increasing agglomeration could have large negative side-eﬀects and worsen even more
the quality of accessibility to primary services in the area of Kampala and increases household poverty.
Instead, improvement of transport quality could have very positive side-eﬀects, providing to businesses
in other sectors incentives to delocalize production outside the central region and reduce the negative
impact of congestion in the area of Kampala. This policy could indirectly foster a more balanced regional
development.
Conclusions
This study was able to deal with revenue distribution along the Ugandan coﬀee value chain and to
prove that spatial dispersion of farmers is a very important factor in the relationship between farmers
and traders, which provides market power to the latter. The analysis gave hints that there is a large
room for local oligopsony by traders, based on high delivery costs. In particular, traders exploit their
market power overcharging distance-related costs between farm and exporter yard in Kampala to farmers.
Distance-related costs consists of all expenditures for the services provided by traders to farmers, which
are signiﬁcantly correlated with distance: the main of which is trasportation of crops to the exporter
yard.
Marginal eﬀect of distance on wholesale-farm gate price spread is between 2.3 and 2.4 Ugandan Shillings
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(UGX) each kilogram of coﬀee and kilometre of distance. This value corresponds to an average decrease
between 6% and 7% of the farm gate price each kilometre, because the average farm gate price is about
35 UGX each kilogram. From the computation entailed in this paper it is evident that direct eﬀect of
supply on price and of price on supply is smaller than indirect eﬀect of distance on both.
In this context, the exploitation of the farmer geographical dispersion by the traders determines an
oligopsonistic coﬀee market structure and plays a signiﬁcant role for farmer welfare, since this cash crop
provides a large part of income for over 500,000 households.
This study comes to divergent conclusions with respect to the ones in Sitko and Jayne (2014) and
Montalbano et al. (2017), where evidence is provided that intermediaries are eﬃcient and give to the
smallholder farmers better marketing possibilities.
This discrepancy is due to the fact that Sitko and Jayne (2014) and Montalbano et al. (2017) analyse the
maize market, while this study evaluates the coﬀee market. While maize is one of the most important
staple crop and is harvested in all districts in Uganda, coﬀee is a cash crop, it is not consumed at all
domestically and it can be grown only in few speciﬁc regions (MAFAP, 2012a, 8) (ICO, 2015) (Haggblade
and Dewina, 2010).
The above mentioned diﬀerence implies that smallholder farmers opt for the sale of the harvested maize
to traders only if these intermediaries are eﬃcient and pay the right price to them, while coﬀee producers
are not able to skip traders in the value chain.
Indeed, farm households are aware of the market price of maize, because this crop is largely traded and
consumed in Uganda (Haggblade and Dewina, 2010). In addition, smallholder farmers can easily skip
the traders, because they can sell their harvest in their neighbourhood to other farmers, who lost the
harvest, or to local non-farm households.
Instead, coﬀee cannot be sold in the farmers' neighbourhood, because it is not domestically consumed in
Uganda. The only one way to obtain some revenues from the coﬀee production is to bring the harvest
to the exporter yard in Kampala. Farmers can transport the harvest by themselves to Kampala or they
can sell it to the traders (Haggblade and Dewina, 2010).
Several factors make impossibile for smallholder farmers to sell directly the crop to the exporters and
allow traders to overcharge distance-related costs to the producers: the limited storage possibilities in the
farm households, regulatory and technical barriers as well as information asymmetry (MAFAP, 2012a)
(Svensson and Yanagizawa, 2009).
Insuﬃcient storage space is much more relevant for coﬀee than for maize: while maize can be sold at
any time after the harvest to the neighbours, coﬀee producers need to wait for the time when traders are
willing to purchase the harvest, often long after the harvest, when the beans are sun-dried.
Furthermore, coﬀee beans can be exported only if they comply with a set of quality requirements, sanitary
and phytosanitary standards: this constraint prevents smallholder farmers to deliver harvest directly to
the exporters. Instead, the requirements for the sale of maize, in particular if it is sold informally or
locally, are far lower.
Moreover, farmers, who are small and dispersed, are not aware about current coﬀee market prices because
of villages remoteness and poor communications with marketplaces and because this crop is not traded
locally at all (Courtois and Subervie, 2015). Farmers are also not aware of actual distance-related costs
faced by traders, which carry larger quantities of coﬀee than single smallholder farmers and spread ﬁxed
costs over a larger amount of crop (Svensson and Yanagizawa, 2009) (Ferris et al., 2008).
This study conﬁrms also that coﬀee production is a labour-intensive process and that Ugandan farmers
employ small quantity of fertilizers and pesticides. In general, low levels of wages in agricultural sector
fosters a substitution of other inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, etc.) with labour. A set of adequate policies
to address the exploitation of market power by traders would consist of investment in quality of trans-
portation and roads in order to reduce delivery time and costs. This strategy would shrink the ability of
traders to exploit information asymmetry against farmers and to overcharge distance-related costs to the
latter.
Such approach is able to produce further positive side-eﬀects and foster de-localization of other businesses
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outside the central region of Kampala and lower negative eﬀects of congestion around Kampala. More-
over, an increase in coﬀee supply could also have a positive impact on the available income of households
without worsening the international coﬀee price, since the market share in world coﬀee export of Uganda
is quite small.
Since there are many open questions and a strong interest for the analysed ﬁeld, the author is keen to
expand this analysis in future research works. For instance, it would be stimulating to disentangle the
complex trading relations between Kiboko and FAQ traders and to ﬁgure out how the complexity of the
value chain impacts sector eﬃciency.
An interesting research purpose would be also to model the optimal area of local oligopsony for traders
and which eﬀect speciﬁc policies can have on the market structure. Finally, interaction between interna-
tional coﬀee market and behaviour of domestic actors was not investigated. This issue could be also an
another stimulating avenue for further research.
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Mathematical annex
In this annex an alternative derivation of spatial equilibrium analysis is given, which makes clear the
similarity of the model developed in this paper with (Sexton, 1990)'s approach. Equation 13 can be also
expressed in form of elasticity.
Given the general conjecture dLdR =  (@w=@R) employed in the analysis, dividing both sides of equation
15 by w as well as multiplying and dividing the second addend of the right-hand side for L, equation 13
becomes:
P   t0   w
w
=
R
w
@w
@R
+
@w
@L
dL
dR
R
w
L
L
Then, it is possible to get relative wholesale-farm gate price spread in terms of elasticity:
P   t0   w
w
= w;R + w;l  L;R
because relative total and partial derivatives can be expressed in terms of elasticity by means of total
derivative theorem:
w;R = w;R + w;l  L;R
In particular, w;l is partial elasticity of farm gate price to geographical distance and depends on distance-
related costs under the assumption of f.o.b. pricing. These costs are transferred from exporters entirely
to traders and at least partially to farmers.
w;R is inverse elasticity of supply of agricultural products. The L;R =
 
dL
dR
R
L

represents the market area
competition and it is analogue to the conjectural variation of the standard oligopoly/oligopsony theory
(Sexton, 1990, 711). In equation 11 it seems to be more natural to regard
 
dR
dL

, which by symmetry of
derivatives, is equivalent to
 
dL
dR

.
The latter point can be made clearer by applying the implicit function theorem. It can be indeed showed
that
 
dR
dL

is the negative of the ratio between marginal eﬀect of market area on farm gate price and
marginal eﬀect of supply of agricultural product on farm gate price:

dR
dL

=  
dw=dL
dw=dR
Indeed, it is possible to resolve the equation for
 
dw
dR

and replace the result in equation 7. Then, total
derivative theorem is applied to
 
dw
dL

and it is possible to get the same equation 14. 
dR
dL

describes the perception by traders how a pure change in market area is going to aﬀect supply by
farmers, net of the eﬀect that a change of farm gate price will have on the supply of agricultural products
by farmers. If traders exploit their market power overcharging distance-related costs between farm and
exporter yard in Kampala to farmers, the latter are willing to supply less coﬀee for a given price. The
parameter
 
dR
dL

corresponds to the conjectural variation of the standard oligopsony theory (Sexton, 1990,
711).
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Table 1: Acronyms and Abbreviations
Symbol Meaning
UCDA Uganda Coﬀee Development Authority
UGX Ugandan Shilling
WDI World development Indicators (World Bank)
ICO International Coﬀee Organisation
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
FGLS Feasible Generalized Least Square
SUR Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
MAFAP-FAO Monitoring and Analysing Food and Agricultural Policies - Food
and Agriculture Organization
FAQ Fair Average Quality (Coﬀee)
f.o.b. Free On Board
LSMS-ISA Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on
Agriculture
f Fixed costs in the farmers production function
bi Technological Conversion Factor between inputs xi and output R
(Leontief production function)
 Conjectural Variation
w;R Total Elasticity of farm gate price to coﬀee supply
w;R Partial Elasticity of farm gate price to coﬀee supply
w;l Partial Elasticity of farm gate price to market area radius
L;R Total Elasticity of market area radius to coﬀee supply
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Table 2: Variables
Symbol Meaning Level Source Notes
L1 Distance between the
household and
Kampala (GPS
co-ordinates)
Household LSMS
(Uganda)
Speciﬁcation of L
(Market Area Radius)
L2 Avg. distance
between village center
and some facilities of
primary importance
Community LSMS
(Uganda)
Speciﬁcation of L
(Market Area Radius):
Remoteness Index
R Quantity of coﬀee
sold
Household LSMS
(Uganda)
w Farm gate price
(UGX)
Household LSMS
(Uganda)
Ratio between Value of
sale and Quantity of cof-
fee sold
xi Quantity of i-th input
(conditional factor
demand)
Household LSMS
(Uganda)
Labour; Other inputs
(Pesticides, Organic
and inorganic
Fertilizers)
pxi=j Input Costs Household LSMS
(Uganda)
Labour; Other inputs
(Pesticides, Organic
and inorganic
Fertilizers)
Pint International coﬀee
price
International ICO ICO composite
indicator price
S World GDP deﬂator International WDI
(World
Bank)
Average of the GDP de-
ﬂator of the consumer
countries
t Cost to export Country Doing
Busines
(World
Bank)
Converted in UGX per
kilogram of coﬀee
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Table 3: Likelihood ratio test
F =
8>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
lnRi = ln a+  ln
wi
S

+ C + 1 (a)
xi=Ri = bi;i +
X
bi;j

pxj
pxi
1=2
+ bi=Ri + 2 (b)
(Pint   t
0
  wi) =
P
i bip
x
i +
P
i
P
j bi;j(p
x
i p
x
j )
1=2Ri

[1 + int (@wi=@L)int]
 1
+ L+ 3(c)
H0: Residuals of the m equations are uncorrelated.
Model Degree of
freedom
(model)
LR test Degree of
freedom
(statistic)
p-value
OLS (restricted)
(H0 valid)
17
SUR (not restricted)
(H0 not valid)
26 34. 33 9 7.8e-05 ***
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
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Table 4: Residuals Correlation (Speciﬁcations 1, 2, 3)
Speciﬁcation 1
Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Eq. a 1.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.62***
Eq. b.1 -0.02 1.00 0.04 -0.06*
Eq. b.2 0.05 0.04 1.00 -0.32***
Eq. c -0.62*** -0.06* -0.32*** 1.00
Speciﬁcation 2
Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Eq. a 1.00 -0.02 -0.42*** -0.21***
Eq. b.1 -0.02 1.00 0.04 0.00
Eq. b.2 -0.42*** 0.04 1.00 -0.04
Eq. c -0.21*** 0.00 -0.04 1.00
Speciﬁcation 3
Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Eq. a 1.00 -0.02 -0.37*** -0.17***
Eq. b.1 -0.02 1.00 0.04 -0.03
Eq. b.2 -0.37*** 0.04 1.00 -0.30***
Eq. c -0.17*** -0.03 -0.30*** 1.00
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
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Table 5: Residuals Correlation (Speciﬁcations 4, 5)
Speciﬁcation 4
Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Eq. a 1.00 -0.03 -0.10** -0.17***
Eq. b.1 -0.03 1.00 0.04 0.01
Eq. b.2 -0.10** 0.04 1.00 0.04
Eq. c -0.17*** 0.01 -0.04 1.00
Speciﬁcation 5
Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Eq. a 1.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.44***
Eq. b.1 -0.02 1.00 0.04 -0.03
Eq. b.2 0.03 0.04 1.00 -0.33***
Eq. c -0.44*** -0.03 -0.33*** 1.00
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
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Table 6: Equation-wise Hausman test
F =
8>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>:
lnRi = ln a+  ln
wi
S

+ C + 1 (a)
xi=Ri = bi;i +
X
bi;j

pxj
pxi
1=2
+ bi=Ri + 2 (b)
(Pint   t
0
  wi) =
P
i bip
x
i +
P
i
P
j bi;j(p
x
i p
x
j )
1=2Ri

[1 + int (@wi=@L)int]
 1
+ L+ 3 (c)
H0: Random eﬀect estimator is consistent
(individual heterogeneity and covariates are uncorrelated)
Model 2 test Degree of
freedom
p-value
Eq. a 0.035 1 0.85
Eq. b.1 1.19 2 0.55
Eq. b.2 27.94 2 8.6e-07***
Eq. c 8.53 3 0.036*
Note: Equation b consists of two sub-equations b.1 and b.2 for two groups of inputs
employed in production process, respectively other inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, etc.) and
labour.
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
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Table 7: Speciﬁcation 1 (SUR-LSDV)
Dependent Variables Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Coﬀee Supply
(log)
Other inputs
requirement
Labour
requirement
Farmgate-
wholesale price
spread
Deﬂated farm gate Price (log) 0:52
(0:038)
Ratio input prices (labour/other inputs)  0:0074
(0:014)
(1/Coﬀee Supply) 5:08 354
(6:21) (48:9)
Ratio input prices (other inputs/labour) 21
(104:7)
Labour Costs 0:00035
(0:00019)
Costs (other inputs)  0:0009
(0:0006)
Labour/other inputs costs (interaction)  0:00002
(0:000013)
Share of signiﬁcant household dummy variables (%)
Signiﬁcance level (sf ) Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
sf  0:1% 0.8 0.45 2.4 71.6
0:1% < sf  1% 9.8 0.15 0.2 3
1% < sf  5% 12.7  1.4 1
5% < sf  10% 10.9  1 23.95
sf > 10% 65.8 99.4 95 0.45
Mc Elroy R2 (system-related) 0.68
Num. obs. (each equation) 1041 1041 1041 1041
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05 (Standard error in brackets)
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Table 8: Speciﬁcation 2 (SUR-RE)
Dependent Variables Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Coﬀee supply
(log)
Other inputs
requirement
Labour
requirement
Farmgate-
wholesale price
spread
Intercept 5:2 4:7 59:1 5938:3
(4:3) (3:0) (24:4) (189:1)
Deﬂated farm gate Price 0:3
(0:0326)
Avg 12-month total rainfall (2001-2010)  2:8
(1:1)
12-month total rainfall (2010) 2:5
(1:1)
Ratio input prices (labour/other inputs)  0:0034
(0:008)
(1/Coﬀee Supply)  0:3 348:1
(4:6) (39:3)
Ratio input prices (other inputs/labour) 40:9
(52:1)
Labour Costs 0:00001
(0:00005)
Costs (other inputs)  0:00007
(0:00014)
Labour/other inputs (interaction) 0:00007
(0:000003)
Distance from Kampala 2:3
(0:5)
Remoteness Index 5:3
(3:5)
Mc Elroy R2 (system-related) 0.34
Num. obs. (each equation) 544 1041 1041 544
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05 (Standard error in brackets)
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Table 9: Speciﬁcation 3 (SUR-RE)
Dependent Variables Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Coﬀee Supply
(log)
Other inputs
requirement
Labour
requirement
Farmgate-
wholesale price
spread
Intercept 6:7 4:3 21:3 8518:5
(4:4) (3:0) (24:2) (71:5)
Deﬂated farm gate Price 0:3
(0:03)
Avg 12-month total rainfall (2001-2010)  2:5
(1:1)
12-month total rainfall (2010) 1:9
(1:1)
Ratio input prices (labour/other inputs)  0:004
(0:008)
(1/Coﬀee Supply) 1:0 489:1
(4:6) (38:1)
Ratio input prices (other inputs/labour) 33:5
(51:8)
Labour Costs 0:00018
(0:00009)
Costs (other inputs)  0:00033
(0:00026)
Labour/other inputs (interaction)  0:00001
(0:00001)
Mc Elroy R2 (system-related) 0.29
Num. obs. (each equation) 544 1041 1041 1041
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05 (Standard error in brackets)
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Table 10: Speciﬁcation 4 (SUR-RE)
Dependent Variables Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Coﬀee Supply
(log)
Other inputs
requirement
Labour
requirement
Farmgate-
wholesale price
spread
Intercept 1:6 5:1 62:0 6002:8
(0:1) (3:0) (25:1) (190:8)
Deﬂated farm gate Price (log) 0:6
(0:03)
Ratio input prices (labour/other inputs)  0:003
(0:008)
(1/Coﬀee Supply)  1:1 358:2
(4:6) (41:3)
Ratio input prices (other inputs/labour) 48:0
(54:8)
Labour Costs 0:000006
(0:00005)
Costs (other inputs)  0:00006
(0:0001)
Labour/other inputs (interaction) 0:0000002
(0:000003)
Distance from Kampala 2:4
(0:5)
Remoteness Index 4:6
(3:5)
Mc Elroy R2 (system-related) 0.33
Num. obs. (each equation) 1041 1041 1041 544
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05 (Standard error in brackets)
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Table 11: Speciﬁcation 5 (SUR-RE)
Dependent Variables Eq. a Eq. b.1 Eq. b.2 Eq. c
Coﬀee Supply
(log)
Other inputs
requirement
Labour
requirement
Farmgate-
wholesale price
spread
Intercept 1:7 4:6  10:5 8493:5
(0:1) (2:1) (19:4) (74:0)
Deﬂated farm gate Price (log) 0:6
(0:02)
Ratio input prices (labour/other inputs)  0:004
(0:006)
(1/Coﬀee Supply) 0:1 553:2
(3:3) (31:0)
Ratio input prices (other inputs/labour) 40:7
(42:9)
Labour Costs 0:00025
(0:00009)
Costs (other inputs)  0:00041
(0:00024)
Labour/other inputs costs (interaction)  0:00001
(0:00001)
Mc Elroy R2 (system-related) 0.19
Num. obs. (each equation) 1041 1041 1041 1041
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05 (Standard error in brackets)
35
Table 12: Estimated elasticities [based on speciﬁcation 2 (SUR-RE)]
Partial elasticity
of farm gate price to distance
 
@w
@L
L
w

-11
Partial elasticity
of coﬀee supply to distance
 
@R
@L
L
R

-3.72
Partial elasticity
of farm gate price to coﬀee supply
 
@w
@R
R
w

3.3
Partial elasticity
of coﬀee supply to farm gate price
 
@R
@w
w
R

0.3
Marginal eﬀect of distance
on wholesale-farm gate price spread
(Eq. c)
Average
farm gate price
Partial price elasticity
of wholesale-farm gate
price spread to distance
2.3 - 2.4 UGX each Kg/Km 35 UGX each Kg 6% - 7%
Note: Elasticity parameters are evaluated at the mean of each variable
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Spatial price transmission and trade policies: new evidence 
from selected sub-Saharan African countries and crops 
with high frequency data 
Lodovico Muratori
*
 and Susanne Fricke
†
 
 
This paper extends the existing literature on spatial price transmission in agricultural markets by 
estimating the impact of tariff and non-tariff trade policies using monthly data. 
The study assesses the conjunctural impact of price insulating policies on spatial price transmission of 
maize, rice and wheat in Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania in the period 2005-2015. We separately 
estimate the impact of trade policies within two regimes of behaviour of the domestic price series: 
while in the first regime the trend of domestic prices is increasing, the second regime reveals a 
decreasing trend. Our findings show that trade policies play a significant role both in case of 
increasing and in case of decreasing domestic prices;  their relevance, however, being much larger if 
prices are increasing. The results show that trade policies were able to insulate the countries from the 
price shocks on international markets during the food price spike crisis. However, although the impact 
of these instruments is proved to be relevant as a counter-cyclical measure during the food price spike 
crisis, these policies cannot be regarded as structural solutions.  
While monthly price series are provided in GIEWS, we obtained monthly ad-valorem equivalent tariff 
rates by a time disaggregation of the yearly effectively applied weighted average tariff rate from the 
WITS (World Bank Integrated Trade Solutions)/UNCTAD-TRAINS (Trade Analysis Information 
System) database through the monthly trade policies from the FAO-FADPA. 
Moreover, employing monthly data allows for a more precise assessment of short-lived movements in 
the analysed series, which could disappear because of a time aggregation bias at lower yearly 
frequencies. This facilitates a better identification of insulation policies.  By presenting high frequency 
analyses and techniques that are able to detect non-linearities in the Data Generating Process (DGP), 
this study  provides results which differ from what is stated in the standard literature (Anderson and 
Nelgen, 2012a) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012b) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012c). 
 
Keywords: spatial price transmission, staple crops, trade barriers, food price spikes 
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Introduction  
 
The nature of international price transmission of agricultural commodities and the assessment 
of its determinants became a key issue in the course of the food crisis in 2007/2008 when 
food importing countries suffered from a significant increase in poverty due to food price 
shocks (Yang et al., 2015). As they predominantly feature economies based on agriculture, 
questions concerning the nature and characteristics of the transmission of prices and price 
information for agricultural products are especially crucial for sub-Saharan African countries. 
Anderson and Nelgen (2012b), Anderson and Nelgen (2012c) and Yang et al. (2015) provide 
evidence that during the food price spike crisis several countries increased their taxes on 
agricultural exports, reduced import duties and introduced import subsidies. In case of upward 
price spikes, the most commonly stated objective of these measures was to safeguard the 
domestic food security of consumers (Anderson, Ivanic and Martin, 2014, 311). Governments 
also expressed the intention to reduce inflationary or balance-of-payments pressures resulting 
from an upward price spike (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012b) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012c). 
 
The present study is meant to assess the conjunctural impact of price insulating policies on 
spatial price transmission of maize, rice and wheat in Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania in the 
period 2005-2015. In particular, our research question was whether price insulating policies 
were able to insulate the country from shocks on the international markets during the food 
price spike crisis. The three countries we selected are highly dependent on cereal imports, 
with maize, rice and wheat taking up a considerable share of their overall import of 
agricultural products. Moreover, since, within the last years, all three countries introduced 
tariff and non-tariff barriers and especially in the course of the food crisis 2007/2009, they 
appeared to be especially suitable for our analysis. 
This paper is meant to improve the approach developed by Anderson and Nelgen (2012b) and 
Anderson and Nelgen (2012c) by estimating the impact of tariff and non-tariff trade policies 
on spatial price transmission in the agricultural markets not on a yearly basis, but with the 
help of monthly data. The use of monthly data allows for a more precise assessment of short-
lived movements within the analysed series. These could, had we used a lower, i.e. yearly, 
frequency, have otherwise disappeared. 
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Since the Gauss-Markov conditions are not fully met by the time series we wanted to analyse, 
we further used some empirical methodologies which introduce some control factors for these 
violations: fractional integration, non-linear regime shifting in the time series as well as 
country time-invariant effects in the panel analysis. Thus the empirical strategy used provides 
a consistent and efficient estimation of the coefficients of the price insulating policies. 
The indicator of trade policies covers a set of trade policies as large as the one included in the 
nominal rate of assistance introduced by Anderson and Nelgen (2012a), Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) and Anderson et al. (2008). 
Trade policies are defined as a set of tariffs, para-tariff and non-tariff equivalent measures 
which governments introduce in order to influence the trade volume and relative prices in 
their respective countries. 
The determination of the tariff rate is based on the tariff schedule and is extended to include 
the specificities of trade policies of each country, in order to take into account preferential 
trade agreements, border and behind-the-border trade measures.  
In addition, the indicator we use covers the same set of trade policies included in the nominal 
rate of assistance introduced by Anderson and Nelgen (2012a), Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008) and Anderson et al. (2008), like specific, ad-valorem, mixed tariffs, non-tariff barriers, 
standards and behind-the-border measures. 
In particular, non-tariff barriers comprise technical measures such as sanitary or 
environmental protection activities as well as other measures traditionally used as instruments 
of commercial policy, e.g. quotas, price control, exports restrictions or contingent trade 
protective measures, as well as further behind-the-border measures, such as competition, 
trade-related investment measures, government procurement or distribution restrictions 
(UNCTAD, 2015). 
 
Based on the prevalence of such trade policies with regard to agricultural products, 
Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania were selected as country samples. In the last few years, these 
three countries enforced several trade-related policy acts to mitigate the adverse effects of the 
food crisis 2007-2009. In particular, during the period of the analysis, Kenya changed the 
tariff rates on wheat and maize several times and introduced some tariff-rate and import 
quotas. Similarly, Cameroon and Tanzania adjusted the import duties on rice and wheat (FAO, 
2016b). Moreover, all three countries are important regional trade hubs and influence 
neighbouring countries through their policy-making. 
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Key aspects of this study concern the questions of how price shocks are transmitted and how 
trade policies affect the pass-through of price information. In this paper, the reference 
framework which is used to answer the research question consists of the “Law of One Price” 
and the Enke-Samuelson-Takayama-Judge spatial equilibrium models (Enke, 1951) 
(Samuelson, 1952) (Takayama and Judge, 1972). In this study, the results based on a time 
series approach are compared with the ones derived from the panel analysis. ARFIMA 
models, which do not take into account non-linearities in the DGP and time-invariant country 
heterogeneity, bias the effect of trade policies on spatial price transmission and their ability to 
offset the impact coming from the price shocks on the international markets. 
Instead, both Markov switching and panel models provide evidence that trade policies play an 
important role in all market situations, but the presence of non-linearities in the DGP and 
time-invariant country heterogeneity affects the price transmission mechanism. 
 
Overall, in this study it was possible to separately estimate the impact of trade policies within 
the two regimes of behaviour of the domestic price series: in the first regime the trend of 
domestic prices is increasing, in the second one it decreases. This highlights that trade policies 
play a role both in case of increasing and decreasing domestic prices. Nevertheless, price 
insulation policies are more relevant if prices are increasing, as the magnitude and the 
significance of the coefficients are larger within the regime of increasing trends of domestic 
prices. 
We found that trade policies were indeed able to insulate the country from the price shocks on 
the international markets during the food price spike crisis, i.e. in times when insulation was 
needed most. It is noteworthy however, that, although the impact of these instruments could 
be proven to be relevant as counter-cyclical measures during the food price spike crisis, these 
policies cannot be regarded as structural solutions. 
1. Literature review  
 
While the question whether governments are able to effectively insulate the domestic 
economy from international price shocks has long been a matter of research, the practical 
relevance of the study of price transmission in agricultural markets again became evident in 
the course of the food crisis 2007/2008, when several countries introduced policy 
interventions in order to insulate themselves from price spikes at the international level. In the 
following, we briefly summarize the literature on price transmission and outline its specific 
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relevance for agricultural markets. In general, the body of literature provides much 
information on the role of price insulating policies for agricultural markets (Johnson, 1975) 
(Lasco et al, 2008) (Ivanic and Will, 2008) (Bouët and Debucquet, 2010) (Timmer, 2010) 
(Anderson and Nelgen, 2012a) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012b) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012c) 
(Will and Anderson, 2012) (Chavas et al., 2014) (Do et al., 2014) (Gouel, 2014) (Gouel and 
Jean, 2015) (Jacoby, 2016). 
1.1. Price transmission background 
 
A complete, symmetric and quick transmission of prices is of high importance for the efficient 
allocation of resources. In this study, we focus on spatial price transmission, which is part of 
the horizontal price transmission and refers to cross-market price transmission which 
concerns the linkages between international and domestic prices and vice versa
3
 (Esposti and 
Listorti, 2013). Spatial price transmission is an indicator for the integration of a country into 
the world market. The theoretical basis for spatial price transmission is the theory of spatial 
arbitrage. Assessment of the degree of price transmission and hence of the pass-through of 
price information relates to the theoretical hypotheses of the so-called law of one price and 
standard spatial price determination models (Enke, 1951) (Samuelson, 1952) (Takayama and 
Judge, 1972). Such approaches postulate that price transmission is complete with equilibrium 
prices of a commodity sold on competitive foreign and domestic markets differing only by 
transaction costs (when converted to a common currency). These models predict that changes 
in supply and demand conditions in one market will affect trade and therefore prices in other 
markets as equilibrium is restored through spatial arbitrage. 
The absence of market integration or of complete pass-through of price changes from one 
market to another has important implications for economic welfare. Incomplete price 
transmission results in a reduction in price information available to economic agents and 
consequently may lead to decisions that contribute to inefficient outcomes. With the help of a 
concise study on price transmission, it is possible to analyse these characteristics 
(Rapsomanikis and Conforti, 2006). 
In this regard, agricultural markets and the question of price pass-through are of particular 
importance. Since agricultural commodities are considered to possess high poverty leverage, 
                                                 
3
 Another level of price transmission is vertical price transmission, which refers to the transmission of prices 
from consumers, triggered by demand shocks, to producers and vice versa. It describes price transmissions along 
a value chain (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2014). Instead, a second part of horizontal price transmission is cross-
commodity price transmission which refers to spillovers between prices of different commodities observed at the 
same position in the value chain (Esposti and Listorti, 2013). 
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the study of price transmission in the agricultural markets is of high relevance for the 
reduction of poverty in developing countries (Mosley and Suleiman, 2007). 
Indeed, the inability of policy-makers to insulate the domestic economy from international 
price shocks could render other political acts aimed at market development and poverty 
reduction ineffective. 
The wide welfare implications of price shocks of agricultural products for producers and 
consumers in developing countries became further evident in the course of the international 
food crisis 2007/2008, when agricultural markets were shocked by an increased volatility with 
a significant impact on the economies and national welfare of (developing) countries. In the 
course of the crisis, the question of what determines the international transmission of 
agricultural and food prices again became a key issue. Moreover, the increased number of 
policy interventions (so called price-insulating policies) in the course of the food crisis 
spurred the question of the influence of domestic policies on price transmission. 
1.2. Impact of monetary policy and exchange rates on agricultural prices 
The trend of the agricultural prices is also determined by monetary policy decisions and the 
exchange rate movements.  
The relationship between monetary policy and real agriculture prices was analysed by the 
branch of research which addresses the non-neutral effects of monetary policy.  
Such field was especially vivid in the 1970s: the link between monetary policy and 
agricultural prices was stressed by Schuh (1974), who applied a partial equilibrium model to 
analyse the US farming sector between the 1950s and the beginning of the 1970s. In 
particular, his research conclusions are different for small or large exporting countries because 
small countries face fixed world prices while large countries can indeed influence their terms-
of-trade. 
For a small exporting country, an overvalued exchange rate reduces the world price in 
domestic currency proportionately. In turn, lower prices imply an increase in the demand of 
crops and a reduction in total supply because mobile resources are moving away from the 
industry. 
The final result for a small exporting country is that both export quantity and value are shifted 
to the domestic economy: the dependence of the agricultural sector from the domestic market 
grows stronger, the magnitude and speed of this change being determined by each crop’s own 
price elasticity and the rate of the downwards shift of the supply curve (Orden, 2002) (Schuh, 
1974, 2-3). 
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In the case of a large country, on the other hand, domestic and foreign prices diverge by the 
extent of overvaluation, while the elasticities of demand and supply of both trading partners 
affect the degree to which domestic prices are going to sink and foreign prices are going to 
soar (Orden, 2002) (Schuh, 1974, 2-3). 
Depreciation raises inflation, increases export and reduces import quantities. Therefore, it has 
a larger impact on export than on import because the price and quantity effect has a 
reinforcing effect in the former case, while they work against each other in the latter (Orden, 
2002, 308). 
Another branch of the literature analyses how changes in exchange rates of a currency affect 
the domestic price of imported goods and services as well as the general domestic price level 
and inflation rate. The pass-through of exchange rate movements to domestic prices is higher 
in industries with homogeneous goods, such as raw materials, among which are also 
agricultural goods (Bouakez and Rebei, 2008) (Ca’Zorzi et al., 2007). For the purpose of our 
study, the relevance of exchange rate pass-through underlines the need to control for 
movements of the exchange rate when assessing the impact of policies on domestic 
agricultural prices.  
 
 
1.3. Determinants of price transmission – policy-related trade costs  
 
One major determinant of price transmission are trade costs, functioning as a wedge between 
domestic and international prices. Trade costs themselves are mainly driven by government 
policies which can thus affect spatial price transmission. Especially border and domestic 
policies (e.g. export subsidies, non-tariff barriers, quotas and prohibitive tariffs) can have a 
strong impact on the degree of spatial price transmission .The issue of policy-related trade 
costs is very relevant for African countries, where very high policy-related trade costs can 
reduce the long run pass-through of price information and increase the costs for importing and 
exporting. However, there has been some discussion about the exact nature of the relationship 
between specific policy measures and price transmission. In this field, research is still very 
limited and focuses mostly on advanced economies. 
So far, research was not able to reach a common empirical stance towards the effect of policy 
intervention on agricultural markets on the extent of price transmission from world prices to 
domestic prices. 
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Looking at this empirical relation for 58 countries between 1968 and 1978, Mundlak and 
Larson (1992) find that domestic policies indeed affect prices, but that variations in world 
prices remain the dominant component in the variations of domestic prices. Barassi and 
Ghoshray (2007) stress that the reform of the European Common Agricultural Policy in 1992 
increased the integration between the European and US wheat market. Thompson et al. (2002) 
stress the point that policy-liberalizing reforms contribute to a more rapid convergence of 
domestic and international prices. 
Yang et al. (2015) scrutinize a worldwide sample of monthly food price indices from 147 
countries: they find that the main determinants of the pass-through of food prices are the level 
of income and policy-related trade costs. While policy-related trade costs have a significantly 
negative impact, trade costs related to geography and infrastructure do not affect price 
transmission. For the rice market in Bangladesh, Goletti et al. (1995) conclude that especially 
trade-related food grain policies had a significant effect on price co-movements and price 
transmission. Generally, their impact can be either positive or negative. While seasonalities 
may be smoothed out by policies for price adjustment, resulting in stronger co-movements of 
prices, these policies meant to stabilize can also become unpredictable and indeed impede the 
transmission of prices.  
 
1.4. Price insulating policy interventions on agricultural markets  
 
In the field of analysing the processes related to the pass-through of price information and the 
determinants of price transmission, one major strand of literature focuses on the effects of 
policies which aim at insulating countries from international price shocks.  
Price insulating policies are all those trade policies which can create a wedge between 
international and domestic prices and can be employed to insulate the domestic economies 
from price shocks. The particular aim which is pursued by policy-makers defines the set of 
price insulating policies. According to statements of most policy-makers, the objective of their 
actions is to reduce price transmission as well as to ensure social welfare and minimize the 
risk of losses for significant groups if international prices are determined as a result of 
imperfections within the world market or irrational speculation on the financial market. This 
observation is consistent with the behaviour of many governments, and it provides an 
economic rationale for the econometric estimation of price transmission elasticities (Will and 
Anderson, 2012, 8) (Freund and Özden, 2008). 
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These policies are thought to be able to reduce the conjunctural impact of imported shocks 
and cannot be regarded as structural trade policies as their focus is on the short term price 
transmission only.  
Anderson and Nelgen (2012b) and Anderson and Nelgen (2012c) provide evidence that 
during the food crisis 2007/2008 several countries increased agricultural export taxes, reduced 
import duties and introduced import subsidies. In case of upward price spikes, the most 
commonly stated objective of these measures was to ensure the domestic food security of 
consumers. Governments also expressed the intention to reduce inflationary or balance-of-
payments pressures from an upward price spike. Indeed, such price-insulating policies reduce 
the degree of perfect price transmission which can result in incomplete price transmission. 
Both large and small economies can enforce policies and increase domestic prices by 
introducing tariff and non-tariff barriers; however, the general equilibrium effects are different 
in the two cases. Indeed, large economies can influence international prices small economies 
are not able to do so.  
1.5. Price insulation literature – effects of price insulating policies 
 
Looking at the effects of price insulation policies, the empirical evidence is mixed.  
Anderson and Nelgen (2012b) and Anderson and Nelgen (2012c) conclude that such policies 
were inefficient and ineffective: indeed, if all countries enforce these trade barriers at the 
same time, public interventions to stabilize agricultural prices remain without any impact. 
Finally, the larger the number of countries insulating their domestic markets, the more other 
countries perceive a need to do likewise: this suboptimal equilibrium implies a reduction of 
the stability, predictability of trade opportunities and decline of gains from trade (Anderson 
and Nelgen, 2012b) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012c). Anderson et al. (2014) also show that 
price-insulation policies during the 2008 food crisis added to the spike in international prices 
for rice, wheat maize and oilseeds which actually diminished the benefits of price insulation. 
While these insulation policies resulted in a smaller increase of domestic prices for these 
commodities in some developing countries, other countries recorded an even higher increase 
in domestic prices than in the absence of such political acts.  
Furthermore, Djuric et al. (2011) and Götz et al. (2013) conclude that Serbian, Ukrainian and 
Russian export restrictions on wheat and other cereals increased the instability of domestic 
markets. Cioffi et al. (2011), however, prove that the European price stabilization mechanism 
was able to insulate the European tomato and lemon markets against low import prices in fifty 
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percent of the cases taken into account and claim that the mechanism was ineffective in a few 
other cases because of the insufficient integration of the European market with the market of 
the country of origin. Esposti and Listorti (2013) come to the conclusion that the suspension 
of EU import duties on cereals in 2008 was effective to offset the impact of a bubble of 
international cereal prices and claim that this relationship can be generalized to several 
markets and commodities.  
In addition, Magrini et al. (2017) conclude that support policies aimed at the agricultural 
sector are effective and increase domestic food security. 
In order to measure price distortions, these studies mainly rely on the usage of yearly data on 
the nominal rate of assistance (NRA), i.e. the percentage by which the policies that were 
implemented have raised the gross returns for farmers compared to the situation without any 
political intervention (Anderson, 2009). Thereby they are able to detect the comprehensive 
impact of price-insulation policies on spatial price transmission (Anderson and Nelgen, 
2012a) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012b). However, as it employs yearly data to compute the 
NRA, these studies on price-insulating policies were not able to detect short-lived movements 
of the price series.  
This shortcoming implies that, up to now, the intra-annual impact of trade policies on spatial 
price transmission was not included in the analysis, even though it should be taken into 
account to give a comprehensive picture of the relationship between the above- mentioned 
variables. Intra-annual price variability is due to weather conditions, seasonality (e.g. 
harvesting times) and demand shifts over the year: and is thus highly relevant for investment, 
production and consumption decisions made by the economic agents.  
Indeed, monthly observations provide much more information about domestic and border 
price series than yearly data. For instance, Figure 6 in the Annex shows how monthly data of 
the maize market provide richer information than the corresponding yearly observations. The 
situation is similar for both the rice and the wheat market, even though the time series graphs 
are not reported in the Annex. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Identification strategy 
 
In this study, the main aim is to assess the impact of price insulating policies on spatial price 
transmission of maize, rice and wheat in Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania in the period of 
2005 to 2015. In particular, the research question is whether price-insulating policies worked 
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as counter-cyclical measures and if they were able to insulate the country from shocks on the 
international markets during the food price spike crisis. 
Macroeconomic factors like exchange rates and all-commodity price inflation enable us to 
take into account the hypothesis of the non-neutrality of money, i.e. the assumption that 
monetary policy affects real agriculture prices. 
It is furthermore expected that there could be differences in the results of the analysis of each 
crop market because policy-makers might adopt different trade policies for each of them. 
Indeed, domestic consumers and producers have distinct preferences towards each agricultural 
product and its specific cultivation properties, post-harvest preservation features and 
international integration of their respective markets determine whether a given trade measure 
will be effective. 
In this paper, the evaluation of the impact of price insulating policies on monthly data is a key 
contribution to the existing body of literature, which has, so far, completely neglected the 
intra-annual impact of trade policies on spatial price transmission, as highlighted in the 
literature review (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012a) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012b) (Anderson 
and Nelgen, 2012c). 
Time series from monthly data allow for a more precise assessment of short-lived movements 
within the analysed series which could have disappeared because of a time aggregation bias at 
a lower yearly frequency. Monthly data provides a richer set of information about the time 
series than yearly observations (see also Figure 6 in the Annex).   
The analysed time series violates the Gauss-Markov conditions as can be seen from the result 
of the specifications tests. Such tests identify fractional integration, non-linear regime shifting 
in the time series as well as country time-invariant effects in the panel analysis 
The empirical methodologies adopted for this study introduce some factors into the estimation 
which control for these disturbances. 
Nevertheless, these techniques do not allow for a separate identification of the estimate of 
these disturbances from the error term. Yet, the coefficient of the price insulating policies, 
which is the focus of this analysis, is consistent and can be properly identified.  
The implementation of the empirical strategy follows a particular sequence: it starts from the 
least to the most sophisticated techniques to control for such confounders. The advanced 
econometric techniques we applied were the autoregressive fractional integration (ARFIMA), 
the Markov switching vector error correction (MSVECM) and a set of long panel models.
4
  
                                                 
4
 A long panel is a panel database where T>N. 
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The ARFIMA model has the d parameter for fractional integration to handle long-run 
dependence and ARMA p and q parameters to handle short-run dependence (Baum, 2013).  
The main strength of the ARFIMA is that this model is able to separate the fractionally-
integrated long-run dependence, which cannot be expressed by a stationary ARMA model, 
from the short-run parameters p and q, which are the focus of interest of this analysis.  
The added value of the MSVECM is that this approach allows us to take into account non-
linear shifts in the general state of the trading system or of the surrounding economic and 
political environment.  
Finally, the techniques for long panels have the advantage that they are able to control for the 
presence of time-constant omitted – because of failed measurements or non-existent 
observations – variables which are correlated with the explanatory variables as such panel 
databases contain information on both intertemporal dynamics and individual heterogeneity 
(Hsiao, 2007, 5) (Hsiao, 2014, 1-10) (Baltagi, 1998). 
Additionally, if the behaviour of each observation-unit is similar, conditional on certain 
variables, panel data enables us to obtain a more accurate description of the behaviour of each 
observation-unit because they supplement observations of one unit with data from other units 
(Hsiao, 2007, 6) (Hsiao, 2014, 1-10). Panel datasets are also better able to study complex 
issues of dynamic behaviour (Baltagi, 1998). 
Finally, if the data is non-stationary, long-panel methodologies provide a computational 
advantage as unit-root tests for long panels have a higher power than the ones for time series. 
Moreover, unit-root tests for long panels follow a Gaussian asymptotic distribution, while the 
ADF and the Philips-Perron converge to non-standard limiting distribution (Hlouskova and 
Wagner, 2006) (Lütkepohl, 2005) (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006) (Hsiao, 2007, 7) (Hsiao, 
2014, 1-10). 
In addition the increase of efficiency in the estimation of long panels with respect to time 
series or cross-section samples is possible but not necessary as large datasets might imply a 
rise of heterogeneity in the sample and should be evaluated case-by-case. 
A detailed explanation of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach is given in Annex II. 
All those econometric approaches aim at giving the best description of the behaviour of the 
price series by assuming different effects of the confounders on the structure of the data-
generating process of the price series.  
This knowledge about the structure of the Data Generating Process (DGP) was then used to 
estimate consistently the impact of price-insulating policies on the price series.  
The rationale of this empirical strategy is not to disregard less sophisticated techniques in 
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favour of more advanced ones, but to compare the results of different methodologies and, 
within the framework of a robustness analysis, to obtain a consistent and comprehensive 
interpretation of the relationship between price-insulating policies and prices. 
2.2. Selection of the Sample 
 
Maize, rice and wheat were chosen as sample crops because they are regarded as politically 
relevant by policy-makers in terms of trade, the generation of welfare for a society and food 
security. Furthermore, maize, rice and wheat are a significant part of the domestic food supply 
and their harvest is sold by producers on domestic markets to increase their income. 
Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania were selected as sample countries because their imports of 
maize, rice and wheat take up a large share of their overall agricultural imports. Furthermore, 
they implemented several price-insulating policies during the food price spike crisis. 
From the following tables and graphs it is possible to see the relevance of the imports of 
maize, wheat and rice for Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania. 
In particular, the averaged absolute values of the international trade of maize, rice and wheat 
are summarized in the following table (ITC, 2016): 
 
Table 1: Value of imported maize, rice and wheat in 2001-2015 
Average 2001-2015 
(ITC, 2016) 
Maize Rice Wheat  
Value of international trade 24,292,833 16,461,116 34,306,375 
Value of imports to Africa 2,836,762 3,645,003 8,464,714 
Value of import to Cameroon 3,618 184,350 118,078 
Value of imports to Kenya 78,746 102,655 183,767 
Value of imports to Tanzania 19,295 17,248 195,676 
All figures are expressed in thousands of US dollars. Comma as thousand separator. Source: ITC (2016) 
 
The focus of the analysis is on imports because a spatial price transmission analysis for the 
exporting sector would not be possible for this group of countries. Indeed, since they are 
small in terms of world trade
5
, the “small open country hypothesis”, stating that there is no 
transmission from domestic to international prices while transmission from international to 
domestic prices, holds for all African countries. Domestic prices are measured as the average 
of the values at different retail markets in several areas of each country and are taken as given. 
                                                 
5
 This implies that they only reveal a very small share in world exports and imports.  
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Domestic shocks to prices are not regarded in the analytical framework of this study. 
This can be seen in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, which depict the import shares of wheat, 
maize and rice for Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania. Evidently, the import share of these crops 
records fluctuations over the period of 1962-2013. However, it still represents considerable 
shares in overall imports especially in recent years, with an overall import share of the maize, 
wheat and rice of around 40% of overall agricultural imports for Cameroon and Tanzania and 
of around 30% for Kenya. Moreover, given the interest in the impact of tariff and non-tariff 
measures on spatial price transmission, the three selected countries are suitable for our 
analysis since, in the last few years, they all have enforced several trade-related policies in 
order to mitigate the adverse effects of recent food price spikes.   
While Kenya’s reduction of import tariffs points towards a trade liberalising policy, the 
imposition of a number of rules and regulations on food products illustrates the rise in non-
tariff barriers.  (FAO, 2016d). Similarly, Cameroon and Tanzania adjusted the import duties 
on rice and wheat (FAO, 2016b). Tanzania also reduced import tariffs for food products, but at 
the same time introduced periodic export bans on staple commodities, such as for example the 
temporary export ban on maize in 2008 which was later expanded to all cereals (FAO, 2014).  
The significance of the analysis of these three countries is also amplified by the fact that these 
countries are regarded as highly competitive within the Sub-Sahara African region and are 
well integrated in the global trade. 
This is underlined by the Global Competitiveness Index
6
 2015 (taking scores from 1 to 7, i.e. 
from a low degree of global competitiveness to a high degree of global competitiveness), 
where Kenya (score: 3.9) and Cameroon (score: 3.7) rank above the Sub-Saharan African 
average (score: 3.6) and Tanzania (score: 3.6) just within the Sub-Saharan African average 
(World Economic Forum, 2015). Tanzania is however above African average when 
considering its share in total value added exports worldwide, which is indicative for a 
country’s participation in global value chains. In 2011, it accounted for 0.65 percent in total 
value added exports (African average: 0.52 percent). While Kenya and Cameroon account for 
a smaller share in total value added exports (around 0.4 percent and 0.37 percent), their value 
added exports are characterised by a relatively high backward integration. Backward 
integration represents the share of foreign value added in a country’s exports. High backward 
integration hence means production and export at higher value added stages of the value chain 
                                                 
6
 The Global Competitiveness Index consists of sub-indices which comprise for example institutions, 
infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and education or financial market development (World 
Economic Forum, 2015).  
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(World Economic Forum, 2015). These characteristics render these countries samples of 
particular interest. As they can be considered small countries at the global level and on world 
markets, with regard to agricultural trade, it justifies their selection for the purpose of our 
analysis. However, their particular regional role adds further significance to the analysis of 
these three countries since they are crucial for the development in their respective Sub-
Saharan African regions.  
 
Figure 1: Import shares of maize, wheat and rice for Cameroon from 1961-2013 Source: (FAO, 2016c) 
 
 
Figure 2: Import shares of maize, wheat and rice for Kenya from 1961-2013 Source: (FAO, 2016c) 
 
 
58 
 
 
Figure 3: Import shares of maize, wheat and rice for Tanzania from 1961-2013 Source: (FAO, 2016c) 
 
2.3. Econometric Model 
 
In the following approach, the aim is to assess the impact of trade policies which have been 
enforced by the governments of Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania in the period of 2005-2015 in 
order to insulate the countries from price shocks on the international markets. Indeed, all trade 
policies can create a wedge between international and domestic prices and can be employed to 
insulate the domestic economies from price shocks. 
Some of them are discretional and are adopted for price-insulation on a case-by-case basis, 
some others are automatic and their insulating effect depends on the relationship between the 
changes in the policing instrument and international prices.  
As these interventions are defined by the aim followed by policy-makers, there is no specific 
definition of price insulating policies in the literature.  According to statements made by 
policy-makers, the objective of these actions is to reduce price transmission as well as to 
ensure social welfare and minimize the risk of losses for significant groups if international 
prices are determined as a result of imperfections in the world market or irrational speculation 
on the financial market, which has been regarded as relevant by several agricultural 
economists (Josling et al., 2010) (Sexton, 2012). This observation is consistent with the 
behaviour of many governments, and it provides an economic rationale for the econometric 
estimation of price transmission elasticities (Will and Anderson, 2012, 8) (Freund and Özden, 
2008). 
These policies are thought to be able to reduce the short-term impact of imported shocks and 
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cannot be regarded as structural trade policies because they address just the short-term price 
transmission. 
Furthermore, in this econometric approach, a partial equilibrium analysis is carried out. 
Indeed, the effect of price insulating policies on other countries or on the international prices 
is not addressed. Since all African countries are small in terms of world trade
7
, the general 
equilibrium effect of price insulating policies is very limited and price transmission occurs 
just from international to domestic prices. 
A general equilibrium analysis is interesting if it is applied to larger countries in terms of 
trade; this, however, will not be the scope of this study. 
The main econometric strategy of this study consists in carrying out a robustness analysis by 
comparing the results of the different econometric approaches.  
The econometric model is derived from an extended version of the law of one price, which 
can be expressed in the following way: 
Pdom,j= (Edom/int Pint, j)  
with Pdom as the (average) domestic price, Edom/int the exchange rate and Pint as the 
international price. 
 
 
It is possible to take the logarithmic form of the previous equation: 
 
ln (Pdom,j)= ln(Edom/int) + ln(Pint, j)  
 
In this approach, the basic law of one price is extended by introducing the logarithm of the 
all-commodity inflation π. Furthermore, the international price is replaced by the logarithm of 
the border price Pborder, j: 
 
ln (Pdom,j)= ln(Edom/int) + ln(Pborder, j) + ln(π) +ε 
 
The border price Pborder, j is the actual import price after the application of the ad-valorem 
equivalent tariff rate to the international price and is computed as Pborder, j=[(1+Tt-1) * Pint, j), 
where Tt-1 is the ad-valorem equivalent tariff rate at time t-1. This relationship is estimated by 
crop for each country. 
                                                 
7
 This implies that they only reveal a very small share in world exports and imports. 
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Inflation and border price have an impact on the price transmission process because 
international markets are not regarded as perfect and some frictions in the price formation of 
each crop are allowed.  
If such variables are not taken into account within the regression, the error term ε has a 
structure. Their inclusion in the regression, however, renders the error term stochastic. 
In particular, in this framework prices of other food items, materials, etc. included in the all-
commodity price inflation index do not transmit completely and quickly to the international 
price of the crop j and are thus regarded as a separate control variable. Furthermore, the 
introduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers creates some distortions and reduces the degree of 
transmission between international and domestic prices. Such distortive effect is explicitly 
taken into account for the determination of the main explanatory variable, as explained in the 
section about the database building.  
The introduction of exchange rate and all-commodity inflation in the econometric 
specification allowed us to control for the correlation between changes in money supply and 
variations of real agricultural prices, as assumed by the money non-neutrality hypothesis. 
While there is no endogeneity between Pint and Pdom (small country assumption), ad-valorem 
the equivalent tariff rate could be endogenous since policy-makers set the rate according to 
the prevailing domestic price. The ad-valorem equivalent tariff rate Tt-1 is used to avoid 
endogeneity. Since the model is log-log, the coefficient can be interpreted as elasticity. 
Time series and panel econometrics aim at understanding the structure of the unknown Data 
Generating Process (DGP) and the price adjustment mechanism. On basis of such 
information, it is possible to disentangle some relationships among variables. The advantage 
of comparing several econometric approaches is to gain a complex and more robust and 
differentiated picture of the underlying price mechanism and transmission processes. 
The main purpose of the econometric strategy is to control for some unknown, unobservable 
confounders which cannot be identified but the impact of which can be consistently estimated. 
After controlling for them it is possible to obtain a pure effect of the policy variable. 
In particular, all the methodologies adopted allow to separately estimate the confounding 
factors and clean the estimates of the variables of interest from them. While the confounders 
cannot be identified, the coefficient of the variables of interest are consistent and can be 
properly identified, conditional on the estimate of the confounders. 
Therefore, on the basis of such information it is possible to disentangle some relevant 
relationship among variables. 
All operational decisions are based on the results of some preliminary specification tests, 
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which allowed us to understand the underlying Data Generating Process (DGP) and to 
estimate the most appropriate model. 
We ran several tests for detecting unit roots, fractional integration or long memory, co-
integration and non-linearities in the time series. The structure and the hypotheses of these 
tests as well as the logical strategy behind the empirical analysis are reported in detail in 
Annex II about the econometric theory and depicted in the flow charts for time series and 
panel analysis.  
Since the time series exhibits fractional integration, an Autoregressive Fractional 
Autoregressive Moving Average (ARFIMA) model was chosen. 
The ARFIMA model has the d parameter for fractional integration to handle long-run 
dependence and ARMA p and q parameters to handle short-run dependence (Baum, 2013).  
The main strength of the ARFIMA is that this model is able to separate the fractionally-
integrated long-run dependence, which cannot be expressed by a stationary ARMA model, 
from the short-run parameters p and q, which are the focus of interest of this analysis.  
 
Since the Zivot-Andrews test verifies the presence of structural breaks, Markov Switching 
Error Correction Models (MSVECM) are computed. These approaches are able to mimic a 
DGP which shifts over a finite set of unobserved states, given that this transition follows a 
ergodic and irreducible Markov process. The MSVECM allows for taking into account the 
general state of the trading system or of the surrounding economic and political environment 
as well as to detect temporary discrete shifts of the transaction costs. 
In addition, the panel analysis was carried out crop by crop and for all countries together 
because most economists acknowledge that the international economic events have a 
pervasive influence on agricultural domestic markets and policies and that specific price 
movements on the international markets are transmitted to domestic economies along the 
marketing channel of each single agricultural products (Josling et al., 2010). Cross-
commodity price transmission is possible, but not explicitly modelled in this study.  
For the panel analysis, several specification tests were run in order to detect serial correlation, 
unit roots, co-integration and cross-sectional dependence. 
While the panel database for rice is stationary, the panel database for maize is non-stationary 
and non-cointegrated. A generalized Hausman test was run for both models: for the former the 
comparison was made between an OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) and a 
FGLS/GLS approach, for the latter between a Prais-Winsten estimator with panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) and a FGLS/GLS approach. The Generalized Hausman test allows for 
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choosing between the always consistent OLS/ Prais-Winsten estimator with PCSE against the 
FGLS/GLS estimator which is more efficient under the null hypothesis that the auto-
covariance structure is correctly specified. 
 
Additionally, the presence of cross-sectional dependence in both databases can be verified 
through the Cross-sectional Dependence (CD) test for large panels (Pesaran, 2015) and, if the 
test rejects the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional correlation, the Common Correlated 
Effect Mean Group (CCEMG) model can be estimated.  
In both panels of this study there is no cross-correlation and we thus did not estimate the 
CCEGM. More details on the specifications tests we employed and the estimated models for 
the time series and panel analysis are to be found in Annex II. 
 
3. Data 
 
The database concerns three African countries: Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania, which 
enforced several trade policies during the study period which covers approximately from 
January 2005 to December 2015. For each country, about 120 monthly price observations are 
available.  
We obtained monthly ad-valorem equivalent tariff rates by a time disaggregation of the yearly 
effectively applied weighted average tariff rate from the WITS (World Bank Integrated Trade 
Solutions)/UNCTAD-TRAINS (Trade Analysis Information System) database through the 
monthly trade policies from the FAO-FADPA (Food and Agriculture Policy Decision 
Analysis) (UNCTAD, 2016) (FAO, 2016b) (World Bank, 2016a). The combination of these 
three datasets allows for the detection of discontinuous change of trade policies on a monthly 
basis and to build up a database of monthly ad-valorem equivalent tariff rates. 
The FADPA database provides accurate information on the monthly policy changes applied by 
each country. Nevertheless, the FADPA database records just the ad-valorem equivalent tariff 
rata at the time of adoption and the termination of a given trade policy. 
Therefore, the WITS/UNCTAD-TRAINS database is needed to build up a complete time 
series and to include data concerning the periods when trade policies were not changed.  
This operation is accurate as FADPA and WITS databases provide equivalent results. Indeed, 
they employ a similar approach for the computation of tariff and non-tariff barriers. This time 
disaggregation is possible as tariffs and non-tariffs barriers as well as trade policies are quite 
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constant over time. Monthly ad-valorem equivalent tariff rates consist of tariff, para-tariff and 
non-tariff measures: they are computed and compared using different methodologies in order 
to carry out a far-reaching sensitivity analysis (UNCTAD, 2016) (Basu et al., 2010) 
(UNCTAD, 2005) (Fugazza, 2013). 
The sensitivity analysis consists of different approaches in order to give a reliable estimate of 
the ad-valorem equivalent tariff rate. 
An initial analysis is carried out by computing the frequency index and the coverage ratio: 
while the former indicator summarizes the percentage of products to which one or more non-
tariff measures (NTM) are applied and does not give any indication of the importance of the 
NTMs on overall import, the latter provides information about the relevance of the NTM 
because it computes the percentage of trade subjects to NTMs for the importing country j 
(Fugazza, 2013). 
These indices are not able to give any indication about possible impacts of NTMs on price 
and quantities produced, consumed or traded; therefore, they are often employed as trade 
restrictiveness indicators in the framework of an estimation procedure of the impact of the 
NTMs on prices and quantities. 
The effect of the NTMs on prices is obtained by regressing the domestic price on the border 
price. This is regarded to be free from the distortions induced by the NTMs after controlling 
for the systematic differences in non-traded goods prices (Dean et al., 2009) (Basu et al., 
2010, 84). 
The computation of the wedge between border and domestic price was challenging because it 
assumes that domestic and imported goods are perfect substitutes and because the 
identification of the appropriate domestic price might be difficult (Fugazza, 2013).  
Furthermore, model-based approaches are employed to quantify the ad-valorem equivalent 
tariff rates, in particular the n-good n-factor general equilibrium model with log-linear utilities 
and log-linear constant returns to scale technologies, the gravity and applied general 
equilibrium models are estimated for this purpose. The first approach allows for the 
disentanglement of the effect of each single NTM, but would prevent us to control for the 
endogeneity of imports due to the presence of the NTMs and could bias elasticity estimates 
(Fugazza, 2013). Gravity models are generally corrected with a Heckman selection procedure 
because sunk costs to export affect the firm’s capability to export and imply a large number of 
zeros in the bilateral trade relationship matrix. It is possible to investigate the effect of the 
NTM on price and quantity traded, produced and consumed, but it requires a large amount of 
information and can be carried out just for a few specific products and a limited range of 
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countries. In addition, a cost-benefit analysis allows for the estimation of the “willingness to 
pay” of the economic agents and for a quantification of the costs and benefits for each group 
of actors. Nevertheless, the latter approach needs a large amount of information and to 
estimate accurately the willingness to pay could be burdensome. 
In the UNCTAD/TRAINS database, the results of these different approaches are compared 
and weighted in order to obtain a realistic estimate of the ad-valorem equivalent tariff rates.  
In particular, non-tariff barriers comprises technical measures, such as sanitary or 
environmental protection measures, as well as others traditionally used as instruments of 
commercial policy, e.g. quotas, price control, exports restrictions, or contingent trade 
protective measures, and also other behind-the-border measures, such as competition, trade-
related investment measures, government procurement or distribution restrictions (UNCTAD, 
2015). While not all of these instruments are used for price stabilization purposes, the whole 
trade-related policy framework is essential from the point of view of the policy-makers for the 
determination of effective price insulation policies. 
The ad-valorem equivalent tariff rates computed take into account both automatic and 
discretional policy measures, since both the former and the latter contribute, even though by 
different mechanisms, to the outcome of insulating the country from price shocks on 
international markets. Nevertheless, in this analysis the single effects of discretional and 
automatic instruments cannot be regarded as separate issues.  
Furthermore, in the computation of the ad-valorem equivalent tariff rate for each product 
several tariff lines which refer to several sorts of the same crop and different countries of 
destination with reduced rates – like members of a free trade area – or standard rates, are 
regarded and included in the indicator.  
Information on non-tariff and para-tariff measures are also obtained on the basis of country-
case studies and are collected from national and international databases as well as from 
business surveys. In particular, the main sources for non-tariff measures reported in the 
WITS/UNCTAD-TRAINS database are the national databases of the Ministries of Trade, 
Ministries of Agriculture, National Standards Bodies, as well as from international 
organizations, for example from the databases of the WTO notifications and the FAO CODEX 
Alimentarius. Furthermore, private sector data, which come from the questionnaires prepared 
by the UNCTAD and ITC for firm-level surveys and web-based portals, are included in the 
computation of the ad-valorem equivalent tariff rate.  
Martinez et al. (2009) provide an approach to combine information about non-tariff measures 
from the EU market access database, the United States Trade Representative’s National Trade 
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Estimate, the WTO Trade Policy reviews and the Japanese Report on Compliance by Major 
Trading Partners with Trade Agreements (European Commission, 2016) (US Trade 
Representative, 2016) (WTO, 2016) (Ministry Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, 2016). 
Trade Policy Reviews are also based on the complaints by traders, which broadens the scope 
of the database because they take into account not only policies of concern, but also any 
difficulty traders may encounter in administering a policy (Basu et al., 2010, 82-83).  
The average tariff rate is weighted according to the yearly/ monthly import share from partner 
countries. The monthly price series are given in the GIEWS database. 
The yearly ad-valorem equivalent tariff rates are already provided in the WITS/UNCTAD 
TRAINS database, while we computed their time disaggregation by exploiting the 
information entailed in the FADPA database. 
On the one hand, the indicators employed exhibit some disadvantages because their accuracy 
depends on the quality of the underlying data and the selection of the most appropriate 
weighting scheme. In addition, the weighted tariff rate does not allow for a differentiation 
between the dissimilar effect of trade policies on consumers and producers as well as for 
taking into account different elasticities between different products in the same country or the 
same product in different countries. This limitation, however, we regarded to be of minor 
relevance, since is not the main goal of this study to provide such a differentiated picture with 
respect to the groups of economic agents, crops and countries. It is important to be aware that 
unweighted average tariff rates tend to overstate the height of average tariffs because they 
include very high and prohibitive tariffs whereas weighted average tariff rates tend to be 
biased downwards because the import levels of high-tariff items tend to be low. 
On the other hand, weighted tariff rates allow for the inclusion of some trade 
diversion/creation effects among countries which are due to regional trade agreements or 
similar areas. 
A further issue in the computation of the weighted average ad-valorem equivalent tariff rates 
is that a problem of endogeneity could arise because prohibitive tariffs lead to zero import 
flows. In this regard, fixed weights and past period trade values are used to avoid such 
downwards bias of this indicator and soften the endogeneity problem (Fugazza, 2013). 
The employment of the average ad-valorem equivalent tariff rate is preferred over the nominal 
rate of assistance (NRA) because of the lack of information needed for the computation of the 
latter (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012a) (Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008) (Anderson et al., 2008) 
(Basu et al., 2010) (UNCTAD, 2005). Indeed, the producer and border prices series are not 
available for the chosen crops in the analysed countries, therefore it is not possible to compute 
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this indicator from the raw data. 
In addition, the database about nominal rates of assistance provided by Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008) and Anderson and Nelgen (2012a) is not adequate for the analysis carried 
out in this paper, because there are not all country-crop combinations useful for the 
comparison. Such data are at too low frequency, i.e. yearly instead of monthly, and the 
covered time period of the NRA dataset is too short to be relevant for this analysis: indeed, the 
database which can be used for this empirical estimation entails only 5 yearly observations 
from 2006 to 2010 for each country and crop. 
The crops analysed are included in the 2017 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System under the chapter 10 (Cereals). They are identified with a three 4-digit code, i.e. 
10.01. for wheat, 10.05. for maize and 10.06. for rice. Such level of detail in the product 
classification is enough to answer the research question addressed in this study
8
 (Amjadi et 
al., 2011) (World Bank, 2016b). 
Furthermore, the monthly all-commodity price-index for fuel and not fuel goods as well as the 
exchange rate (national currency per US dollar, period average) are derived from the IMF 
database (IMF, 2016). 
Following the results of the preliminary tests on seasonality, the variables were seasonally 
adjusted through the X13 algorithm-based methodology.
9
 Moreover, a logarithmic 
transformation was applied on all variables in order to interpret the coefficients of the 
regression as elasticities. 
Monthly data on international and domestic prices of agricultural crops are taken from the 
FAO-GIEWS (Global Information and early warning system) Database (FAO, 2016a). Price 
data are collected by the FAO from national statistical authorities and harmonized in order to 
make possible cross-country comparisons. Although the collection and harmonization 
procedures carried out by the FAO is rigorous and this database is largely used for empirical 
                                                 
8
 The 6-digit HS classification could provide more information about the trade flows of these crops than the 4-
digit HS codes. Nevertheless, such level of detail is not available for all countries and crops. Moreover, the 
difference between maize in seed (1005.10) or in other form (1005.90) or between brow rice (1006.20) and 
broken rice (1006.40) is of minor relevance for the research question addressed in this study. 
9
 The X13 algorithm-based methodology is an extension of the X12 and X11 ARIMA methods. In this approach, 
each time series Yt is assumed to be the multiplicative composition of the three parts of trend-cycle (Ct), seasonal 
(St) and irregular component (It): Ct × St × It, The trend-cycle component is obtained by applying a trend moving 
average to the original series Yt, which is then de-trended: SIt= St × It= Yt/ Ĉt . Then, a quarterly or monthly 
seasonal moving average is applied to the de-trended series SIt and a seasonally-adjusted time series is obtained: 
SAt= Yt/Ŝt. The Henderson symmetric filter are applied to seasonally-adjusted time series SAt to obtain the 
trend-cycle component and the process is iterated from the first step. Henderson (1916) minimize the sum of 
squares of the third difference of the moving average series, by applying symmetric filters in the middle of the 
time series and asymmetric weights at its end and at its start. This procedure removes all irregular variations 
shorter than 6 months and preserves cyclical patterns longer than one year (Ladiray and Quenneville, 2001). 
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analyses, readers should be aware of such a caveat. 
Employment of monthly data reduces the number of available covariates, for instance data on 
GDP and trade flows are not collected on a monthly basis, but it improves the quality of the 
assessment of the short-lived movements of the time series, which cannot be detected at lower 
yearly frequency because of time aggregation bias. 
A time series and an unbalanced as well as balanced panel databases were built and used for 
the estimation. In the unbalanced panel database there are some missing values because we 
did not implement an imputation strategy for the missing values. Indeed, all possible 
strategies were regarded as not being sound enough and not able to avoid biases in the 
database-building. 
 
4. Results of the analysis  
 
In this study we compared the behaviour of the price series in three sub-Saharan African 
countries: Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania. The focus is on the analysis of the price behaviour 
of three major staple crops maize, rice and wheat in each of the countries.  
During the food crisis 2007/2008, these three countries introduced several trade policies . The 
indicator employed for trade policies is the ad-valorem equivalent and includes both tariff and 
non-tariff measures. A purpose of these measures was to keep price transmission in check, 
given that these crops provide the bulk of caloric intake of the population of these three 
countries. Therefore, this analysis is very relevant from the point of view of policy design. 
In the specific econometric approach of this paper, the value added comes from the use of 
high-frequency monthly data. If monthly data are used, there is a trade-off between the ability 
to detect short-lived movements and the limited availability of control variables. Indeed, high-
frequency data significantly decrease the time aggregation bias of the estimation, but are not 
largely available for most of the macroeconomic variables: for instance, GDP and trade flows 
are not collected on a monthly basis. 
In this insight, the advantage coming from the employment of high-frequency data is regarded 
as larger than the disadvantage of using further control variables because the monthly 
variables included in the regression allow for taking into account the main international 
factors, like all-commodity inflation and exchange rate which determine spatial price 
transmission (Orden, 2002) (Schuh, 1974). 
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In the first part of this study, each country was analysed separately by employing time series 
econometrics methodologies. Later on, a panel database was built from the series of the three 
countries and in this way time-invariant country effects were controlled for.  
Panel databases were available only for rice (Cameroon and Tanzania) and maize (Cameroon, 
Kenya and Tanzania). Given the limited availability of tests and models for unbalanced long 
panels, the analysis was carried out only on balanced panels. 
In order to properly mimic the Data Generating Process (DGP), the selection of the most 
appropriate econometric model was data-driven.  
Therefore, several preliminary tests were run. In most of the cases the time series exhibited 
significant seasonal components. Seasonality in the agricultural sector is mostly supply-led 
because the availability and perishability of products strongly influence the market and vary 
across the year according to weather conditions. To get a consistent estimate of the effect of 
the variables of interest, seasonality was removed: in this paper the X13 algorithm-based 
methodology was used
10
. All standard preliminary tests were then applied to seasonally 
adjusted time series.  
The specification tests provide evidence that the analysed time series violate the Gauss-
Markov conditions. The factors to control for these violations, like fractional integration, non-
linear regime shifting in the time series as well as country time-invariant effects in the panel 
analysis allow for a consistent and efficient estimation of the relationship between price 
insulating policies and prices within the framework of a robustness analysis. 
Since most of the time series in the database are fractionally integrated, an Autoregressive 
Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) model is computed 
The ARFIMA model allows for the separation of the fractionally-integrated long-run 
dependence from the short-run response of the time series which are the focus of interest of 
this analysis.  
In all ARFIMA models it is evident that the impact of the international macroeconomic 
framework is key to the determination of domestic price. In particular, both the coefficients of 
all-commodity price inflation and exchange rate or at least one of them are significant. 
The ARFIMA models are appropriate to describe the DGP, the fractional integration 
parameter d being large (between 0.33 and 0.5) and highly significant. The analysed countries 
are highly integrated with the international economic environment. The outcome with regard 
to the importance of the trade policies is mixed. While the coefficients of trade policies were 
                                                 
10
 See footnote 9. 
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not significant for the maize market in all three countries as well as for the rice market in 
Tanzania, such measures played an important role in insulating the Cameroonian rice and 
wheat market from international price shocks. These results give rise to an ambiguous 
interpretation and suggest that more advanced tests and methodologies should be applied. 
Since the Zivot-Andrews tests suggest the existence of structural breaks for many time series, 
a set of Markov Switching Models with a threshold and two regimes was estimated. All 
models were run without constant. 
In particular, the results shown in Table 6 confirm that the DGP behaves differently in the two 
regimes. While the main divide between the two regimes for wheat market is the absolute 
value of the domestic prices, the key element for the maize and rice market for the definition 
of the two regimes is the increasing or decreasing trend of domestic prices. 
The variables of interest exhibit different significance and magnitudes, depending if they lie 
in one or in the other regime. 
The relevance of international drivers in spatial price transmission is confirmed: in particular, 
the coefficients of the exchange rate are positive, very large in magnitude and very stable in 
significance across all specifications. 
Only if the trend of maize domestic prices decreases, the exchange rate in Kenya and 
Tanzania does not play a role. The opposite situation occurs for the rice market in Tanzania, 
where the increasing trend of domestic prices renders the exchange rate not significant. 
Moreover, the all-commodity-price inflation is important in several specifications, but its 
coefficient level of significance is much more unstable. In some cases, the coefficient is 
positive, in some other cases it is negative. 
From the estimation of the Markov switching models, which allow for taking into account the 
existence of non-linearities and the prevalence of different behaviours of DGP in the two 
regimes, the interpretation of the role of trade policies changes in a relevant way. 
The prevalence of one or the other regime in the maize market determines the magnitude and 
significance of the coefficient for trade policies.  
In the rice market, the coefficients of trade policies are highly significant for all countries and 
their magnitude is larger with increasing than decreasing domestic prices.  
Moreover, the regimes of the wheat market in Cameroon are not determined by the trend of 
domestic prices, but by their absolute value. In the DGP of wheat domestic prices, there are 
two regimes: the former with high average domestic prices, the latter with low domestic 
prices. In both regimes, the coefficients of trade policies are highly significant.  
Furthermore, such coefficients are positive for Cameroon and Tanzania if the DGP lies in the 
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regime with the increasing trend of domestic prices, while they are negative or not significant 
if a decreasing trend of domestic prices is prevailing. In contrast to that, in Kenya the 
coefficient for trade policies is positive if the decreasing trend of domestic prices prevails, 
while it is negative if the trend of domestic prices increases.  
If the sign of the coefficient is the same as for the trend of domestic prices and smaller than 
one, domestic prices grow less than international prices: trade policies are able to insulate the 
country from price shocks on the international markets during the food price spike crisis. 
The price insulation effect of trade policies is stronger if the coefficient has the opposite sign 
of the direction of the trend because the trade policies are able not just to speed down the 
trend of domestic prices, but also to offset it. 
Such offsetting effect takes place on the maize market in Tanzania and on the rice market of 
Cameroon and Tanzania if the trend of domestic price decreases. 
Across all markets, countries and specifications, the states are very persistent: transition 
probabilities to be in a given state in the next period conditional on being in the same state in 
the current period are very high, ranging from 85% to 99%. Both the states with increasing or 
decreasing trend of domestic prices as well as with high or low domestic prices exhibit similar 
persistence. This matrix of transition probabilities means that the DGP is very unlikely to 
switch from one state to the other. The impact of trade policies on spatial price transmission in 
the maize and wheat markets is much larger if the DGP lies in the regime with increasing 
trend of domestic prices than in the case where the regime of decreasing trend of domestic 
prices prevails. 
Important insights can be also obtained from the panel analysis. In particular, the markets of 
maize and rice look very different here. While the panels concerning the rice market are 
stationary, the database for maize is non-stationary and non-cointegrated. This implies the 
application of different estimation techniques for the two panels. 
In this framework the significance of international macroeconomic factors is confirmed: either 
the all-commodity inflation or the exchange rate or both are highly significant. Nevertheless, 
the ability of governments to insulate the country from international shocks through trade 
policies is not similar between the two markets.  
On the one hand, countries were able to insulate domestic economies from rice price shocks 
on the international markets in the analysed period, since the coefficient for trade policies in 
the rice market is highly significant, positive and smaller than one. On the other hand, the 
non-significance of the coefficient for trade policies in the maize market provides evidence 
that such instruments had no price insulation effect in this case. 
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At the same time, tests for dependence across countries in the database were computed. The 
CD test shows that there is no cross-sectional dependence between countries. The significance 
of the coefficients of the international macroeconomic variables and the output of the CD tests 
are a hint at the fact that the countries are strongly dependent on the development of the 
macroeconomic framework, but are not linked by contagion processes. In particular, the 
domestic variables of interest are not directly influenced by their value in the other countries 
of analysis but by the international environment. 
The insulation effect of the trade policies analysed is quite relevant in terms of welfare of an 
average consumer. If the case of the Kenyan maize market is taken into account, such 
instruments are able to insulate the domestic markets from shocks on the international markets 
by allowing that less than 20% of the increase of the international price of maize is 
transmitted to the domestic market if a decreasing trend of domestic prices prevails. 
On the other hand, if on the Kenyan maize market prices increase, trade policies allow that 
less than 25% of the international price of maize is transmitted to the domestic market. 
A positive shock of 25% on the international maize price, if fully transmitted to the domestic 
market, implies an increase of the Kenyan domestic price by 77 USD each tonne since the 
Kenyan average domestic price for maize was 308 USD each tonne between January 2006 
and February 2016. The enforcement of price insulation policies makes it possible that the 
domestic price increases less than the international price and, in particular, just by 15.50 and 
14.50 USD each tonne if the trend of domestic prices is decreasing or increasing, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
In this study an empirical model of spatial price transmission was developed and the questions 
how price shocks are transmitted and how trade policies affect the pass-through of price 
information were addressed. The selection of the different econometric methodologies is data-
driven and based on the output of specification tests. 
The analysis deals with the maize, rice and wheat markets in Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania 
in the period 2005-2015. 
These countries were chosen because they enforced several trade policies in order to influence 
the trade volume and relative prices and mitigate the adverse effects of the food crisis 
2007/2009.  
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In this paper, the value added with respect to previous literature like Anderson and Nelgen 
(2012b) and Anderson and Nelgen (2012c) comes from the use of high-frequency monthly 
data, which allows for the detection of short-lived movements which could have disappeared 
because of a time aggregation bias at a lower yearly frequency. Monthly data provide more 
information than yearly data. In addition, the policy coverage of the ad-valorem equivalent 
tariff rate employed in this study is at least as good as the nominal rate of assistance 
introduced by Anderson and Nelgen (2012a), Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and Anderson 
et al. (2008). 
Although there are several distortions in the agricultural markets which determine the 
violation of the Gauss-Markov conditions in the Data Generating Process (DGP) of the price 
series, the adopted empirical methodologies provide a consistent and efficient estimation of 
the coefficients of the price insulating policies because they are able to control for such 
disturbances. 
The results of the analysis shows that the price transmission process exhibits non-linearities 
and regime shifts in the markets of all three countries. Country heterogeneity is highly 
correlated with the set of international factors which determine the price transmission and 
induces a non-linear behaviour of price transmission mechanism. The introduction of country 
heterogeneity in the estimation of the panel model results in a better estimation for the rice 
market, but not for the maize market. 
The comparison between the results of the Markov switching models and the panel analysis 
enables us to draw the conclusion about the characteristics of the non-linearities in the DGP. 
The coefficients of the price insulation policies in the rice market keep their significance level 
both in the Markov switching estimation and in the panel analysis because the non-linearities 
of the DGP are due to time-invariant country specific effects which are controlled for in the 
panel models. 
Whereas, coefficients of the price insulation policies in the maize market are significant in the 
Markov switching estimation but become non-significant in the panel models. This is due to 
the fact that time-invariant country specific effects are not relevant in the maize market. Very 
likely some other unknown factors play an important role in the DGP. 
The application of such sophisticated econometric methodologies, which were chosen on 
basis of the results of several specification tests, was key to determine the mechanism of 
spatial price transmission in the maize, rice and wheat markets in Cameroon, Kenya and 
Tanzania in the period 2005-2015. 
ARFIMA models, which do not take into account non-linearities in the DGP and time-
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invariant country heterogeneity, underestimate the effect of trade policies on spatial price 
transmission and their ability to reduce the negative impact coming from the price shocks on 
the international markets. 
In contrast to that, both Markov switching and panel models provide evidence that trade 
policies play an important role in all market situations, while the presence of non-linearities in 
the DGP and time-invariant country heterogeneity affects the price transmission mechanism. 
Overall, in this study it was possible to separately estimate the impact of trade policies within 
the two regimes of behaviour of the domestic price series: in the first regime the trend of 
domestic prices increases, in the second one the trend decreases. This highlights that trade 
policies play a role both in case of increasing and decreasing domestic prices, their relevance 
being much larger, however, if prices increase. The policy implication is that trade policies 
were able to insulate the country from price shocks on the international markets during the 
food price spike crisis, when it was mostly needed.  
It is noteworthy, however, that, although the impact of these instruments has been proven to 
be relevant as counter-cyclical measures during the food price spike crisis, these policies 
cannot be regarded as structural solutions as this study does not provide any analysis of 
structural trade policies. 
A discussion of the specific measures for the long term development of agricultural markets is 
beyond the scope of this paper but provides and interesting subject for further analysis. 
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Annex I: Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
Acronym Meaning 
ACF Autocorrelation Function 
ADF Augmented Dickey Fuller 
AIC Aikake Information Criterion 
ARDL Autoregressive Distribute lag 
ARFIMA Autoregressive Fractional Moving Average 
ARMA Autoregressive Moving Average 
BIC Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion 
CADF test Cross-sectionally augmented Dickey Fuller test 
CCE Common Correlated Effect 
CCEMG Common Correlated Effect Mean Group 
CD test Cross-sectional Dependence test 
CIPS test Cross-sectionally Augmented Im–Pesaran–Shin test 
COMESA 
DFE 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
Dynamic Fixed Effect 
DGP Data Generating Process 
EAC 
ECCAS 
FADPA 
East African Community 
Economic Community of Central African States 
Food and Agriculture Policy Decision Analysis 
FGLS/GLS (Feasible) Generalized Least square 
FTA Free Trade Area 
GIEWS Global Information and early warning system 
GPH test Geweke-Porter-Hudak test 
Hadri LM test Hadri-Lagrange multiplier test 
HT Harris–Tsavalis test (Harris and Tzavalis, 1999) 
IPS Im–Pesaran–Shin test (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003) 
ITC  International Trade Center 
LLC Levin–Lin–Chu test (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002) 
MG Mean Group 
MSAR Markov Switching autoregressive model  
MSDR Markov Switching Dynamic regression 
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MSVECM Markov Switching Error Correction Models 
NTM Non-tariff measures 
PACF Partial autocorrelation function 
PCSE Panel corrected standard errors 
PMG Pooled Mean Group 
PMLP Phillips' Modified Log Periodogram 
PP test Phillips-Perron Test 
REC. Regional Economic Community 
RLP Robinson’s Log Periodogram 
TRAINS Trade Analysis Information System 
TVECM Threshold Vector correction model 
VECM Vector Error Correction Model 
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Annex II: Econometric Theory 
6. Motivation 
 
Time series and panel econometrics aim at understanding the structure of the unknown Data 
Generating Process (DGP) and the price adjustment mechanism. On the basis of such 
information it is possible to disentangle some relationships among variables. The advantage of 
comparing both econometric approaches is to gain a complex and more robust and 
differentiated picture of the concrete underlying price mechanism and transmission processes. 
In the specific econometric approach of this paper, the value added comes from the use of 
high-frequency monthly data and from advanced econometric techniques which take in 
account the existence of some unknown, unobservable confounders.  
The monthly variables included in the regression allow to take in account the main 
international factors which determine spatial price transmission (Orden, 2002) (Schuh, 1974). 
The main purpose of the econometric strategy is to control for some unknown, unobservable 
confounders, which cannot be identified, but the impact of which can be consistently 
estimated. After controlling for them it is possible to obtain a pure effect of the policy 
variable. 
The implementation of the empirical strategy follows a logical sequence: it starts from the less 
to the most sophisticated techniques to control for such confounders.  
All the outlined econometric approaches aim at describe at best the behaviour of the price 
series, by assuming different effects of the confounders on the structure of the Data 
Generating Process (DGP) of the price series.  
Such a knowledge about the structure of the Data Generating Process (DGP) is employed to 
estimate consistently the impact of price insulating policies on the prices series.  
The rationale of this empirical strategy is not to disregard the less sophisticated techniques in 
favour of the most advanced ones, but to compare the results of the different methodologies 
and to obtain in the framework of a robustness analysis a consistent and comprehensive 
interpretation of the relationship between price insulating policies and prices. 
The operational steps in time series and panel econometrics depend on the result of 
preliminary tests. In the following part, the specific logical framework of both time series and 
panel analysis are outlined. 
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7. Time series analysis  
 
The process to carry out a time series analysis is outlined in the following paragraphs and 
depicted in the flow chart about time series analysis. 
 
2.1. Preliminary tests 
 
Preliminary tests are needed to identify the structure of the DGP and select the most 
appropriate econometric model for inference. Tests and graphical tools which describe the 
structure of the DGP can explore the time domain (where the time series is viewed as a 
repetitive process over time) or the frequency domain of the series (i.e. spectral analysis with 
the spectrum of a time series as decomposition of the variance into components of various 
frequencies which contribute to it) (Brandes et al., 1968). The following preliminary tests of 
the time series are implemented. 
 
2.2. Trend and autocorrelation 
 
First evidence of the structure and characteristics of the time series is provided by the trend 
and the analysis of the existence of autocorrelation in the series. Knowledge about the 
presence of a non-zero constant or a trend and the number of significant lags is also important 
for designing the non-stationarity tests and the model to be estimated. 
The presence of a trend or a non-zero constant is easily seen from the plot of the series. 
Information on the autocorrelation structure of the series is provided by computing 
information criteria such as  the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz-Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) which identify the number of lags for which the autocorrelation is 
significant
11
. In general, the information criteria gives the same result, in case of conflicting 
results, the AIC tends to produce the most accurate structural and semi-structural impulse 
response estimates for realistic sample sizes, if monthly data are available (Ivanov and Kilian, 
2005).  
To get a better picture of the structure of the DGP, an autocorrelation analysis is then carried 
                                                 
11
 These tools are similar to the adjusted R
2
: they compare the benefits and the costs due to the increase of the 
number of the lags. By increasing the lags, the residual variance is reduced, but the prediction interval widens 
and the estimates become inefficient (Ivanov and Kilian, 2005). 
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out. The aim is to detect the number of the lags for which there is a significant level of serial 
correlation. By including all lags with significant autocorrelation in the regression, the effect 
of such bias is controlled for. A first step to look at the existence of autocorrelation is to 
visualize the total and partial autocorrelation function. 
While the total autocorrelation function computes the unconditional autocorrelation up to a 
given lag p, the partial autocorrelation function calculates such value, conditional on the 
autocorrelation up to the lag p-1. The ACF and PACF describe the memory of the process and 
explain if and how a series can be predicted from its own past. A white noise is described by 
the lack of significant ACF and PACF coefficients at a given lag. So far a given lag is 
significant, there is some autocorrelation up to this lag (Sjö, 2011). 
In particular, for AR(p) process ACF tails off asymptotically and PACF cut off at lag p, while 
for MA(q) ACF cuts off at lag q and PACF tails off asymptotically. For ARMA processes ACF 
and PACS tails off asymptotically (Sjö, 2011). 
 
2.3. Seasonality  
 
Since time series data are raw, the presence of seasonality has to be checked. Seasonality is 
generally defined as “the systematic, although not necessarily regular, intra - year movement 
caused by the changes of the weather, the calendar, and timing of decisions, directly or 
indirectly through the production and consumption decisions made by the agent of the 
economy” (EUROSTAT, 2016) (Hylleberg, 1992). 
The assessment of seasonality in the time series is first done with the help of graphical 
instruments like the cycle plot which is a seasonal subseries plot. The graph depicts the mean 
or the median of the time series of interest for the same month across different years with their 
values plotted against the relevant month. The seasonal subseries plot allows to identify in 
which month during the year such seasonality occurs. Seasonal subseries plot is drawn to 
study seasonality after decomposition of the series into frequency components (Cleveland et 
al., 1978). In addition to that, Friedman and Kruskal-Wallis tests are useful to detect 
instabilities in the time series and to identify cyclical components
12
. 
The null hypothesis is that the series do not exhibit any stable seasonality, i.e. all months have 
                                                 
12
 Further tools to detect seasonality are periodogram and spectral density. To draw such graphs, the time series 
are decomposed into a unique set of sinusoids of various frequencies and amplitude and each frequency is then 
plotted against its amplitude. It is possible to identify seasonal components , by computing the cycle of the 
series, which is the reciprocal of the peak frequency. 
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the same mean. Stable seasonality represents a recurring component, which is stable, 
systematic and predictable from one to the other year. For both tests the null hypothesis of no 
seasonality is rejected, if the p-value is smaller than 5% (EUROSTAT, 2016).  
If both graphical representations and the aforementioned tests depict a significant level of 
seasonality, the series should be de-seasonalized. 
In case of significant seasonality, the series can be seasonally adjusted through the seasonal 
dummies approach, seasonal differencing, model-based approaches like TRAMO/SEATS or 
filter-based ones like X11/X12/X13. Model-based methods assume that time series and their 
components can be described by an econometric model. In this case the model accuracy can 
be precisely evaluated, the underlying assumptions can be verified and a confidence interval 
can be built around the estimate. On the contrary, in the filter-based methods there is no 
reference to an explicit model. This is an empirical approach that decomposes time series into 
unobservable components using ad-hoc iterative procedure based on successive smoothing 
regardless the stochastic properties of the time series. For this reason the precision of the 
estimation cannot be rigorously checked. The underlying hypothesis of the filter-based 
methods is that each component can be described by the certain cycle lengths. Long cycles are 
attributed to the trend-cycle, the seasonal component is formed by seasonal frequencies and 
the irregular component is defined as the cycle that does not belong to the first two 
components (EUROSTAT, 2016).  
On the contrary, the model-based philosophy assumes that the trend component, seasonal 
component and irregular component are present at all cycle lengths. Obviously, the share of 
each component in the given cycle is different, e.g. the trend component dominates in the 
longer cycles. The model-based approach describes the relationship between the components 
and assumes that irregular component is a white noise, i.e. is random, has zero mean and a 
constant variance and zero co-variances (EUROSTAT, 2016)
13
. 
In this paper all time series, which exhibit relevant levels of seasonality, were seasonally 
adjusted through the X13 algorithm-based methodology
14
. 
2.4. Stationarity/ unit root tests  
 
A common characteristic of economic and financial time series is covariance non-stationarity, 
which means that the first and second moments of their distribution are not constant over 
                                                 
13 In this paper, the seasonality tests and the de-seasonalisation procedure are carried out by the software 
Demetra+ and Stata (EUROSTAT, 2016). 
14
 See footnote 10 
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time. Main reason for non-stationarity is the existence of a non-zero constant, trend or 
structural breaks. If a series is non-stationary, standard econometric techniques for cross-
section inference cannot be applied, because these methodologies produce biased standard 
errors and then inefficiency. Indeed, in time series there are high levels of autocorrelation, 
which lead to violation of the Gauss Markov assumptions of no serial correlation. Significant 
serial correlation does not imply biased and inconsistent coefficients but reduces the 
efficiency of the estimates. In this context, specific approaches are needed to describe 
accurately the behaviour of the series and then to draw conclusions about the relationship 
among variables. 
Along with the above mentioned graphs for detecting autocorrelation, more formal tests for 
unit-root integration are run: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron tests. Both tests 
are based upon the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test. The null hypothesis of the Dickey-Fuller test 
assesses whether the autoregressive coefficient is equal to one against the alternative that it is 
smaller than one. This corresponds to verify whether there is a unit root, i.e. whether the 
series is non-stationary (Sjö, 2011). 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) is an extended version of the Dickey-Fuller, which 
includes more than one lag in the formula and then control for additional correlation deriving 
from lags higher than the first one. This test is valid, only if the residuals from the ADF 
regression are white noise (Sjö, 2011). 
The Philips-Perron test suggests a non-parametric correction of the bias in the Dickey-Fuller 
test and can be used, even if the residuals of the ADF regression are not white noise. The 
empirical residual variance of the DF regression is adjusted by a non-parametric estimation of 
the residual variance, using Bartlett’s triangular window. The Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP) have the same null hypothesis as the Dickey-Fuller, i.e. that 
the series has a unit root (Sjö, 2011). 
Depending on the results of the unit root tests, the model can be specified. If the series do not 
have any unit root, it is possible to run an OLS without any problem of inefficiency.  
 
2.5. Fractional integration 
 
However, price series of agricultural crops have shown in previous studies the presence of 
fractional integration or long memory. This implies that the series keeps the memory of a 
shock for a long period (Mohanty et al., 1998).If a series exhibits long memory, neither it is 
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stationary I(0) nor it is a unit  root I(1) process; it is an I(d) process (with d as a real number). 
A series exhibiting long memory, or persistence, has an autocorrelation function that damps 
hyperbolically, more slowly than the geometric damping exhibited by short memory ARMA 
processes. Thus, fractionally integrated processes may be predictable at long horizons (Baum, 
2013) (Baillie, 1996).  
To assess fractional integration the following tests can be used: the Geweke-Porter-Hudak 
(GPH) Test, Phillips' Modified Log Periodogram (PMLP) and Robinson’s Log Periodogram 
(RLP).  
The null hypothesis for the Geweke-Porter-Hudak, Phillips' Modified Log Periodogram and 
Robinson’s Log Periodogram is that there is no fractional integration and that the series is 
then stationary. i.e. the degree of integration d=0. All tests are computed, using different 
powers in the framework of the robustness analysis (Geweke and Porter-Hudak, 1983) 
(Philipps, 1999a) (Phillips, 1999b) (Robinson, 1995). The three tests are compared, because 
each of them has some strengths and weaknesses. 
The GPH method uses nonparametric methods - a spectral regression estimator - to evaluate d 
without explicit specification of the short memory ARMA parameters of the series. The power 
determines the number of harmonic ordinates to be included in the spectral regression. The 
regression slope is an estimate of the series' power spectrum in the vicinity of the zero 
frequency
15
. To evaluate the robustness of the GPH estimate, a range of power values is 
included (Geweke and Porter-Hudak, 1983) (Baum and Wiggings, 2000). 
To distinguish unit-root behavior from fractional integration through the Geweke-Porter-
Hudak test may be problematic, given that this estimator is inconsistent against the alternative 
hypothesis that the degree of integration d is larger than 1. This weakness of the GPH 
estimator is solved by Phillips' Modified Log Periodogram Regression estimator, which is 
based upon a modification of the Discrete Fourier Transform. In this way, it is possible to 
estimate the degree of integration d, so that its limiting distribution at d=1 is the same of the 
Geweke-Porter-Hudak estimator in the stationary case. This semiparametric test is then 
consistent against both d < 1 and d > 1 fractional alternatives (Baum, 2013) (Philipps, 1999a) 
(Phillips, 1999b).  
An advantage of the Robinson’s Log Periodogram Regression estimator is that it can be 
applied to more than one variable and that it is not restricted to using a small fraction of the 
ordinates of the empirical periodogram of the series. When applied to a set of time series, the 
                                                 
15
 If too few ordinates are included, the slope is calculated from a small sample. If too many are included, 
medium and high-frequency components of the spectrum will contaminate the estimate. 
92 
 
degree of integration d for each series is estimated from a single log-periodogram regression 
which allows the intercept and slope to differ for each series. The multivariate Robinson’s 
Log Periodogram Regression is based on the assumption that different time series share a 
common differencing parameter and are normally distributed. Robinson claims that other 
conditions underlying his derivation are milder than those conjectured by GPH (Robinson 
1995). The standard errors for the estimated parameters are derived from a pooled estimate of 
the variance in the multivariate case, so that their interval estimates differ from those of their 
univariate counterparts (Baum, 2013) (Robinson, 1995). 
If at least one series in the regression is fractionally integrated, the Autoregressive 
Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) model is run. The ARFIMA model was 
proposed by Sowell (1992) and is computed through the full maximum likelihood estimation. 
The ARFIMA model has the d parameter for fractional integration to handle long-run 
dependence and ARMA p and q parameters to handle short-run dependence. Sowell has 
argued that using different parameters for different types of dependence facilitates estimation 
and interpretation (Baum, 2013). 
In the ARFIMA model the degree of integration d is not an integer, but a real number. After 
the value of d is estimated form the data, the short-run effects is described by the behaviour of 
the fractionally differenced process, which is obtained by setting d = 0. Instead, the long-run 
effects are represented by the behaviour of the fractionally integrated process, which is 
modelled by using the estimated value of d. 
Granger and Joyeux (1980) motivate the usefulness of the ARFIMA models by noting that 
their implied spectral densities for d > 0 are finite except at frequency 0, whereas stationary 
ARMA models have finite spectral densities at all frequencies. The ARFIMA model is indeed 
able to capture the long-run dependence, which cannot be expressed by stationary ARMA 
models (Baum, 2013). 
 
2.6. Cointegration 
 
If the Geweke-Porter-Hudak, Phillips' Modified Log Periodogram and Robinson’s Log 
Periodogram are not able to reject the null hypothesis of no fractional integration as well as 
the ADF and Philips-Perron test are not able to reject the null hypothesis of unit-root, the 
series are unit-root, but not fractionally integrated. In this case, the existence of cointegration 
should be tested through the Johansen eigenvalue and trace tests (Sjö, 2011). 
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The Johansen test is checking sequential null and alternative hypotheses. It starts with the first 
null (rank=0) against the alternative (rank > zero), then it tests the null (rank =1) against the 
alternative (rank > 1) and so on. The rank points out the number of cointegrating 
relationships. If rank=0 the series are integrated, but not cointegrated. If there is full rank 
series are stationary (Lütkepohl, 2005). 
If the series are integrated, but not cointegrated (rank=0) an Autoregressive Distribute lag 
(ARDL) model is employed. In this approach, the series has to be differenced in order to 
remove non-stationarity. On the contrary, if there is cointegration, a Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) is run. The VECM is a powerful tool, which allows disentangling the long-
run equilibrium from the short-term deviations from this equilibrium. In particular, VECM 
directly estimates the speed at which a dependent variable returns to equilibrium after a 
change in other variables (Sjö, 2011). 
 
2.7. Structural breaks 
 
Sometimes the estimates could be not reliable because the time series could exhibit structural 
breaks. If there are structural breaks, the estimated parameters are computed as an average 
across different regimes and the hypothesis testing could be undermined because of too large 
standard errors. To increase reliability of the results, the hypothesis of the existence of 
structural breaks along the series is verified.  
In particular, the Zivot-Andrews test has a null hypothesis of a unit root process with drift that 
excludes exogenous structural change against the alternative hypothesis of existence of one 
break in the trend or in the intercept or in both. If minimum t-statistics is smaller than critical 
value, the test is not able to reject the null hypothesis, it means that there are no structural 
breaks (Zivot and Andrews, 1992).  
The Zivot-Andrews test is a sequential test which utilizes the full sample and uses a different 
dummy variable for each possible break date. The break date is selected where the t-statistic 
from the ADF test of unit root is at a minimum (most negative). Consequently a break date 
will be chosen where the evidence is least favorable for the unit root null (Zivot and Andrews, 
1992) (Glynn and Perera, 2007) (Baum, 2004). 
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2.8. Markov Switching Model 
 
If the Zivot-Andrews test verifies the presence of structural breaks, some Markov switching 
models are computed. These models belong to the class of the piecewise linear TAR models 
and allow a flexible specification: indeed, the relationship between some variables can be 
locally linear, but globally non-linear because of the existence of one or more structural 
breaks in the relationship. (Ihle and Cramon-Taubadel, 2008). 
Threshold models are widely applied for the analysis of spatial and vertical price transmission 
and, in particular, to test the Law of one price in the Enke-Samuelson-Takayama-Judge spatial 
equilibrium models (Enke, 1951) (Samuelson, 1952) (Takayama and Judge, 1972). In the 
framework of threshold models, the assumption of perfect competition is removed and the 
existence of positive transaction costs is taken in account. The above mentioned threshold can 
be a function of the analysed price series or of external determinants which do not need to be 
observed (Ihle and Cramon-Taubadel, 2008). 
In the first case a Threshold Vector correction model (TVECM) is applied: if the deviation of 
the process from its long-run equilibrium is at least as large as the transaction costs, the model 
adjusts and the price series tend to converge in the long term. On the contrary, if the deviation 
of the process from its long-run equilibrium is smaller than the transaction costs, no converge 
between the two prices takes place. Such feature implies the existence of a “band of inaction”, 
where international and domestic prices or prices at different levels of the value chain do not 
converge in the long term, since transactions costs are larger than the price difference (Ihle 
and Cramon-Taubadel, 2008). 
An alternative methodology is the Markov Switching Error Correction Model (MSVECM), 
which is able to mimic a DGP which shifts over a finite set of unobserved states, given that 
this transition follows a ergodic and irreducible Markov process. The MSVECM allows to 
take into account the general state of the trading system or of the surrounding economic and 
political environment as well as to detect temporary discrete shifts of the transaction costs. 
While in the TVECM the price convergence occurs with certainty outside the “band of 
inaction”, in the MSVECM the adjustment takes place with a given positive probability (Ihle 
and Cramon-Taubadel, 2008, 19). 
While the time of transition from one state to another and the duration between changes in 
state is random and it is not possible to know with certainty in which state the process lies, the 
probability to be in each of them, conditional on the state where the process lay in the 
previous period, can be estimated. Moreover, in these models the process can evolve 
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differently in each state. 
In the class of the MSVECM the two available econometric methodologies are the Markov 
Switching Dynamic regression (MSDR), which allows a quick adjustment after the process 
changes state, and the Markov Switching autoregressive model (MSAR), which describes a 
gradual adjustment after the process changes state. While the MSDR mimics accurately 
monthly and higher-frequency data, MSAR is more suitable for quarterly and lower-frequency 
data. Since monthly data are available in this study, the MSDR could be more adequate. 
Nevertheless, the two different methodologies are compared in order to check the robustness 
of the estimates (Ihle and Cramon-Taubadel, 2008). 
8. Panel data analysis  
 
The process to carry out a panel data analysis is outlined in the following paragraphs and 
depicted in the flow chart about panel data analysis. 
In particular, all these methodologies allow to separately estimate the confounding factors and 
clean the estimates of the variables of interest from them. While the confounders cannot be 
identified, the coefficient of the variables of interest are consistent and they can be properly 
identified, conditional on the estimate of the confounders. 
 
8.1. Preliminary tests 
 
The described econometric analysis deals with long panels
16
 which exhibit both serial and 
cross-correlation. Along with the results provided in the time series analysis, specific 
preliminary tests and estimation methodologies are applied to study the behaviour of long 
panels. Such approaches for long panels combine panel and time series analysis. 
The techniques for long panels give the advantage that they are able to control for the 
presence of time-constant omitted – mismeasured or unobserved – variables which are 
correlated with the explanatory variables, because such panel databases contain information 
on both the intertemporal dynamics and the individual heterogeneity (Hsiao, 2007, 5) (Hsiao, 
2014, 1-10) (Baltagi, 1998). 
Moreover, if the behaviour of each observation unit is similar conditional on certain variables, 
panel data allow to obtain a more accurate description of the behaviour of each observation 
                                                 
16
 A long panel is a panel database where T>N. 
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unit supplementing observations of this unit with data on other units (Hsiao, 2007, 6) (Hsiao, 
2014, 1-10). Panel datasets are also better able to study complex issues of dynamic behaviour 
(Baltagi, 1998). 
Finally, long panel methodologies provide a computational advantage, if there is non-
stationarity: indeed, unit-root tests for long panels have higher power than the ones for time 
series. Moreover, unit-root tests for long panels follow a Gaussian asymptotic distribution, 
while the ADF and the Philips-Perron converge to non-standard limiting distribution 
(Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006) (Lütkepohl, 2005) (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006) (Hsiao, 
2007, 7) (Hsiao, 2014, 1-10). 
Instead, the increase of efficiency in the estimation of long panels with respect to time series 
or cross-section samples is possible, but not necessary, because large datasets could imply the 
rise of heterogeneity in the sample and should be evaluated case-by-case. The preliminary 
checks concern the existence of serial correlation and unit-root in panel databases.  
8.2. Serial correlation 
 
Serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the standard errors and causes the results 
to be less efficient, therefore it is important to identify serial correlation in the idiosyncratic 
error term. In this insight, there is a trade off between robustness and power of the tests for 
detecting serial correlation (Drukker, 2003) (Wooldridge, 2002).  
A first category of tests like the Baltagi–Wu test derived in Baltagi and Wu (1999) are based 
on very specific assumptions about the nature of the individual effects or assess individual-
level effects jointly. Therefore, these tests are very powerful against this specific assumption, 
but not robust against different specifications. These tests for serial correlation are highly 
parametrized and based upon many assumptions and then they represent optimal tests within 
each class.  
Instead, the Wooldridge’s procedure is a more general test, which is based upon fewer 
assumptions, and then more robust, but less powerful against a specific set of assumptions 
than the previous tests. In the Wooldridge test, the following first-difference regression is run 
and the presence of serial correlation between the first-differenced errors is tested (Drukker, 
2003) (Wooldridge, 2002): 
Δyit= ΔXitβ1+ Δεit 
The main observation made by (Wooldridge, 2002) is that corr(Δε, Δε, t-1) is equal to 0.5, if the 
residuals are not serially correlated. Therefore, the Δε is regressed on its lags and the 
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coefficient of the first lag of the differenced residuals is tested to be equal to 0.5. In this 
procedure, it is also possible to account for the within-panel correlation in the regression and 
to design a test, which is also robust to conditional heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002). 
8.3. Unit root tests 
 
A second type of preliminary checks concerns the existence of a unit root. Such tests in long 
panel have to take in account that the database could exhibit both serial and cross-correlation. 
The main unit-root tests for long panels are described in Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Harris 
and Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000), Breitung and Das (2005), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), 
Choi (2001) and Hadri (2000).  
In particular, the null hypothesis of the Levin–Lin–Chu test (LLC) (Levin, Lin and Chu, 
2002), Harris–Tsavalis test (HT) (Harris and Tzavalis, 1999), Breitung test (Breitung, 2000) 
(Breitung and Das, 2005), Im–Pesaran–Shin test (IPS)  (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003) and 
Fisher test (Choi 2001) is that all the panels contain a unit root (Hlouskova and Wagner, 
2006).  
On the contrary, the null hypothesis of the Hadri-Lagrange multiplier (LM) test is that all the 
panels are stationary or trend stationary versus the alternative hypothesis that at least some of 
the panels contain unit roots (Hadri, 2000) (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006). 
The LLC, HT and Breitung tests make the simplifying assumption that all panels share the 
same autoregressive parameter so that ρi=ρ for all i. Such restriction implies that the rate of 
convergence would be the same for all countries, an implication that is too restrictive in most 
of the applications. The IPS and the Fisher-type tests, however, allow the autoregressive 
parameter to be panel specific (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006). 
All these tests are not perfectly equivalent, because they behave asymptotically in a different 
way. According to the specific sample, it could be more appropriate to choose one rather than 
the other. If a dataset has a small number of panels and a large number of time periods, then a 
panel unit-root test that assumes that N is fixed or that N tends to infinity at a slower rate than 
T will likely perform better than one that is designed for cases where N is large. For the 
database in this study LLC, Breitung, IPS, Fisher-type and Hadri-LM tests are the most 
suitable ones. Moreover, HT, Breitung and LLC work only for balanced panels, while IPS, 
Fisher-type tests can be also computed on unbalanced panel.  
In particular, the Hadri-LM test can be used just on the balanced panels and test whether the 
series is stationary against the alternative of unit root. In this approach, the following equation 
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is estimated (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006): 
yit=rit+βit+εit 
where rit is a random walk component of the series. In particular, rit= rit-1+uit. εit and uit are 
zero-mean i.i.d. normal errors. The Hadri-LM test verifies the following null hypothesis: 
λ: ζu/ζε=0 against λ>0 
If ζu is zero, rit collapses to a constant and the series yit is stationary. 
HT-test assesses directly whether the autoregressive parameter is equal to 1, while LL-test is 
based on the same transformation as in the ADF. Furthermore, while HT-test and LLC-test 
adjust the autoregressive parameter and its t-statistics after running the fitting regression, the 
Breitung test pre-whiten
17
 the data, before running the regression for verifying the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006). 
In the IPS-test the regression is fitted to each panel separately and the resulting t-statistics is 
averaged, whereas in the LLC-test data are pooled before fitting the regression. Therefore, in 
LLC-test a common autoregressive parameter is imposed, since the t-statistics is computed on 
the result of the pooled regression (Maddala and Wu, 1999).  
8.4. Cointegration  
 
If the series have a unit root, they could be also co-integrated. To assess the existence of co-
integration in panel databases, the tests of Westerlund are run. Westerlund (2007) provides 
four co-integration tests for long panels, i.e. Ga, Gt, Pa and Pt, based on the error correction 
approach. The underlying idea is to test for the absence of co-integration by determining 
whether the error correction term for individual panel members or for the panel as a whole is 
significant. Westerlund (2007) defines an error-correction model where ai is the error 
correction parameter.  
In this framework, the Ga and Gt statistics test H0: ai = 0 for all i versus H1: ai < 0 for at least 
one i. These statistics start from a weighted average of the individually estimated ai and their 
t-ratio respectively. Rejection of H0 should therefore be taken as evidence of co-integration of 
at least one of the cross-sectional units.  
Instead, the Pa and Pt statistics pool information over all the cross-sectional units to test H0: ai 
= 0 for all i versus H1: ai < 0 for all i. Rejection of H0 should therefore be taken as evidence of 
                                                 
17
 A whitening transformation is a linear transformation that transforms a vector of random variables with a 
known covariance matrix into a set of new variables whose covariance is the identity matrix meaning that they 
are uncorrelated and all have variance 1. The transformation is called "whitening" because it changes the input 
vector into a white noise vector (Kessy et al., 2015) 
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co-integration for the panel as a whole. Such tests allow the computation of robust critical 
values through bootstrapping, if there is some cross-sectional correlation (Persyn and 
Westerlund, 2008) 
8.5. Model specification 
 
If there is no serial correlation and no unit-root in the panel, a simple OLS model with panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSE) can be run. The standard random and fixed effects 
estimators as well as GLS estimators for balanced panel as developed in Baltagi and Li (1991) 
and for unbalanced panels as provided in Baltagi and Wu (1999) are not suitable for long 
panels, because they converge to their limiting distribution, if the number of countries N 
converges to infinity. These estimators are more useful when there are many panels relative to 
time periods (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006). On the contrary, the OLS estimator with panel 
corrected standard errors is consistent for long panels, because it converges to the limiting 
distribution, when the number of time periods T approaches infinity. (Hlouskova and Wagner, 
2006). 
Instead, if there is serial correlation and unit root, but no co-integration, a Prais–Winsten 
estimator with the panel corrected standard errors is computed. The Prais-Winsten estimator 
controls for serial correlation and converges to its asymptotic distribution, when the number 
of time periods T approaches infinity. Moreover, OLS and Prais-Winsten estimator with PCSE 
take in account disturbances, which can be either heteroskedastic across panels or 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels (Hlouskova and Wagner, 
2006). 
A further approach for estimation in long panels is the GLS or FGLS estimator, which allows 
heteroscedasticity, but no cross-sectional correlation. This methodology can be applied to both 
serially correlated and not serially correlated data. In particular, full FLGS variance–
covariance estimates are very optimistic, if the database consists of 10–20 panels with 10–40 
periods per panel, while the OLS or Prais–Winsten estimates with PCSEs have coverage 
probabilities that are closer to nominal ones (Beck and Katz, 1995) (Hlouskova and Wagner, 
2006). 
The alternative choice between OLS/Prais-Winsten with PCSE and GLS/FGLS estimators 
could be evaluated with a Generalized Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that the 
covariance structure is correctly specified. Under the null hypothesis both estimators 
OLS/Prais-Winsten with PCSE and GLS/FGLS are consistent, but GLS/FGLS estimates are 
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more efficient. While the OLS/Prais-Winsten with PCSE is always consistent but less efficient 
under null hypothesis (covariance structure correctly specified), GLS/FGLS are more efficient 
under the null hypothesis, but inconsistent under the alternative (covariance structure not 
correctly specified). For the computation of the confidence intervals of both estimators the 
FGLS estimate of the covariance matrix is employed, because this is asymptotically superior 
under the assumed covariance structure of the disturbances (Hlouskova and Wagner, 2006). 
Finally, if the Westerlund tests reject the null hypothesis and the panel exhibit then co-
integration, the approach by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) is applied. Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith (1999) introduce a generalized framework, which takes in account three strategies to 
model the behaviour of a dynamic co-integrated panel: Mean Group, Pooled Mean Group and 
Dynamic Fixed Effect estimator. The difference between these approaches concerns the 
poolability of the estimated parameters. On the one hand, in the mean group approach the 
parameters of each equation are estimated by group and the relative distribution is analysed. 
The mean group estimator is then a consistent estimate of the average heterogeneous 
parameters (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). On the other hand, the Dynamic Fixed Effect estimator 
assumes the same slope across all individuals (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999). 
An intermediate solution is the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (1999). This approach is very flexible, because intercepts, error variance and 
short term parameters are different, while the long run parameter is the same across all 
individuals. The PMG estimator can be applied to both stationary and non-stationary 
covariates and describes the pooled long run effects without implausible common dynamics. 
In particular, the estimator can converge towards a MG or towards a PMG approach, 
according to introduced specifications. The approach can be tested through a Hausman-type 
poolability test (Hausman, 1978). 
Hausman-poolability test assesses the null hypothesis that the parameters are homogenous 
across the individuals and compares MG and PMG. Under the null hypothesis that the 
parameters are homogenous across the individuals, both MG and PMG are consistent, but 
PMG is more efficient. Under the alternative, PMG is not consistent because the parameters 
are heterogeneous across the individuals (Maddala and Wu, 1999) (Pesaran, 2007) (Eberhardt, 
2011) (Hausman, 1978). 
8.6. Panel data with cross-sectional dependence  
 
A further concern in the analysis comes from the presence of cross-correlation in the panel 
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data, which leads to the violation of the Gauss Markov conditions. Significant cross-
correlation does not imply biased and inconsistent coefficients but it reduces the efficiency of 
the estimates. Therefore, standard techniques for panel data like fixed and random effects are 
not suitable. Cross-correlation among individuals can be due to the fact that there is some 
deterministic or stochastic common factor in the panel. If there is cross-correlation in the 
panel database, all the above mentioned estimators could be seriously biased in size.  
In order to test the presence of cross-sectional dependence, Pesaran (2015) extends the Cross-
sectional Dependence (CD) test, introduced in Pesaran (2004), to large panels. In the CD test 
the null hypothesis is that there is no cross-sectional correlation, i.e. the coefficient of the 
unobserved common factor is zero.   
If there is cross-sectional dependence and unit-roots in the long panel, the Common 
Correlated Effect Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator is computed.  This estimator is based 
upon the Common Correlated Effect (CCE) originally developed in Pesaran (2006) for short 
panels. Pesaran (2006) shows that the CCE can be consistently estimated, if the unobserved 
common factor in a short panel is approximated by the cross-sectional mean xt  under strict 
exogeneity of xi,t. This estimator is robust to different types of cross-sectional dependence of 
errors, possible unit roots in the common factor and slope heterogeneity (Chudik and Pesaran, 
2015) (Ditzen, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the CCE is not consistent in dynamic panels, because dynamic panels include 
lagged dependent and weakly exogenous variables as regressors (Chudik and Pesaran, 2015). 
Therefore, the aim of Chudik and Pesaran (2015) and Pesaran (2015) is to derive an estimator 
for long panels, which is consistent in presence of cross-sectional dependence. In order to 
address this issue, Chudik and Pesaran (2015) extend the CCE model into the Common 
Correlated Effect Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator. They propose the following equation to 
be estimated: 
Δyit= αi + βiyi,t-1+ γixi,t + δi xi,t  + θi yi,t-1  + ei,t 
They conclude that the CCEMG is asymptotically valid in dynamic panels under the 
condition that the lags of cross-sectional averages to be included in the regression should be 
large enough and at least as large as the number of unobserved common factors. Generally it 
is suggested to introduce 
3√T cross-sectional averages in order to control for cross-sectional 
dependence and to warrant consistency of the estimator (Ditzen, 2016) (Chudik and Pesaran, 
2015) (Pesaran, 2015). 
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Flow Chart for time series analysis 
 
Figure 4: Flow chart for time series analysis 
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Flow Chart for panel analysis 
 
Figure 5: Flow chart for panel analysis 
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Annex III: Results 
9. Time series Analysis 
Preliminary tests and graphs 
 
Figure 6: Comparison among graphs of monthly and yearly time series (Maize: Tanzania, Cameroon, 
Kenya 
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Figure 7: Time series plot, Seasonal subseries plot, autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation 
function for All-Commodity Price Inflation (same for all countries and all crops) 
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Figure 8: Trend analysis with time series plots for rice for international price and domestic prices in 
Cameroon and Tanzania 
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Figure 9: Seasonality analysis with seasonal subseries plot for rice for international price and domestic 
prices in Cameroon and Tanzania 
 
 
Figure 10: Autocorrelation functions and partial autocorrelation functions for rice for international price 
and domestic prices in Cameroon and Tanzania 
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Figure 11: Trend analysis with time series plots for maize for international price and domestic prices in 
Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania 
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Figure 12: Seasonality analysis with seasonal subseries plot for maize for international price and domestic 
prices in Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania 
 
 
Figure 13: Autocorrelation functions and partial autocorrelation functions for maize for international 
price and domestic prices in Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania 
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Figure 14: Trend analysis with time series plots for wheat for international price and domestic price in 
Cameroon 
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Figure 15: Seasonality analysis with seasonal subseries plots for wheat for international price and 
domestic price in Cameroon 
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Figure 16: Autocorrelation functions and partial autocorrelation functions for wheat for international 
price and domestic prices in Cameroon 
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Table 2: Results for stationarity tests for all variables (general, country- and crop-specific variables) 
Variables Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
General variable (same for all crops and countries)
All Commodity Price Index -1.862 -3.446 0.674 -1.321 -3.446 0.883 Yes
Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
Cameroon
Exchange Rate -1.538 -3.446 0.816 -1.629 -3.446 0.781 Yes
Kenya
Exchange Rate -3.039 -3.449 0.122 -2.791 -3.449 0.200 Yes
Tanzania
Exchange Rate -0.849 -3.448 0.961 -0.686 -3.447 0.974 Yes
Crop-specific variable (same for all countries)
Average International Price -1.998 -3.446 0.602 -1.848 -3.446 0.681 Yes
Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
Country-specific variables
Domestic Price -1.722 -3.447 0.741 -1.593 -3.447 0.795 Yes
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate -3.909** -3.446 0.012 -3.700** -3.446 0.022 No
Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
Country-specific variables
Domestic Price -2.601 -3.447 0.280 -2.754 -3.447 0.214 Yes
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate -3.129* -3.448 0.100 -4.244*** -3.447 0.004 No
***p-value < 0.01; **p-value < 0.05: *p-value < 0.10
Variables Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
Crop-specific variable (same for all countries)
Average International Price -2.151 -3.446 0.517 -1.957 -3.446 0.625 Yes
Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
Country-specific variables
Domestic Price -2.028 -3.447 0.586 -1.913 -3.447 0.648 Yes
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate -3.018 -3.446 0.127 -2.642 -3.446 0.261 Yes
***p-value < 0.01; **p-value < 0.05: *p-value < 0.10
Variables Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
Crop-specific variable (same for all countries)
Average International Price -1.707 -3.446 0.748 -1.556 -3.446 0.809 Yes
Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
Country-specific variables
Domestic Price -2.967 -3.447 0.142 -2.350 -3.447 0.407 Yes
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate -3.018 -3.446 0.127 -3.064 -3.446 0.115 Yes
Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
Country-specific variables
Domestic Price -2.256 -3.447 0.459 -2.168 -3.447 0.508 Yes
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate -2.250 -3.448 0.462 -2.071 -3.447 0.563 Yes
Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Test Statistic 5% Critical Value P-value Non-stationarity
Country-specific variables
Domestic Price -3.229 3.448 0.079 -2.765 -3.447 0.210 Yes
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate -1.74 -3.448 0.733 -1.679 -3.447 0.760 Yes
***p-value < 0.01; **p-value < 0.05: *p-value < 0.10
d lag length specification (based on tests for lag-order selection statistics for VARs and VECMs) : Domestic Price (4), Exchange Rate (2), Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate (2)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Testc Phillips-Perron Test
a  lag length specification (based on tests for lag-order selection statistics for VARs and VECMs) : Average International Price (2)
b  lag length specification (based on tests for lag-order selection statistics for VARs and VECMs) : Domestic Price (4), Exchange Rate (2), Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate (3)
c lag length specification (based on tests for lag-order selection statistics for VARs and VECMs) : Domestic Price (2), Exchange Rate (2), Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate (1)
Tanzania
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Testd Phillips-Perron Test
Cameroon
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Testb Phillips-Perron Test
Kenya
a  lag length specification (based on tests for lag-order selection statistics for VARs and VECMs) : Average International Price (2)
b  lag length specification (based on tests for lag-order selection statistics for VARs and VECMs) : Domestic Price (1), Exchange Rate (2), Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate (2)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Testa Phillips-Perron Test
Results Stationarity Tests for Maize
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Testb Phillips-Perron Test
Note: While All Commodity Price is the same for all countries and crops and Average International Price for all countries, the respective length of the time series varies depending on the 
remaining variables for the analysis. We depict here the results for the time series covering most of the months (January 2005-December 2015).
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Testa Phillips-Perron Test
Cameroon
Phillips-Perron Test
a  lag length specification (based on tests for lag-order selection statistics for VARs and VECMs) : All Commodity Price Index (2); Average International Price (3)
b  lag length specification (based on tests for lag-order selection statistics for VARs and VECMs) : Domestic Price (2), Exchange Rate (2), Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate (3)
c lag length specification (based on tests for lag-order selection statistics for VARs and VECMs) : Domestic Price (1), Exchange Rate (2), Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate (1)
Results Stationarity Tests for Wheat
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Testb
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Testc
Tanzania
Cameroon
Phillips-Perron Test
Results Stationarity Tests for Rice
Country-specific variables 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Testb Phillips-Perron Test
Results Stationarity Tests1
1 if seasonality was detected in the time series, the series were de-seasonalized. Therefore, all series are seasonally adjusted.
Phillips-Perron TestAugmented Dickey-Fuller Testa
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Table 3: Results for structural break tests for all variables (general, country- and crop-specific variables) 
Variables
Minimum t-
statistic
5% Critical 
Value
Time of structural 
break
General variable (same for all crops and countries)
All Commodity Price Index -3.764 -5.08 December 2013
Results Structural Break Test Rice, Zivot Andrews Test
Crop-specific variable (same for all countries)
Average International Price -5.980 -5.080 no break
Minimum t-
statistic
5% Critical 
Value
Time of structural 
break
Minimum t-
statistic
5% Critical 
Value
Time of 
structural break
Country-specific variables
Domestic Price -4.995 -5.08 January 2008 -5.695 -5.08 no break
Exchange Rate -3.418 -5.08 September 2007 -3.115 -5.08 April 2014
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate -5.619 -5.08 no break -3.958 -5.08 January 2012
Results Structural Break Test Wheat, Zivot Andrews Test
Variables
Minimum t-
statistic
5% Critical 
Value
Time of structural 
break
Crop-specific variable (same for all countries)
Average International Price -3.523 -5.080 April 2008
Minimum t-
statistic
5% Critical 
Value
Time of structural 
break
Country-specific variables
Domestic Price -3.838 -5.08 September 2008
Exchange Rate -3.418 -5.08 September 2007
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate -4.691 -5.08 May 2008
Results Structural Break Test Maize, Zivot Andrews Test
Variables
Minimum t-
statistic
5% Critical 
Value
Time of structural 
break
Crop-specific variable (same for all countries)
Average International Price -4.293 -5.080 August 2010
Minimum t-
statistic
5% Critical 
Value
Time of structural 
break
Minimum t-
statistic
5% Critical 
Value
Time of 
structural break
Minimum t-
statistic
5% Critical 
Value
Time of 
structural 
break
Country-specific variables
Domestic Price -3.665 -5.08 November 2008 -3.780 -5.08 February 2011 -4.114 -5.08 January 2010
Exchange Rate -3.418 -5.08 September 2007 -3.115 -5.08 April 2014 -3.115 -5.08 April 2014
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate -4.459 -5.08 July 2013 -4.758 -5.08 July 2010 -4.568 5.08 July 2010
Tanzania
Cameroon
Cameroon Kenya
TanzaniaCameroon
Note: While All Commodity Price is the same for all countries and crops and Average International Price for all countries, the respective length of the time 
series varies depending on the remaining variables for the analysis. We depict here the results for the time series covering most of the months (January 2005-
December 2015).
Results Structural Break Test, Zivot Andrews Test 1
1 if seasonality was detected in the time series, the series were de-seasonalized. Therefore, all series are seasonally adjusted.
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Table 4: Results for fractional integration tests for all variables (general, country- and crop-specific 
variables) 
P-values P-values P-values
Geweke/Porter-
Hudak Test
Phillips' 
Modified Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Robinson's 
Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Fractional 
integration
General variable (same for all crops and countries)
0.4 0.010 0.041 0.001
0.5 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.6 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000
Crop-specific variable (same for all countries)
0.4 0.016 0.104 0.005
0.5 0.001 0.004 0.000
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-values P-values P-values P-values P-values P-values
Country-specific variables
Geweke/Porter-
Hudak Test
Phillips' 
Modified Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Robinson's 
Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Fractional 
integration
Geweke/Porter-
Hudak Test
Phillips' 
Modified Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Robinson's Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Fractional 
integration
0.4 0.093 0.101 0.049 0.046 0.004 0.005
0.5 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4 0.226 0.811 0.205 0.009 0.000 0.000
0.5 0.022 0.153 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.6 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4 0.136 0.022 0.113 0.832 0.073 0.483
0.5 0.020 0.000 0.016 0.078 0.003 0.070
0.6 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.059 0.004 0.057
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-values P-values P-values
Geweke/Porter-
Hudak Test
Phillips' 
Modified Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Robinson's 
Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Fractional 
integration
Crop-specific variable (same for all countries)
0.4 0.038 0.040 0.023
0.5 0.002 0.001 0.001
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-values P-values P-values
Country-specific variables
Geweke/Porter-
Hudak Test
Phillips' 
Modified Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Robinson's 
Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Fractional 
integration
0.4 0.071 0.111 0.027
0.5 0.001 0.001 0.000
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4 0.226 0.811 0.205
0.5 0.022 0.153 0.017
0.6 0.001 0.010 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4 0.164 0.613 0.142
0.5 0.007 0.029 0.004
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000
Results Fractional Integration Test Maize
P-values P-values P-values
Geweke/Porter-
Hudak Test
Phillips' 
Modified Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Robinson's 
Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Fractional 
integration
Crop-specific variable (same for all countries)
0.4 0.043 0.034 0.027
0.5 0.006 0.003 0.004
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-values P-values P-values P-values P-values P-values P-values P-values P-values
Country-specific variables
Geweke/Porter-
Hudak Test
Phillips' 
Modified Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Robinson's 
Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Fractional 
integration
Geweke/Porter-
Hudak Test
Phillips' 
Modified Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Robinson's Log 
Periodogram 
Regression
Fractional 
integration
Geweke/Po
rter-Hudak 
Test
Phillips' 
Modified 
Log 
Periodogra
m 
Regression
Robinson's 
Log 
Periodogra
m 
Regression
Fractional 
integration
0.4 0.143 0.116 0.033 0.030 0.032 0.014 0.047 0.912 0.013
0.5 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.053 0.001
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4 0.226 0.022 0.205 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000
0.5 0.022 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.6 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.4 0.159 0.256 0.137 0.071 0.102 0.116 0.002 0.001 0.005
0.5 0.019 0.026 0.014 0.019 0.018 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.001
0.6 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Variables
Cameroon Tanzania
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Powers
Powers
Domestic Price
Exchange Rate
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate
All Commodity Price Index
Results Fractional Integration Test Rice
Average International Price
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate Yes
Cameroon
Powers
Domestic Price Yes
Variables Powers
Average International Price Yes
Yes
Results Fractional Integration Test Wheat
Yes
Yes
Exchange Rate Yes Yes
Interaction International Price and Tarif Rate Yes Yes
Domestic Price Yes
1 if seasonality was detected in the time series, the series were de-seasonalized. Therefore, all series are seasonally adjusted.
Results Fractional Integration Tests1
Tanzania
Yes
Yes
Cameroon Kenya
Powers
Variables Powers
Average International Price Yes
Exchange Rate Yes
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Estimated Models  
Table 5: Results for autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average (ARFIMA) models 
Dependent variable 
Model containing no constant containing no constant containing no constant
Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea
Constant 9073*** 0.000 1.275 0.452 1.716 0.515
ln(Interaction International 
Price and Tarif Rate)
0.0004 0.983 0.084 0.370 0.0804 0.393 -0.232 0.441 -0.267 0.369
ln(InAll Commodity Price 
Index)
0.1117 0.190 0.269** 0.042 0.318*** 0.006 0.27* 0.055 0.317*** 0.009
ln(Exchange Rate) -0.556*** 0.005 0.59* 0.055 0.789*** 0.000 0.352 0.244 0.531*** 0.000
Dependent variable 
Model containing no constant containing no constant
Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea
Constant 11.418*** 0.000 -0.215 0.981
ln(Interaction International 
Price and Tarif Rate)
0.054*** 0.000 -0.0144 0.875 -0.0144 0.875
ln(InAll Commodity Price 
Index)
0.076* 0.069 -0.385 0.487 -0.391 0.412
ln(Exchange Rate) -0.864*** 0.000 0.828 0.446 0.803** 0.015
Dependent variable 
Model containing no constant
Coefficient p-valuea
Constant 14.205*** 0.000
ln(Interaction International 
Price and Tarif Rate)
0.026** 0.024
ln(InAll Commodity Price 
Index)
0.007 0.883
ln(Exchange Rate) -1.231*** 0.000
a  ***p-value < 0.01; **p-value < 0.05: *p-value < 0.10: critical value for hypothesis testing is 0.05
Cameroon
ln(Domestic Price)
Tanzania
ln(Domestic Price)
containing a constant
Autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average
no convergence of the 
Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfa
rb–Shanno algorithm 
Maize
Rice
Wheat
containing a constant
no convergence of the 
Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfa
rb–Shanno algorithm 
Tanzania
ln(Domestic Price)
containing a constant
containing a constant
no convergence of the 
Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfa
rb–Shanno algorithm 
Cameroon Kenya
ln(Domestic Price)
containing a constant
ln(Domestic Price)
Cameroon
ln(Domestic Price)
containing a constant
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Table 6: Results for Markov-switching regression models 
Dependent variable 
Regime
Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea
ln(Interaction International 
Price and Tarif Rate)
0.582* 0.06 -0.245*** 0.000 0.195*** 0.002 -0.247*** 0.005 0.603*** 0.000 0.227 0.409
ln(InAll Commodity Price 
Index)
-0.432 0.123 1.066*** 0.000 0.132* 0.057 0.752 0.000 -0.281*** 0.002 0.459 0.259
ln(Exchange Rate) 0.838*** 0.000 0.351*** 0.000 0.931*** 0.000 0.685 0.000 0.526*** 0.000 0.233 0.074
Regime 1
Regime 2
Dependent variable 
Regime
Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea Coefficient p-valuea
ln(Interaction International 
Price and Tarif Rate)
0.522*** 0.000 0.673*** 0.000 0.482*** 0.000 0.175** 0.031
ln(InAll Commodity Price 
Index)
0.177** 0.03 0.043 0.21 -0.187*** 0.000 -0.151 0.877
ln(Exchange Rate) 0.39*** 0.000 0.03*** 0.000 0.600 0.000 0.777*** 0.000
Regime 1
Regime 2
Dependent variable 
Regime
Coefficient p-value
a Coefficient p-value
a
ln(Interaction International 
Price and Tarif Rate)
0.151** 0.016 0.213*** 0.000
ln(InAll Commodity Price 
Index)
0.207*** 0.005 0.333*** 0.000
ln(Exchange Rate) 0.77*** 0.000 0.662*** 0.000
Regime 1
Regime 2 0.011 0.967
Transition probabilities
0.918 0.113
0.082 0.887
0.989 0.034
0.027
0.028 0.973
0.959 0.065
0.041 0.935
a ***p-value < 0.01; **p-value < 0.05: *p-value < 0.10: critical value for hypothesis testing is 0.05
Tanzania
Regime 1 Regime 1
ln(Domestic Price)
Regime 1
Regime 2
Regime 2 Regime 2
0.987
0.013
0.033
Regime 2
0.967
Regime 1: increasing trend of domestic prices is 
prevailing
Regime 2: decreasing trend of domestic prices is 
prevailing
Regime 1: decreasing trend of domestic prices is 
prevailing
Regime 2: increasing of domestic prices is prevailing
Regime 1: increasing trend of domestic prices is 
prevailing
0.898 0.093
0.102 0.907
Transition probabilities
Markov-switching regression model (estimation without a constant)
Maize
Regime 1
Tanzania
ln(Domestic Price)
Regime 1
Regime 1
Kenya
ln(Domestic Price)
Cameroon
ln(Domestic Price)
Regime 2
0.972
Cameroon
ln(Domestic Price)
Regime determination
Regime determination
Regime determination
Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 2: decreasing trend of domestic prices is 
prevailing
Regime 1: very high domestic prices are prevailing
Regime 2: low or average domestic prices are 
prevailing
Transition probabilities 
Wheat
Rice
Regime 2
ln(Domestic Price)
Cameroon
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2
Regime 1: decreasing trend of the domestic pricesis 
prevailing
Regime 2: increasing trend of the domestic prices is 
prevailing
Regime 1 increasing trend of domestic trends is 
prevailing
Regime 2 decreasing trend of domestic prices is 
prevailing
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10. Panel Data Analysis 
Preliminary tests and graphs 
 
Table 7: Results for Wooldridge test for autocorrelation for balanced panel data for Maize and Rice 
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Table 8: Results for panel unit root tests for balanced panel data for Maize and Rice 
Testa
Null 
hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis
Asymptotics Test Statistic  p-value
b Outcome Test Statistic  p-valueb Outcome Test Statistic  p-valueb Outcome
Test 
Statistic
 p-value
b Outcome
Fisher ADF (Inverse 
Chi-squared)
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
T→ Infinity 6.594 0.3601
All panels contain 
unit roots
3.8176 0.7014
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
7.0985 0.3118
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
11.0625* 0.0865
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
Fisher  Philips-
Perron (Inverse Chi-
squared)
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
T→ Infinity 3.993 0.6776
All panels contain 
unit roots
1.6677 0.9476
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
1.1271 0.9803
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
5.8583 0.4393
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
IPS 
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
Some panels are 
stationary
T, N → Infinity, 
sequentially
-0.5338 0.2968
All panels contain 
unit roots
0.1196 0.5476
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
-0.8127 0.2082
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
-1.4172* 0.0782
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
LLC 
Panels contain 
unit roots
Panels are 
stationary
N/T→ 0 0.4312 0.668
Panels contain 
unit roots
-0.9198 0.1788
Panels contain 
unit roots
-0.231 0.4087
Panels contain 
unit roots
-1.7799** 0.0375
Panels are 
stationary
Breitung 
Panels contain 
unit roots
Panels are 
stationary
T, N → Infinity, 
sequentially
0.0135 0.5054
Panels contain 
unit roots
0.5787 0.7186
Panels contain 
unit roots
2.8747 0.998
Panels contain 
unit roots
-0.6418 0.2605
Panels 
contain unit 
roots
Hadri LM
All panels are 
stationary
Some panels 
cointains unit 
root
T, N → Infinity, 
sequentially
13.0787*** 0.000
Some panels 
cointains unit 
root
39.341*** 0.000
Some panels 
cointains unit 
root
14.4595*** 0.000
Some panels 
cointains unit 
root
28.12*** 0.000
Some panels 
cointains 
unit root
Testa
Null 
hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis
Asymptotics Test Statistic  p-valueb Outcome Test Statistic  p-valueb Outcome Test Statistic  p-valueb Outcome
Test 
Statistic
 p-valueb Outcome
Fisher ADF (Inverse 
Chi-squared)
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
T→ Infinity 112.288*** 0.000
At least one panel 
is stationary
141.652*** 0.000
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
89.9196*** 0.000
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
82.0179*** 0.000
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
Fisher  Philips-
Perron (Inverse Chi-
squared)
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
T→ Infinity 95.303*** 0.000
At least one panel 
is stationary
114.601*** 0.000
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
113.5888*** 0.000
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
93.914*** 0.000
At least one 
panel is 
stationary
IPS 
All panels 
contain unit 
roots
Some panels are 
stationary
T, N → Infinity, 
sequentially
-12.261*** 0.000
Some panels are 
stationary
15.523*** 0.000
Some panels 
are stationary
10.2823*** 0.000
Some panels 
are stationary
-9.5565*** 0.000
Some panels 
are 
stationary
LLC 
Panels contain 
unit roots
Panels are 
stationary
N/T→ 0 -12.163*** 0.000
Panels are 
stationary
15.353*** 0.000
Panels are 
stationary
10.0244*** 0.000
Panels are 
stationary
-8.2628*** 0.000
Panels are 
stationary
Breitung 
Panels contain 
unit roots
Panels are 
stationary
T, N → Infinity, 
sequentially
-6.553*** 0.000
Panels are 
stationary
-6.772*** 0.000
Panels are 
stationary
-7.9532*** 0.000
Panels are 
stationary
-5.6295*** 0.000
Panels are 
stationary
Hadri LM
All panels are 
stationary
Some panels 
cointains unit 
root
T, N → Infinity, 
sequentially
-1.662 0.952
All panels are 
stationary
-1.789 0.963
All panels are 
stationary
1.378 0.916
All panels are 
stationary
-0.961 0.832
All panels 
are 
stationary
a  lag length specification (based on Moment and Model selection Aikake Information Criterion for Panel VARs and Panel VECMs) : 1 lag
b  ***p-value < 0.01; **p-value < 0.05: *p-value < 0.10: critical value for hypothesis testing is 0.05
Balanced Panel Rice (Cameroon and Tanzania)
Results Panel Unit Root Tests1,2
1 if seasonality was detected in the time series, the series were de-seasonalized. Therefore, all series are seasonally adjusted.
2 
The tests include non-zero constants and time trend, if they were detected from the graphs or the tests.
Domestic Price Interaction International Price and Tarif All Commodity Price Index Exchange Rate
b
 ***p-value < 0.01; **p-value < 0.05: *p-value < 0.10: critical value for hypothesis testing is 0.05
Balanced Panel Maize (Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania)
Interaction International Price and Tarif 
Rate
a  lag length specification (based on Moment and Model selection Aikake Information Criterion for Panel VARs and Panel VECMs) : 1 lag
Domestic Price Exchange RateAll Commodity Price Index
1 if seasonality was detected in the time series, the series were de-seasonalized. Therefore, all series are seasonally adjusted.
2 The tests include non-zero constants and time trend, if they were detected from the graphs or the tests.
Results Panel Unit Root Tests1,2
 
 
Table 9: : Results for Westerlund test for co-integration for balanced panel data for Maize and Rice 
Value Z-value p-value (robust)
Is there co-
integration?
-2.603 0.202 0.49
-12.596 0.632 0.59
-4.546 -0.297 0.38
-12.664 -0.113 0.39
Statistics 
Panel Statistics 
Group Mean Statistics
Balanced Panel Maize (Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania)
Westerlund test for co-integration in panel data1
1 if seasonality was detected in the time series, the series were de-seasonalized. Therefore, all series are seasonally adjusted.
H 0 = no co-integration
NO
Ga
Gt
Pt
Pa  
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Table 10: Results for cross-sectional dependence (CD) test for balanced panel data for Maize and Rice 
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Estimated Models  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: : Results for non-stationary non-cointegrated panel model for maize 
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Table 12: Results for stationary panel model for rice 
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Shocks, price transmission and Food 
consumption with changes in Price risk aversion 
 
Shocks and Food consumption
with changes in Price risk aversion
Lodovico Muratori
This paper aims to answer the following key research questions: i) does household
price risk aversion change over time? ii) and, eventually, does a time-varying risk
aversion aﬀect production and consumption pattern of farm households? To this
end, I apply to the Ugandan Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) three-
wave panel data for the period 2009-2012 the risk aversion parameter introduced by
Bellemare et al. (2013b), which analyses the eﬀect of the market imperfections and
the institutions which facilitate risk-bearing on the household behaviour towards
risk. Unlike Bellemare et al. (2013b) I develop a microfounded empirical model,
where the risk aversion parameter is allowed to change over time and not just across
households, and estimate it by a two-stage structural approach. The empirical results
show that the risk aversion parameter is not constant over time and that peasants
prefer to increase their income with the sale of the harvested crop instead of directly
consuming it, because the reduction of dietary energy consumption derived from
the giving up the harvest for sale is more than oﬀset by the rise of food purchasing
power due to the larger proﬁts obtained.
Keywords: commodity prices, risk aversion, panel data, Uganda
JEL codes: D13, D81, O12, Q12
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Introduction
Since 795 million of people are undernourished worldwide, food security is still a relevant problem
in many countries and represents a primary policy goal from a social and economic point of view
(FAO et al., 2015).
Prolonged under-nutrition reduces ability to work, endangers country's human capital and can
imply large health care costs in the medium and long term. Children under 5 years of age are
particularly vulnerable and inadequate nutrient intake has long-term negative impact on their
cognitive skills and health, then on the long-term development potential of the country.
Household food consumption depends on the available supply, prevailing food prices and house-
hold income. If the households produce and consume crops at the same time, their optimization
decisions are more sophisticated than the ones of standard consumers, because the opportunity
costs to sell one unit of harvested crop on the market is represented by the giving up the con-
sumption of this unit of self-produced crop. In order to address this issues, farm household
models were introduced and applied ﬁrstly to the rural sector in Japan (Kuroda and Yotopoulos,
1978).
The major innovation of the farm household models is that the production and consumption de-
cisions of farm households are interlinked, because the latter consume and produce crops at the
same time, while in the standard microeconomic theory consumers and producers are separate
agents (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) (Singh et al., 1986) (Taylor and Adelman, 2003).
Given the objective of the farm households to increase their own welfare and make sure their own
food security, the farmers face a major trade-oﬀ between the consumption of their own harvested
crop and the sale of it on the market (Taylor and Adelman, 2003).
The main peculiarities of these models is that the budget of farm households is not ﬁxed, as it is
the case of standard consumers, but endogenously determined by positive farm proﬁt component
which is to be added to negative elasticity between price and consumer's demand (Mendola,
2007) (Taylor and Adelman, 2003, 36).
Indeed, farm household models encompass the dual role of the households as producers and con-
sumers of the regarded crops and allow to summarize at the microeconomic level demand-side
and supply-side factors into a single variable, the marketable surplus. The marketable surplus
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between produced and consumed quantities of a given crop by the
household.
This variable allows to take into account the household heterogeneity, because households can be
net sellers, net buyers or autartik as well as they can switch over time (Bellemare et al., 2013b,
879) (Singh et al., 1986).
The past few decades have witnessed renewed interest from the scientiﬁc community with respect
to the analysis of the behaviour of farmers: the neoclassical farm household models, which de-
scribe these economic agents as both producers and consumers, were extended to include the risk
analysis, which allows to understand why farmers prefer low-risk and low-return over high-return
and high-risk strategies (Mendola, 2007) (Nielsen and Zeller, 2013) (Dercon, 1996) (Lybbert and
McPeak, 2012) (Morduch, 1994) (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993).
While income risk aversion has been widely documented by the literature, price risk aversion,
which is the focus of this study, has aroused just more recently researchers' interest (Finkelshtain
and Chalfant, 1991) (Barrett, 1996) (Bellemare et al., 2013b).
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The question whether the risk aversion parameter is constant or changing over time has been
often neglected, while it should be systematically addressed.
In this paper, it is investigated whether the occurrence of exogenous shocks change price risk
aversion and which is the impact of a time-varying price risk aversion on household food con-
sumption.
Risk assessment by the farm households depends on both the psychological risk preferences of
each household and the existing institutional framework, i.e. the existence of market imperfec-
tions and the availability of institutions which facilitate risk-bearing (Mendola, 2007) (Bellemare
et al., 2013b).
If there are incomplete markets and only a partial possibility for farmers to insure themselves
against food consumption risk, the only available food consumption smoothing strategy is preu-
cationary saving, which consists of storing some portions of the harvest in response to uncertainty
regarding future food availability (Thomson and Metz, 1999, 65-66).
Food storage allows to make crops available along the year, but several farmers do not have
appropriate storage facilities and they are not able to store properly in their houses or granaries:
they need to sell their harvest to traders or wholesaler, who own appropriate storage facilities
and demand for a remuneration for the use of their capital (Thomson and Metz, 1999, 65-66).
Therefore, storage can imply some costs and households are not likely paying additional costs
to store very small excess supply. Some of these costs are indirect, because farmers sell most of
their product in the post-harvest period, in order to avoid that the harvest spoils: this behaviour
leads to a temporary surplus and low farm gate prices (Thomson and Metz, 1999, 65-66).
Moreover, it is very likely that household will shift consumption from one month to other, but
less likely that the food intertemporal consumption decisions will extend from one year to the
other. Indeed, several crops are highly perishable: they are bought not long before their actual
consumption and their harvest is sold within a reasonable interval of time before crops perish
(FAO, 1997).
Traders and wholesalers can also opt for inter-annual storage, but such an activity has a specu-
lative purpose. For food security reasons, inter-annual storage is carried out by the government,
but not by the private economic agents. Finally, to store some commodities like fruits and
vegetables for more than few weeks can be very expensive and these items are traded just on
seasonal basis (Thomson and Metz, 1999, 65-66).
For the above mentioned reasons, in the empirical two-stage structural model developed in this
study, precautionary savings in food and storage are not included.
Data are obtained, by combining the Uganda Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) and
the calories intake for kilogram is taken from the International Network of Food Data Systems
(World Bank, 2015) (FAO, 2015). Data are prepared in order to make them available for esti-
mation of the magnitude and the sign of the variables of interest.
The panel database concerns 3284 households which consumed or produced the major staple
crops in Uganda, like beans, cassava, maize, plantains, rice and sweet potatoes during three
survey waves 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012.
Two diﬀerent databases, a balanced and an unbalanced panel, were built and used for the analysis.
In the unbalanced panel database all 3284 households are taken into account for the estimation,
while the balanced one consists of 2491 households, since some observations are missing for one
or two years. Information employed for the empirical analysis are the market and farm gate
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prices of the crops, dietary energy consumption, quantity supplied and consumed of crops by
the households, income of the household, a set of household features taken from the literature
(Dohmen et al., 2011), (Moscardi and Janvry, 1977) (Nielsen and Zeller, 2013) (D'Souza and
Tandon, 2015, 14). A survey wave dummy variable allows to assess whether the risk aversion
parameter is changing over time.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the risk aversion parameter is not constant over
time and that households can become more risk averse, if they face adverse market conditions
in the previous periods.
This study provides evidence that peasants prefer to increase their income with the sale of the
harvested crop instead of directly consuming it, because the reduction of dietary energy con-
sumption derived from the giving up the harvest for sale is more than oﬀset by the rise of food
purchasing power due to the larger proﬁts obtained.
Furthermore, the attendance of the primary school by the household head reduces the psycho-
logical risk aversion, while all other household features have just an impact on the strategy how
households employ the risk-bearing institutions. In particular, attendance of the primary school
provides conﬁdence and skills to the household heads to face some of the challenges, which there
are in a risky environment.
Knowledge of the importance of the exogenous shocks for the determination of the time-varying
risk aversion parameter is useful for design of development policies. Finally, awareness of the key
contribution of the harvest sale on the market to the farm household food security could stress
the relevance of measures for the development of agricultural markets in developing countries.
Literature Review
In the context of agricultural business, farmers face several forms of business risk: it includes
personal, institutional, production and price risk1. The personal risk is due to death or illness of
the ﬁrm owners, whereas the institutional risk refers to political risk, i.e. the implementation
of unfavourable policy changes. The latter can be further decomposed into relationship risk, i.e.,
the breach of contracts between business partners in the value chain, and sovereign risk, i.e., the
inability by the government to honour its commitments like the enforcement of trade agreements
(Hardaker, 2004, 6-7) (Hardaker et al., 2015, 5-6). Production risk concerns the harvest shortfall
due to unexpected bad weather conditions and to the impact of pests and diseases on crops and
livestock. Price risk is linked to volatility of the input, output prices and of the exchange rates.
Both production and price risks are assumed to be particularly relevant in agriculture because
production decisions have to be made long before the time the harvest is sold, so that the market
price for the output is not known at the time these decisions have to be made (Hardaker, 2004,
6-7) (Hardaker et al., 2015, 5-6). In several models concerning production decisions, peasants
are assumed to carry out mostly subsistence production for self-consumption; therefore, output
and input prices, if included in the approach, are treated as exogenous variables (Janvry et al.,
1991, 1400-1401).
Before the contribution by Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991), the assessment of the impact of risk
1A separate issue concerns ﬁnancial risk. It refers to the way the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced and is due to debt leverage, it means
the ratio between debt capital and total capital, which makes the business dependent on lenders, or to changes in interest
and inﬂation rates as well as to the anticipated calling-in of a loan by a lender (Hardaker, 2004, 6-7) (Hardaker et al., 2015,
5-6).
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and uncertainty on welfare was carried out separately for consumption and production decisions
(Bellemare and Lee, 2016).
Producers
Concerning the welfare analysis of producers, Oi (1961) challenged the conventional wisdom that
price instability is undesirable for ﬁrms, which can obtain larger proﬁts under price uncertainty.
Oi (1961) came to this conclusion because of his assumption that ﬁrms can predict future prices
perfectly or can adjust their output instantaneously.
Instead, if this hypothesis is dropped, the expected proﬁt is smaller with price instability than
with price stability, and that the expected proﬁt declines as price variability increases (Tisdell,
1963). Unlike Oi (1961) and Tisdell (1963), who deal with risk-neutral ﬁrms, McCall (1967)
introduces risk aversion and shows that a risk-averse ﬁrm will produce less than a risk-neutral
and even less than a risk-loving ﬁrm.
These approaches evaluate how price stabilisation inﬂuences the level of output, while Schmitz
et al. (1981) assessed the beneﬁt of price stabilisation to producers by directly addressing its
eﬀect on preferences. In particular, Schmitz et al. (1981) showed that Oi (1961)'s results hold if
the ﬁrm is proﬁt risk-loving, while a risk-averse ﬁrm may prefer price stability.
Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) applied diﬀerent approaches but both found that a risk averse
producer will produce less when price is a matter of chance than when it is certain and known.
In particular, Baron (1970) regards price uncertainty as given and analyses the impact of price
risk aversion on the ﬁrm's output, while Sandmo (1971) considers proﬁt risk-aversion as given
and focuses on the impact of price uncertainty on output.
The Sandmo (1971)'s predictions about lower productivity of the risk-averse producers were em-
pirically conﬁrmed by Appelbaum and Ullah (1997), who applied non-parameteric methods to
estimate the ﬁrst four moments - mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis - of the price distribu-
tion in the printing and publishing industry as well as in the stone, clay and glass industries. In
this approach, the output under price certainty cannot be observed from the data, therefore the
authors obtained it by introducing some restrictions on the parameters derived from duality and
compared it with actual output level under price uncertainty.
Leland (1972), Turnovsky (1973) and Epstein (1978) extended the approach of Baron (1970) and
Sandmo (1971) by modelling ﬁrms as risk-averse agents, which can set both supply price and
quantities as well as they are able to change at extra cost their ex-ante decisions after the actual
selling price is realised. From these studies, Leland (1972), Turnovsky (1973) and Epstein (1978)
concluded that a change from risk-neutrality to risk-aversion does not necessarily decrease output
and can actually increase the planned output depending upon the shape of the cost function.
Batra and Ullah (1974) extended also the models by Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) and in-
troduced the decision-making process of farmers about the amount of capital and labour. By
exploiting such a framework, Batra and Ullah (1974) came to the conclusion that - under the
assumption that absolute risk aversion is decreasing - a risk averse producer will use less of all
inputs if output prices are uncertain than in the case these prices are certain and known.
Hartman (1975) disputes the Batra and Ullah (1974)'s result and pointed out that their conclu-
sions hold only if labour and capital are complements (i.e., increasing one input increases the
marginal productivity of the other input and the production function is concave).
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A diﬀerent approach is followed by Feldstein (1971), who developed a model based on the Jensen
inequality, where production outcomes rather than output prices are matter of chance. Feldstein
(1971) found that a risk-neutral producer should produce more than a risk-averse one and that
risk aﬀects not just risk-averse, but also risk-neutral producers.
Ratti and Ullah (1976) extended the approach by Feldstein (1971) with the introduction of a
proportional random shock. Their result is that a risk averse producer produces less than a risk
neutral producer and use less of capital and labour, if these input are complements. Pope and
Just (1978) and Pope and Kramer (1979) argued that the implications derived by Ratti and
Ullah (1976) do not correspond to the available empirical evidence. Indeed, several risk averse
producers over-employ rather than under-employ some production factors and that some inputs
like irrigation can reduce risk rather than increase it. By allowing that the chance outcome can
negatively aﬀect the productivity of an input, Pope and Just (1978) and Pope and Kramer (1979)
prove that risk averse producer may use more rather than less inputs than a risk neutral producer.
Finally, Ratti (1978) develops a more sophisticated model as reply to the latter critiques by Pope
and Just (1978) and Pope and Kramer (1979) as well as he provides evidence that risk-averse
producers use fewer inputs and in a less intensive way.
Consumers
Waugh (1944) was the ﬁrst to analyse the issue of price instability and risk aversion from the
point of view of the consumers and argued that consumers are better oﬀ under price variability
than under a price stabilized at its mean, given the assumption that consumption can be allo-
cated freely among diﬀerent time periods.
Nevertheless, the Waugh (1944)'s approach does not take into account the concept of the price
risk aversion, which was later introduced in this ﬁeld by Stiglitz (1969). In particular, Stiglitz
(1969) highlighted the link between risk neutrality and linearity: if an economic agent is risk-
neutral at all income and price ratios, its income-consumption curves are linear and its cardinal
utility can be represented by a function, which is linear in income.
Turnovsky et al. (1980) showed that the consumers' preference for price stabilization is a func-
tion of the income elasticity of demand for the commodity, the price elasticity of demand for the
commodity, the budget share allocated for consumption of the commodity and the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion. Since the desirability of price stabilization is positively correlated with
income risk aversion and negatively correlated with price and income elasticities, consumers can
be price risk-loving if the budget share is small and the income risk aversion is low.
Hanoch (1977) investigated the relationship between income risk preference and price risk pref-
erence. In particular, he showed that a necessary condition for a consumer to be price risk-loving
is that relative risk aversion over income be less than 2 and that a consumer can never be price
risk-averse with respect to all commodities.
In all these models farm gate output prices, if included, are taken as exogenous and household
farms are not able to give up own consumption or reduce quantity sold on the market or to
replace consumption of one crop with the other and sell the crops with the highest farm gate
prices, in order to make sure their food security.
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Farm households
The rigid separation between consumption and production in the analysis of the impact of risk
on the welfare was overcome by Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991), who realized that both the
prices of the commodities the farm household consumes and its income are random. Finkelshtain
and Chalfant (1991) provided evidence that the relationship betwen risk aversion and output is
ambiguous: production under price uncertainty can be greater or equal to or smaller than the
certainty output.
Indeed, the conclusions of Sandmo (1971) represent a special case of the Finkelshtain and Chal-
fant (1991)'s more general approach: they depend on the fact that the wealth eﬀect of price
dominates the consumption eﬀect. In the Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991) model the farm
household maximizes its expected utility over the consumption of a portion of the farm output,
an aggregate market good and leisure. In this framework, the decision-making process involves
two-periods: in the ﬁrst one, the household makes its leisure and output decisions, and in the
second one, after the uncertain prices are realized, it makes its consumption decision. The risk
premium developed by Finkelstaink generalizes the Arrow-Pratt risk premium (Pratt, 1964): in
the Pratt (1964)'s approach the risk premium is deﬁned as the maximum amount of income an
individual is willing to pay to stabilize his income at its expected value, given that income is
the only random variable, while the one employed by Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991) is the
maximum amount of income an individual is willing to pay to stabilize his income when both
income and price are random.
Barrett (1996) combined the approach of Turnovsky et al. (1980) and Finkelshtain and Chalfant
(1991) and provided evidence that, in the case of a farm household which produces and consumes
a single commodity, the inverse farm size-productivity relationship holds true.
The Barrett (1996)'s approach was extended by Bellemare et al. (2013b) to the production and
consumption of several crops: the latter article showed that the Ugandan farm households are
risk-averse and willing to give up about 18% of its income to stabilize the commodity prices.
More recently, McBride (2016) highlighted that the results by Bellemare et al. (2013b) about the
computation of the willingness to pay depend on the way missing data are dealt with.
In the reply to McBride (2016), Bellemare et al. (2016) explained that both the assumptions
for the replacement of missing data made by Bellemare et al. (2013b) and McBride (2016) are
ad-hoc and that additional empirical research is needed in this ﬁeld, since the change of a single
assumption leads to very diﬀerent results. Therefore, Lee et al. (2015) and Bellemare and Lee
(2016) stressed the importance to integrate previous reseach on the price risk aversion with the
results provided by the experimental and behavioural economics.
Moreover, for simplicity's sake, in the analysis of the household behaviour in a risky environ-
ment the risk aversion parameter has been taken as constant over time by the standard economic
theory and the question, whether this parameter can change over time, has been long ignored
(Stigler and Becker, 1977). In this ﬁeld, the most updated contributions addressed the possibility
of variation of the psychological risk aversion over time - proxied by the Arrow Pratt coeﬃcient
of risk aversion. However, they do not reach a consensus whether individuals become more risk-
averse or risk-tolerant after the occurrence of a shock or a major life event of psychological, social
or economic nature (Hanaoka et al., 2015; Decker and Schmitz, 2015; Görlitz and Tamm, 2015;
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Malmendier et al., 2011; Cohn et al., 2015; Andersen et al., 2008; Schurer, 2015)2.
Also, more recently, scholars extended the concept of risk aversion pointing out that two sets of
factors inﬂuence the decisions of the farm households in a risky environment: their psychological
risk preferences and the availability of institutional arrangements to mitigate the risk, which they
face (Bellemare et al., 2013b). This because the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
proxies just psychological risk preferences and it is not able to describe alone the prevailing risk
faced by the households in the economy, since it is independent from market imperfections and
availability of institutions which facilitate risk-bearing. Analysis of the socio-economic context
is also important to determine household risk proﬁle because households could exercise caution
and forfeit expected proﬁt in order to protect themselves and reduce risk, if institutions provide
incomplete insurance (Mendola, 2007).
The Model
The developed model lies in the research tradition related to the standard expected utility theory
under uncertainty (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) and assumes that households prefer lower
smooth consumption streams to ﬂuctuating ones (Morduch, 1994).
While in the classical microeconomic theory consumers and producers are separate agents, in
the farm household models production and consumption decisions are interlinked, because the
economic actors consume and produce crops at the same time (Singh et al., 1986; Taylor and
Adelman, 2003)3. This feature implies that the budget of farm households is not ﬁxed, as it is
the case of standard consumers, but endogenously determined by positive farm proﬁt component
which is to be added to negative elasticity between price and consumer's demand (Taylor and
Adelman, 2003, 36). Sources of non-separability can be high transaction costs - due to transports
expenditures, distance from the market or excessive marketing margins - and thin, remote mar-
kets with very few buyers and sellers as well as prevalence of risk in the economic environment
(Singh et al., 1986).
Several studies give proof that ﬁrms forego expected proﬁts to hedge against risk in presence
of output price uncertainty (Sandmo, 1971; Schmitz et al., 1981; Baron, 1970). In this respect,
risk analysis can help explaining why farmers prefer low-risk and low-return over high-return and
high-risk strategies (Mendola, 2007; Nielsen and Zeller, 2013; Dercon, 1996; Lybbert and McPeak,
2012; Morduch, 1994; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). Instead, individual consumers are price
risk-loving for a speciﬁc commodity when the budget share of that commodity is not too large,
given the quasi-convexity of their indirect utility function (Deschamps, 1973; Hanoch, 1977;
Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979; Turnovsky et al., 1980; Finkelshtain and Chalfant, 1991; Barrett,
1996; Bellemare et al., 2013b).
In our model we present a farm household model where each household h faces in each period
t the following optimization problem of its direct utility function with respect to non separable
production and consumption decisions on crop j (Singh et al., 1986; Bellemare et al., 2013b)4:
2 There is some evidence that a change in risk aversion occurs over the life cycle, but it was shown by some authors that
the trend of its variation depends on the socioeconomic group of the individuals (Dohmen et al., 2011; Cohen and Einav,
2007; Schurer, 2015). In particular, risk aversion soars for all socioeconomic groups from late adolescence until the agents
reach the middle age, afterwards it decreases for individuals, who are in a good socioeconomic position, while it continues
to increase with age - at the same rate as observed before middle age - for the more disadvantaged people (Schurer, 2015).
3For a more technical reference see Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
4In order to keep simple the notation, the index h is omitted in the mathematical derivation, but it should be always
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maxE[U(
X
j
MSjt)] (1)
subject to X
j
PPjtMSjt = E[Yt(Aijt)] (2)
whereMSjt is the marketable surplus, i.e. the diﬀerence between quantity harvested and quantity
consumed of the crop j, PPjt is the farm gate price, Yt is the full income and Aijt is the price risk
aversion coeﬃcient, given the correlation between the prices of the crop i and j. The equal sign
in the budget constraint equation 2 is due to the fact that all oﬀ-farm activities are disregarded
in this empirical model. The home consumption of self-produced food is not included in the
model too, because the focus is on market price risk aversion.
Through Epstein (1975)'s duality result, I can derive the maximization of indirect utility function
which is equivalent to the maximization of the direct one, as follows5:
maxE[V (PPjt ; Yt)] (3)
subject to X
j
PPjtMSjt = E[Yt(Aijt)] (4)
where MSjt, P
P
jt , Yt and Aijt are the same variables of the equations 1 and 2.
Optimization of indirect utility function provides advantages over direct one, since it is homoge-
nous of degree zero in prices and income and measurement unit for prices and income do not
matter (Bellemare et al., 2013b).
Note that precautionary saving is omitted in this empirical model, which uses average annual
values net of the shift of intertemporal food consumption from one month to the other. Indeed,
the bulk of storage activity for food security purposes is carried out by private economic agents
on intra-annual basis, because inter-annual storage activity is expensive and carried out for spec-
ulative purposes as well as several crops are highly perishable: they are bought not long before
their actual consumption and their harvest is sold within a reasonable interval of time before
crops perish (Thomson and Metz, 1999, 65-66) (FAO, 1997).
I assume that equation 1 can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas direct utility function over N
crops:
U(MSjt) =
NY
j=1
MS
j
jt (5)
given
P
j = 1.
Along the lines of the derivation of the model entailed in the Annex II, the indirect utility
regarded that the optimization is carried out at household level.
5Optimization of direct utility, equation 1, consists in maximization of consumption of goods given income and prices,
while optimization of indirect utility, equation 3, minimizes total expenditure with ﬁxed prices given a certain target utility
level (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, 50-60). Indirect utility function can be obtained by replacing optimal marketable surplus
MSjt into direct utility function (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, 50-60)
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function for N crops is the following one:
lnV (PPjt ; Yt; Aijt) = j lnj   j lnP
P
jt + lnYt + lnAijt
8j
NX
i
j = 1
(6)
In this approach, the price risk aversion coeﬃcient Aijt plays a relevant role. Aijt takes into
account that some families are both producers and consumers of crops and was developed by
Turnovsky et al. (1980), Barrett (1996) and Bellemare et al. (2013b):
Aijt =
MSjt
PCj
[jt (j  R) + ij ] (7)
where MSjt is the marketable surplus of commodity j, P
C
j the consumer market price of com-
modity j, jt =
PPjtMSjt
Yt
is the budget share of marketable surplus of commodity j, j the income
elasticity of marketable surplus of commodity j, R the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of risk aversion as
well as ij the cross-price elasticity between the marketable surplus of the crops i and j.
The derivation of the price risk aversion matrix Aijt is entailed in the annex I.
The geometric meaning of Aijt is similar to the one of the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of risk aversion.
Speciﬁcally, Aijt indicates the concavity of the utility function: if Aijt is negative, the farm
household is price risk averse, since the minus sign provides evidence that the utility function
is concave down; if Aijt = 0 the household is price risk-neutral; if Aijt is positive, the farm
household is risk-loving, since the plus sign provides evidence that the utility function is convex.
The components of Aijt have the following interpretation: the marketable surplus MSjt or the
share of the sale revenues over the household income jt are positively correlated with the Aijt,
because the larger jt andMSjt, the larger is the loss of the farmer household if an adverse price
shock occurs. (j  R) is an adjustment factor for the marketable surplus MSjt, which deducts
the psychological risk preferences proxied by the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coeﬃcient from j ,
the income elasticity of marketable surplus. Namely, (j  R) represents the elasticity of the
utility function due to the variations in the marketable surplus net of the changes in the risk
psychological preferences. PCj is negatively correlated with Aijt, because low consumer market
prices PCj provide an alternative to sale revenues for farm households to obtain enough calories
from the market, in case of adverse producer price shock. Finally, the cross-price elasticity ij is
positively correlated with Aijt, because a high level of crop cross-correlation reduces the eﬃcacy
of any farm household diversiﬁcation strategy.
The empirical strategy
The aim of the empirical analysis is to investigate whether the household price risk aversion coef-
ﬁcient is changing over time and then how time-varying price risk aversion aﬀects the household
food consumption pattern. This study provides an original contribution with respect to Belle-
mare et al. (2013b), because the empirical analysis is microfounded and the price risk aversion
parameter is allowed to change over time. To this end, the following empirical regression, which
is derived from the above micro model, is used for estimation:
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lnDEC = c  j lnP
P
jt + ln et + lndAijt (8)
where the log of the indicator of dietary energy consumption (lnDEC), i.e. the amount of calories
a representative farm household is assuming during the year, is employed as empirical counterpart
of the indirect utility function (Ramasawmy, 2012, 17), dAijt is the estimated household price
risk aversion (see below), et is the total expenditure, which proxies for the full income Yt of the
equation 6.
To control for possible sources of endogeneity between price risk aversion coeﬃcient Aijt, and
dietary energy consumption, DEC (e.g., it is possible that households with higher level of DEC,
i.e. richer in terms of calories consumption, are less risk-averse toward food shortfall), the price
risk aversion coeﬃcient Aijt is not directly introduced as explanatory variable in the equation
8. Rather, a 2SLS approach is applied by ﬁrst instrumenting the risk aversion parameter (dAijt)
through a ﬁrst stage regression, equation 9, and then including it as explanatory variable in the
equation 8.
In order to instrument dAijt, the following ﬁrst-stage equation is estimated:
lndAijt = j lnPCj;t 1 + lnH +W1112 +  (9)
where dAijt is the empirical counterpart of the price risk aversion parameter introduced by Belle-
mare et al. (2013b), PCj;t 1 is the lagged value of the market price of the crop j, H a set of
household control variables and W1112 is equal to 1 if the observation refers to the survey wave
period 2011-2012, 0 if it refers to the waves 2009-2010 or 2010-2011.  the error term.
The lagged value of the market prices PCj;t 1 is employed to control for the contemporaneous
endogeneity between the market prices, PCj;t, and the price risk aversion coeﬃcient, Aijt.
Further instruments are the market prices of plantains, beans, cassava, maize, rice and sweet
potatoes as well as the household size, the number of children and daughters, the literacy indi-
cator, the attendance of the school, the gender and age of the household head (Dohmen et al.,
2011; Moscardi and Janvry, 1977; Nielsen and Zeller, 2013) (D'Souza and Tandon, 2015, 14).
The literacy of the household heads is proxied by a dummy, which is equal to 1, if they are
literate, 0 otherwise. School attendance is deﬁned by two dummy variables: the ﬁrst one refers
to primary school, which is equal to 1 if the household head attended primary school, 0 other-
wise; the second dummy concerns the attendance of secondary school, which is equal to 1 if the
household head attended secondary school, 0 otherwise. The dummy variable for the gender of
the household heads is equal to 1 if they are male, 0 if they are female.
The selection of instruments is based on a far-reaching literature and the relevance of the in-
struments has been tested by various techniques: microeconomic models, econometric regression-
based techniques, lottery-based, game-theoretical experiments, etc. (Dohmen et al., 2011; Moscardi
and Janvry, 1977; Nielsen and Zeller, 2013; D'Souza and Tandon, 2015).
Take also into account that the equation 8 captures the impact of time-varying price risk aversion
on household food consumption pattern, while the equation 9 allows to disentangle the variation
of the price risk aversion coeﬃcient over time and to understand which household features have
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a major impact on the price risk aversion coeﬃcient.
In this study, approaches of the previous literature are extended to detect the impact of these
variables on the price risk aversion coeﬃcient, which assesses the relationship between the un-
derlying market conditions and the household behaviour towards risk (Bellemare et al., 2013b).
To this end, survey wave dummy variables are also introduced to detect changes of the price risk
aversion over time. The inclusion of such time dummy allows to disentangle whether there was
some break in the risk aversion parameter during the time period of the survey.
Note that in this empirical framework farm gate price PPjt and market price P
C
j are included as
two diﬀerent variables, because they are assessed at the diﬀerent levels of the value chain of the
crop j. The diﬀerence between them depends on the structure of the value chain and can be
due to several factors, like transport and transaction costs as well as market distorsions, which
are not speciﬁcally addressed in this study (Muratori, 2016). As it can be seen in the graph 1,
high volatility of food prices occurred between 2009 and 2012. This situation allows to assess the
impact of very volatile prices on the behaviour of farm households and, in particular, to study
the changes of their risk aversion parameter over time in a comprehensive fashion.
Be also aware that in the price risk aversion matrix Aijt (Bellemare et al., 2013b), the Arrow
Pratt coeﬃcient of risk aversion, R, which proxies psychological risk preferences, is deducted.
Therefore, Aijt does not provide any information whether the household psychological risk pref-
erences change over time after the occurrence of some price shocks. Nevertheless, it is possible
to have an insight in the variations of the psychological risk preferences due to the occurence of
price shocks, by analysing the residuals  of the ﬁrst-stage regression 9. Indeed, the residuals
 are the left-over, after the relationship between price risk aversion parameter Aijt and a set
of variables, which proxy the availability and eﬃciency of risk-bearing institutions, is estimated.
Therefore, although the residuals  entail much noise, they represent a rough indicator of the
empirically estimated household psychological risk aversion, bR, as well as they can be employed
as dependent variable in the following regression, which is estimated within a ﬁxed eﬀect model:
bR = H +W1112 (10)
This approach allows to investigate whether the household psychological risk preferences, R
change over time and which factors determine such a variation. The above described model
includes both the behaviour of net sellers and net buyers. Nevertheless, it is likely that the
behaviour of two groups of farm household is diﬀerent after the occurrence of a price shock. To
deal with this issue, the equation 9 is extended with a market position dummy variable, MPhjt,
which is equal to 1, if the farm household is a net seller of a given crop j, 0 otherwise:
lndAijt = j lnPCj;t 1 + lnH +W1112 +MPhjt (11)
The equation 11 allows to disentangle whether there is diﬀerence in the reaction to price shocks
between net seller and net buyer farm households.
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Data
The approach is based on the data collected by the Ugandan Statistical Oﬃce and the World
Bank team within the framework of the Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) (World
Bank, 2015).
Such database applied to this method allows to draw consistent conclusions, which can be gener-
alized to the population of Uganda, because its sampling design warrants representativeness at
national and sub-national level (Himelein, 2012). Moreover, the database is integrated with data
on calories intake of food, which are collected from International Network of Food Data Systems
(FAO, 2015).
The panel database concerns households which consumed or produced the major staple crops
in Uganda, like beans, cassava, maize, plantains, rice and sweet potatoes during three survey
waves, taking into consideration the following years 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012.
Data were prepared to allow the estimation of the magnitude and the sign of the variables of
interest. Due to the particular structure of the agricultural survey data, several sheets of the
Living Standard Measurement Study were merged in order to obtain necessary information for
the analysis.
The collected database provides information about consumption and production behaviour of
3284 households which harvested or consumed the above mentioned staple crops during the
LSMS survey waves 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 or at least in one of them.
This leads to the construction of two diﬀerent databases, a balanced and an unbalanced panels
which are both used for the analysis. In the unbalanced panel database all 3284 households are
taken into account for the estimation, while the balanced one consists of 2491 households, since
some observations are missing for one or two years.
In order to compute dietary energy consumption (DEC), calories intake for kilogram is taken
from the International Network of Food Data Systems (FAO, 2015). In particular, I distinguished
calories data between the diﬀerent food items and their processing status, for instance if they
are dry or fresh.
Another important issue with respect to data preparation concerns the conversion of non-
standard measurement units, like cups, buckets, etc., widely used in the context of rural agri-
culture, into kilograms. Conversion factors were taken from (World Bank, 2011) and (Woittiez
et al., 2013).
The reported farm gate and market prices, given for the speciﬁc measurement units provided by
the respondents (for instance, a sack or a cup), were converted in prices per kilogram of crop.
If market prices were missing, they were replaced by the average market price of the speciﬁc
crop. Instead, farm gate prices were not imputed and therefore there are many missing values
for this variable. The reason of the diﬀerent approach with respect to the missing values of
the two prices is due to the fact that the farm gate price received by the farmers can vary in a
signiﬁcant way across regions, along seasons and due to the market access available to the farm
household. Farmers cannot easily switch from one buyer to the other, because they are quite
dispersed across the country and live often in remote areas. On the contrary, consumers, mostly
living in urban environment, can more easily switch from a seller to the other in order to obtain
a better price for kilogram of crop, given the same quality level of the purchased product.
The kilogram-equivalent quantities and the calories intake for kilogram are also used for the
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computation of the yearly dietary energy consumption.
Moreover, information about actual income earned by the household members is diﬃcult to ob-
tain because of the reticence of respondents to declare such data and the prevalence of informal
business activities. In order to have a reliable estimate of the household income, the expenditure
approach is followed. Household ﬁnancial capability is based on total expenditures, i.e. all ex-
penses for consumption, non-durable, durable goods and for taxes and other fees. Such outlays
are reported for diﬀerent time horizons and therefore all of them are converted on a 365-days
basis to get total yearly expenditures.
In order to develop comparison some controls were introduced. Such dummies indicate whether
the household head is male, whether he or she is literate and attended primary or secondary
school. The number of children (members younger than 18 years) in each household and their
gender, household size and the age of the household head were also computed and included in
the panel database.
Following the equation 7, all parameters for the calculation of the the price risk aversion coeﬃ-
cient Aijt were separately computed.
By merging the household production and consumption database for the above mentioned crops
and taking the diﬀerence between the yearly kilogram-equivalent harvested and the kilogram-
equivalent consumed quantity, the yearly marketable surplus for each crop and household was
obtained.
If quantity produced and consumed of a given crop were missing and then the marketable sur-
plus could not be computed, it is not straightforward, whether the missing values are due to zero
production and consumption or whether the respondent was not able to reply to the question.
To avoid to spoil the dataset, in this case missing values of marketable surplus were not replaced.
The budget share of marketable surplus of commodity jt =
PPjtMj
Yt
was also added to the
database. The price risk aversion matrix evaluates the impact of the underlying market con-
ditions on the household behaviour towards risk: in particular, it includes the amount of the
marketable surplus, the value of the market prices, the budget share of the revenues from the
sale of each commodity, the cross-price elasticity between the marketable surplus of diﬀerent
commodities, the income elasticity of marketable surplus and the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of rel-
ative risk aversion (Turnovsky et al., 1980) (Bellemare et al., 2013b).
The Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is estimated from the data, by computing the
second derivative of the dietary energy consumption with respect to the quantity of consumed
crops (Arrow, 1971). The Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient is estimated by a two-steps static panel model:
in the second stage the quantity of consumed crops is regressed on the ﬁtted value of DEC,
derived from the ﬁrst stage computation. The choice of the ﬁxed or random eﬀects strategy
is based upon the results of the Hausman test. Result of the estimation with respect to the
Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is 1.0277, which is within the range of credible
values found in the literature (Bellemare et al., 2013b, 886) (Friend and Blume, 1975) (Chavas
and Holt, 1990) (Hansen and Singleton, 1983) (Saha et al., 1994).
In this empirical analysis the utility function V (PPjt ; Yt; Aijt) is given by the dietary energy con-
sumption (DEC). This function turns quantity of crops consumed into calories available to the
household.
Besides, a speciﬁc database is created to estimate the income and cross-price elasticity of the
marketable surplus of each commodity. The elasticities are computed through a static panel
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model, which used the results of the Hausman test also in this case.
With all information included in the database, the price risk aversion coeﬃcient Aijt is com-
puted for each combination of household, crop and year. Then, this parameter was added to the
database.
Since endogeneity between risk aversion coeﬃcient and dietary energy consumption was detected
in several speciﬁcation tests, a set of instruments to be employed in the IV regression was derived
from the microfounded model or taken from the literature: some of the instrumental variables are
the market prices of plantains, beans, cassava, maize, rice and sweet potatoes. Moreover, there
are some instruments which describe the main household features like the household size, the
number of children and daughters, the literacy indicator, the attendance of the school, the gender
and age of the household head (Dohmen et al., 2011), (Moscardi and Janvry, 1977) (Nielsen and
Zeller, 2013) (D'Souza and Tandon, 2015, 14).
The literacy of the household heads is proxied by a dummy, which is equal to 1, if they are
literate, 0 otherwise. The attendance of the school is deﬁned by two dummy variables: the ﬁrst
one refers to primary school, which is equal to 1 if the household head attended primary school,
0 otherwise; the second dummy concerns the attendance of secondary school, which is equal to
1 if the household head attended secondary school, 0 otherwise.
Moreover, the dummy variable for the gender of the household heads is equal to 1 if they are
male, 0 if they are female. Finally, a survey wave dummy variable was introduced, which as-
sumes value 1 over the 2011-2012 period, and value 0 if the wave is 2009-2010 or 2010-2011. The
inclusion of such time dummy allows to disentangle whether there was some break in the risk
aversion parameter during the time period of the survey. A summary of the dummy variables is
provided in table 2.
The selection of the instruments is based on a far-reaching literature: indeed, several articles
verify the relevance of the above mentioned variables as determinants of risk preferences, by ap-
plying microeconomic models, econometric regression-based techniques, lottery-based and game-
theoretical experiments (Dohmen et al., 2011), (Moscardi and Janvry, 1977) (Nielsen and Zeller,
2013) (D'Souza and Tandon, 2015).
All variables other than the dummy indicators were converted in logarithms, so that the coeﬃ-
cients of the all estimated regressions can be directly interpreted as elasticities.
Estimation Results
Speciﬁcation tests
The most appropriate econometric technique for the estimation has been chosen after having
conducted several speciﬁcation tests.
With respect to the alternative between an OLS and an IV estimator is assessed through a set of
Lagrange Multiplier tests. The tests of Breusch and Pagan, Honda, King and Wu, Gourieroux,
Holly and Monfort follow a normal or chi-square asymptotic distribution under the null hypoth-
esis that individual and time eﬀects are not signiﬁcant (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) (Gouriéroux
et al., 1982) (Honda, 1985) (King and Wu, 1997).
If the p-value of these tests is smaller than 5%, the null hypothesis is rejected and the IV esti-
mator is consistent, since time and individual eﬀects are signiﬁcant.
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The output of these tests is reported in the table 3. The tests by Breusch and Pagan (1980),
Gouriéroux et al. (1982) and Honda (1985) reject the null hypothesis, while the test by King and
Wu (1997) is not able to reject it.
Moreover, a Wu-Hausman test between the IV and the OLS estimator is conducted. In this case,
the null hypothesis is that both instrumental variable and OLS estimators are consistent, but
OLS is more eﬃcient against the alternative hypothesis that the OLS estimator is inconsistent,
while the instrumental variable estimator is consistent (Hausman, 1978) (Wu, 1973).
The Wu-Hausman test reported in table 4 rejects the null hypothesis and therefore the instru-
mental variable model is estimated.
In order to overcome the simultaneity bias between market price and risk aversion in the ﬁrst
stage regression, the ﬁrst lag of the market price variables is used. The introduction of the one
lag-price variables allows to introduce some dynamics in the model, taking into account that
households do not change immediately their behaviour and need one period to adjust their ex-
pectations to the new prevailing economic environment.
The instrumental variables are tested in order to verify whether they satisfy the inclusion and
exclusion restrictions.
Sargan-Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions allows to assess the exclusion restriction, i.e.
the joint exogeneity of the instruments. A necessary requirement to apply the test is the overi-
dentiﬁcation of the model, it means that the number of instruments has to be larger than the
number of the endogenous variables. The null hypothesis of the Hansen-Sargan test is that the
instruments are jointly exogenous against the alternative that at least one of them is endogenous.
If the p-value is smaller than 5%, the null hypothesis is rejected (Sargan, 1958) (Hansen, 1982).
As shown in table 6, the null hypothesis of joint exogeneity of all above mentioned instruments
was rejected both for the balanced and unbalanced panel.
If the null hypothesis is rejected, it is not possibile to identify which instrument is endogenous,
unless all instruments are excluded one by one from the regression and the test is re-run.
By excluding one by one the instruments from the test, it was possible to conclude that the
market price of plantains is endogenous. Therefore, this variable was removed and a second
Hansen-Sargan test was re-run. In this case, the test was not able to reject the null hypothesis
of joint exogeneity of all instruments as shown in table 6.
After evaluating the exogeneity restriction, the relevance of this reduced set of instruments is
tested. For this purpose I used the F-test for weak instruments in the ﬁrst-stage regression is
computed (Stock and Yogo, 2005).
As indicated in the table 7, all instrumental variables are relevant and satisﬁes the inclusion
restriction.
Furthermore, the IV model on panel data can be run with ﬁxed or random eﬀect.
In order to select between the two alternatives, the Hausman test between random and ﬁxed
eﬀect estimators was computed. In this test, the null hypothesis is that both random and ﬁxed
eﬀect estimators are consistent, but the random eﬀect is more eﬃcient against the alternative
that random eﬀect is inconsistent (Hausman, 1978) (Wu, 1973).
As indicated in table 5, the Hausman tests conﬁrms that the random eﬀect estimator is not con-
sistent and then a ﬁxed eﬀect estimator should be computed. Only in the case of the balanced
panel, the Hausman test is not able to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, for completeness'
sake both the random and ﬁxed eﬀect models are estimated only for balanced panel and compared
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with each other.
Estimated models
Several instrumental variable ﬁxed and random eﬀects models are estimated, because endogene-
ity between the risk aversion parameter and the dietary energy consumption was detected by the
speciﬁcation tests.
Although the Wu-Hausman test provides evidence that there is some endogeneity, a panel FGLS
is also estimated as benchmark model and compared with the IV models. This comparison allows
to assess the relevance of endogeneity in the dataset.
The FGLS is an extension of the OLS model: both the FGLS and the OLS approaches do not
take into account endogeneity, but the FLGS is more robust than the OLS against heteroschedas-
ticity and autocorrelation of the error term (Wooldridge, 2002) (Baltagi, 2008).
All results of the FGLS, ﬁxed and random eﬀect models are reported in tables 8, 9 and 10. The
conclusion of the FGLS model is that all coeﬃcients - apart the one of the farm gate price of rice
- are highly signiﬁcant as shown in table 8: the most important factors for the determination
of the dietary energy consumption of the households are their risk aversion parameter and their
income. The farm gate prices of the regarded crops play also an important, but smaller role on
the level of dietary energy consumption of the households. Nevertheless, the results of the FGLS
are not trustworthy, because this model disregards the endogeneity between price risk aversion
coeﬃcient Aijt and dietary energy consumption, DEC, which exists in the data.
In particular, it is possible that households with higher level of DEC, i.e. richer in terms of
calories consumption, are less risk-averse toward food shortfall.
Both the Wu-Hausman test and the results of the two-step IV panel models in tables 9 and 10
conﬁrm that the endogeneity problem is a serious issue in the estimation of the above mentioned
empirical approach. Given the joint exogeneity and high relevance of the instruments employed,
the results of the IV panel models in tables 9 and 10 are indeed more reliable.
From the second stage IV regression in table 9, it is possibile to see that only the farm gate
prices for beans and rice, the income as well as the risk aversion parameter are signiﬁcant.
The IV panel models conﬁrm that the income and the risk aversion parameter of the households
are the most important factors in the determination of the household dietary energy consump-
tion. The coeﬃcient of the income lies between 0.64 and 0.56 and it is signiﬁcant at 5% in all
cases, while the one of the risk aversion parameter lies between 0.45 and 0.51 and signiﬁcant at
0.01%.
The relevance of the estimates of the farm gate prices is more ambiguous. The coeﬃcient of the
farm gate price of beans is signiﬁcant at 0.01 % in the random eﬀect model and at 10 % in the
ﬁxed eﬀect model. Instead, the estimate of the farm gate price of rice is signiﬁcant at 5% only
in the ﬁxed eﬀect model.
In general, the estimated coeﬃcients of the IV panel models are larger in absolute value than
the ones from the panel FGLS regression. This suggests that the endogeneity of the model leads
to a downward bias, i.e. the explanatory are negatively correlated with the error term.
The introduction of the instrumental variables to control for endogeneity make a striking changes
in the estimates of farm gate prices. While all farm gate prices - apart the one of rice - are highly
signiﬁcant in the FGLS regression, in the panel IV model only the coeﬃcient for the rice farm
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gate price is signiﬁcant at 5 % and the relevance of the farm gate price of beans is ambiguous.
Moreover, the estimate of the elasticity of the farm gate price of rice is large in magnitude, i.e.
it amounts to 0.5.
The second-stage IV regression conﬁrms the hypothesis, that income and dietary energy con-
sumption are positively correlated, it means that the richer a household, the larger its consump-
tion of calories will be.
The farm gate price for rice is therefore negatively correlated with the dietary energy consump-
tion. It means that households reduce their dietary energy consumption, if the farm gate price
of rice increases. Farm households give up consumption of rice, if they think that they can sell
it on the market at high prices.
Farm households prefer to increase their income instead of directly consuming the harvested rice,
because the reduction of dietary energy consumption derived from the giving up the rice harvest
for sale is more than oﬀset by the rise of food purchasing power due to the larger proﬁts obtained.
Indeed, the elasticity of DEC with the respect to income is much higher in absolute value than
the one of DEC with respect to the rice farm gate price. Since rice is a crop with large market
potential, which is facing an increasing demand mostly by urban households, in this way farmers
make sure their food security in the medium term.
This outcome is also conﬁrmed by the fact, that risk aversion parameter is positively correlated
with the dietary energy consumption and highly signiﬁcant.
While rice contributed to the caloric intake of urban households, which seem to prefer it over
other food items, it generated income for rural households, which were so able to purchase more
traditional crops like cassava, plantains, beans, etc. on the market and improve their food secu-
rity.
Such interpretation seems consistent with the evolution of the rice market in Uganda. Indeed,
rice does not belong to the traditional staple crops in Uganda both for consumers and producers,
but its production and consumption soared in a signiﬁcant way in the last few decades (Ahmed,
2012) (Kikuchi et al., 2013).
In particular, between 2006 and 2011 rice was the crop, the export of which grew at most with
an annual growth rate of 20.49%. Moreover, it was the second fastest growing in production
after cocoa beans with an annual growth rate between 2006 and 2011 of 8.63% (Kikuchi et al.,
2013, 2).
This change of trend is due to the fact that in the early 2000s a massive campaign was launched
by the Africa Rice Center, the West African Rice Development Association, to promote rice pro-
duction and consumption (Kikuchi et al., 2013, 2). In 2008 the Government of Uganda released
the Uganda National Rice Development Strategy, by stressing that the rice is the key to food
security and poverty reduction in Uganda. In the following years a signiﬁcant eﬀort was made
to train farmers in rice cultivation (Kikuchi et al., 2013, 2).
The farm gate price of beans is also negatively correlated with the household dietary energy
consumption, but the estimates of its coeﬃcient are not very reliable, because they are very
unstable. These parameters are highly signiﬁcant only in the random eﬀect model, but their
p-value is larger than the critical value of 5% in the ﬁxed eﬀect model. From this output some
doubts can be cast on the relevance of beans for food security.
Indeed, the direct contribution of beans to caloric intake is very important for rural households,
while its market potential and its ability to generate income for farm household is very limited.
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Beans are a traditional crop, but more recently they have been socially regarded as an inferior
good. Several Ugandan consumers consider them as the "poor man's meat" and they are not
at ease preparing and eating them, because of the long cooking time needed and the discomfort
due to the eﬀects of ﬂatulence (Kilimo Trust, 2012, 7). This opinion is mostly widespread within
the urban households.
Moreover, the results of the model in table 9 are conﬁrmed by the fact that beans production
increased only by 2% in this period after a sharp decline in 2006, although population grew
steadily between 2006 and 2010 (Kilimo Trust, 2012, 7-12).
The slightly increasing production was then used for self consumption of the producer house-
holds and export, although the income generating ability of this business is still very small. In
particular, farm households consume 68% of the harvested beans, while the remaining 32% is
split in two parts, one is sold to domestic consumers (12%), and the other one, which is exported
(20%) to Kenya, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Burundi, UK and USA
(Kilimo Trust, 2012, 7-12).
Therefore, the little impact of beans farm gate price on dietary energy consumption are due
to the fact that some farm households gave up their consumption to sell them to other rural
household or for export. Nevertheless, the conclusions concerning the beans cannot be regarded
as very strong, because the instability of the signiﬁcance level of the estimates makes them not
reliable.
All models are in log-log form, therefore the coeﬃcient estimates can be interpreted as elastici-
ties.
In particular, an increase by 1% of the risk aversion parameter leads to a surge by between 0.45%
and 0.51% of the DEC: since the overall rise of the price risk aversion coeﬃcient between 2009
and 2011 was about 21.5 % - after a large drop by 72.5 % between 2009 and 2010 and a positive
recover in the following year - the increment of the yearly median dietary energy consumption
in the analysed period lies within the range of 47,522 and 53,860 calories for each household.
Instead, if the household income grows by 1%, the DEC soars by betweeen 0.56% and 0.64%.
Between 2009 and 2011 the household income rose by 14 %, which corresponds to an increase
of 267,000 UGX. Such an income variation implies a surge of the median yearly dietary energy
consumption between 38,500 and 44,000 calories for each household.
Among the analysed crops, the most relevant one in terms of DEC is rice. If the farm gate price
of rice rises by 1%, the dietary energy consumption decreases by 0.5%.
The overall increase of the rice farm gate price between 2009 and 2011 was about 11% - after a
very high spike in 2010 and a reduction in the following year - this rice price change implies a
reduction of the household dietary energy consumption by 5.5%, which corresponds to a yearly
median decrease of about 27,000 calories for each household.
The instruments, which were proved as exogenous and relevant, were used in the ﬁrst stage
regression to control for the endogeneity of the risk aversion parameter in the second-stage re-
gression. Therefore, from the ﬁrst stage IV regression, it is possible to see the impact of the
instruments on the endogenous variable, the risk aversion parameter.
In order to overcome the simultaneity bias between market price and risk aversion in the ﬁrst
stage regression, the ﬁrst lag of the price variables is used. The introduction of the one lag-price
variables allows to introduce some dynamics in the model, taking into account that households
do not change immediately their behaviour and need one period to adjust their expectations to
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the new prevailing economic environment.
As shown in the results in table 10, only the market prices of cassava and sweet potatoes are sig-
niﬁcant in the ﬁrst-stage IV regression. The coeﬃcient of the market price of cassava is -0.13 and
signiﬁcant at 0.1%, while the one of the market price of sweet potatoes is 0.048 and signiﬁcant at
5%. The diﬀerent sign of the two market prices suggests a diﬀerent reaction by the households in
building up their expectation with respect to the variations of the two above mentioned prices.
It is noteworthy that in the ﬁrst stage regression the elasticity of the risk aversion parameter
with respect to the cassava market price is both larger in magnitude and more signiﬁcant that
the one of risk aversion parameter with respect to the market price of sweet potatoes.
Given the diﬀerent magnitude of the two estimates, it is possible to conclude that their diﬀerence
is negative and that the comprehensive eﬀect of increasing market prices is the reduction of the
risk aversion parameter of the farm households.
In spite of this general conclusion, it is valuable to investigate the reasons of the diﬀerence of
signs between the coeﬃcients of market price of cassava and sweet potatoes.
Both cassava and sweet potatoes represent an important contribution to the diet of Ugandan
households, but they are dissimilar in terms of their cultivation properties, post-harvest preser-
vation features and their marketing potential (Haggblade and Dewina, 2010, 2-4).
Firstly, cassava is very tolerant to drought and arid weather, while sweet potatoes are not so.
Therefore, cassava is grown as a form of insurance against drought and the failure of other staple
crops. Moreover, cassava can be stored in the ground for longer period and harvested as needed,
while sweet potatoes are very perishable (Haggblade and Dewina, 2010, 2-4).
Cassava is produced by the farm households for their own consumption, but an increasing share
of the harvest is sold on the market. Nevertheless, cassava is mostly sold on domestic markets
within Uganda, because the high water content makes very diﬃcult to trade this crop in large
volumes across international borders. On the contrary, sweet potatoes are largely a subsistence
crop with little commercialization due to their perishability and their low value-to-bulk ratio
(Haggblade and Dewina, 2010, 2-4). The diﬀerence among the signs of the coeﬃcients of cassava
and sweet potatoes is based upon the discrepancy between the expectations built up by the farm
households concerning the farm gate and market prices of the two crops at time t.
High market prices in the period t-1 induce the expectation in the farm households that the
market price in period t will be high as well. High market prices at time t can have two major
implications on the welfare of the households at time t. On the one hand, high market prices
at the time t imply high farm gate prices at the same time, everything else equal. On the other
hand, high market prices at the time t make more expensive the purchase of crops by the con-
sumers at the same time t.
For farm households the decision-making process is more straightforward, because the immediate
overall eﬀect on them is deﬁnitively positive, because these households do not need to purchase
staple crops on the market.
Concerning the functioning of this mechanism the diﬀerence between cassava and sweet potatoes
can be highlighted. While cassava has a relevant marketing potential and high farm gate prices
increase the potential income and then the food security of the farm household, the marketing
potential of sweet potatoes is very limited and the above outlined relation between high market
prices at time t-1 and risk aversion parameter at time t does not work properly.
Since farm households are well aware that the production of sweet potatoes is not able to gen-
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erate a relevant income to them, the expectation that the market price of sweet potatoes will
be high at the time t increases slightly the risk aversion of the farm households. Indeed, high
market prices of sweet potatoes could put at risk the household food security, because they make
more expensive to purchase enough quantity of this food at time t, if all other sown crops fail.
On the contrary, the market prices of beans, rice and maize play no role in the determination
of the risk aversion parameter. The reasons of the limited relevance of the crop market prices
other than the ones of cassava and sweet potatoes is due to the speciﬁc features of the market
of beans, rice and maize.
Indeed, beans are important for the consumption of the producers, but they are very little traded.
Their price is also very volatile from one year to the next, therefore it cannot be used for fore-
casting next year prices (Haggblade and Dewina, 2010, 8-9).
Instead, rice is not a traditional crop and it is mostly imported. Therefore, changes in its market
price cannot lead to expectation of future higher proﬁts for the farm households.
The fact, that the coeﬃcient for maize market price is not signiﬁcant, is puzzling, because maize
can be easily dried, stored and sold formally and informally for cash domestically and across the
Uganda-Kenya border (Haggblade and Dewina, 2010, 4). The commercial ties between Uganda
and Kenya are very tight, because Uganda, which is self-suﬃcient in maize, exports a sizeable
share of its maize production to Kenya. This strong link with Kenya leads to the fact that Ugan-
dan maize domestic price is strongly inﬂuenced by the regional prices (Haggblade and Dewina,
2010, 7-8).
Therefore, an explanation of the lack of sensitivity of the risk aversion parameter to the changes
in maize market price could be the occurence of political turmoils in Kenya during 2007 and
2008, which increased the Kenyan demand of maize import from Uganda and then the domestic
price in Uganda. Most of consumers reacted to the increasing market price of maize, by replacing
it with some less price-sensitive rootcrops and perennials (Haggblade and Dewina, 2010, 7-8).
Because of this change of behaviour with respect to the consumers, the farm household probably
regarded this increase of prices very transitory. Therefore, the elasticity of the risk aversion to
the market price of maize is not signiﬁcant.
Some household control variables are also important in the regression: the estimate of the liter-
acy dummy is signiﬁcant at 1%, while the one of the primary school dummy is signiﬁcant at 5%.
Both coeﬃcients are large and similar in magnitude, but they have opposite signs. The ability
to read and write increases the risk aversion of the households, because it makes the household
heads aware of the existing risks. Instead, the attendance of the primary school provides the
household heads conﬁdence and skills to face some of these risk and leads to a reduction of the
risk aversion parameter. The attendance of the secondary school does not have any impact on
the risk aversion parameter.
The coeﬃcient of the household size is -0.076 and the one of the age of the household head is
-0.0022; both are signiﬁcant at 5%. The larger the household the lower the risk aversion: it
means that to live in the same household represents an insurance mechanism against the risk
that one of the members is temporarily not able to make a living.
Similarly, an increasing age of the household head can be associated with more experience, which
reduces the risk aversion parameter. Both the coeﬃcient of household size and head age are very
small and their eﬀect is therefore of minor importance.
The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable of the survey wave is 0.87, very large in magnitude and
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signiﬁcant at 0.1%. This results means that the household risk aversion grew much in 2011-2012
with the respect to the average of the former waves 2009-2010 and 2010-2011. Such conclusion
gives a hint, that the risk aversion parameter is not constant over time and that househols can
become more risk averse, if they face adverse market conditions in the previous periods. Indeed,
very volatile food prices between 2009 and 2012 - as depicted by the graph 1 - induced such an
outcome.
All other household control variables, like the number of children and daughters as well as the
gender of the household head, play no role in the determination of the risk aversion parameter.
Since the price risk aversion matrix Aijt does not provide any information whether the house-
hold psychological risk aversion changes over time after the occurence of some price shocks, the
residuals  of the ﬁrst-stage regression 9 can be employed as proxy of the empirically estimated
Arrow Pratt coeﬃcient of risk aversion, bR in the ﬁxed eﬀect model, equation 10.
This approach allows to investigate whether the household psychological risk preferences, R
change over time and which factors determine such a variation.
The results of the equation 10 for balanced and unbalanced panels are reported in table 13. The
only two variables, which are signiﬁcant at 5%, are the dummies for literacy and attendance of
the primary school of the household head.
By comparing the results from the tables 10 and 13, it is possible to analyse the impact of house-
hold features on the psychological risk preferences. The diﬀerence in magnitude and signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcients of literacy dummies in the two tables suggests that the ability to read and
write increases the psychological risk aversion of the household heads, because it makes them
aware of the existing risks and at the same time induces them to be involved in more complex
market transactions. In particular, the participation in more complex market transactions seems
more signiﬁcant that the psychological risk component.
Instead, the attendance of the primary school provides the household heads conﬁdence and skills
to face some of these risk and leads to a reduction of the risk aversion parameter. Since the
diﬀerence in magnitude and signiﬁcance between the coeﬃcients of the dummies for attendance
of the primary school in the tables 10 and 13 is negligible, it is possible to stress that such vari-
able aﬀects the psychological component of the household risk attitudes and not how households
employ risk-bearing institutions.
The coeﬃcients for household size and age of the household head are signiﬁcant in the table 10
and not signiﬁcant in the table 13: this diﬀerence implies that these factors do not change the
psychological attitudes of the households, but the strategy how households employ risk-bearing
institutions.
In particular, the larger the household size, the higher the probability that each individual can
be insured by other household members against the risk not to be able to make a living in a
given period of the year: in this regard, the household size represents a risk-sharing mechanism.
At the same time, the age of the household head is an insurance mechanism, because the older
the household head is, the higher his or her experience and the more likely he or she will able
to manage in an eﬃcient way the household and to make sure its livelihood. From the analysis
of this paper it is possible to draw some important conclusions. Risk aversion parameter and
income have a large and positive eﬀect on food security.
The results of the econometric exercise conﬁrm that farm household sell the crops with large
market potential and consume the ones with limited selling opportunities.
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This is the case of rice, which faces an increasing demand by urban households: since the market
price for rice is high, its sale increases the food purchasing power of farm households and allow
them to make sure their food security in the medium term.
Furthemore, risk aversion is negatively determined by the attendance of the primary school,
which provides to the household head the skill needed to face some of the risks, and negatively
driven by the prices of some crops like cassava, which induce the expectation of higher farm gate
prices and then higher proﬁt in the next period in the mind of the household heads.
Finally, the attendance of primary school by the household head reduces the psychological risk
aversion, while all other household features have just an impact on the strategy how households
employ the risk-bearing institutions. In particular, attendance of primary school provides conﬁ-
dence and skills to the household heads to face some of the challenges, which there are in a risky
environment.
The above explained study investigates the farm household behaviour in the sample, without
distinguishing between the actions of the net-seller and net-buyer households. These results
are valid for the entire population of farm households, since the Uganda LSMS sampling design
makes sure representativeness of the analysis at national and sub-national level (Himelein, 2012).
In order to disentangle the diﬀerence of behaviour between net seller and net buyer farm house-
holds, the empirical model was extended through a market position variable, which is equal to 1
if the household is a net seller, 0 otherwise.
Such an approach - entailed in the equation 11 - is able to focus on the behaviour of the sub-
sample of the net sellers: the estimation results are reported in the tables 11 and .
While the coeﬃcients of farm gate prices are negative in the second stage estimation of the full
sample model as reported in the table 9, the same coeﬃcients are positive in the net seller sub-
sample model as shown in the table 11. In the latter estimation the signiﬁcance and magnitude
of the coeﬃcients of farm gate prices are larger than in the former one.
In both models the coeﬃcients for income and price risk aversion are positive: for the net sellers
sub-sample the coeﬃcient for income is smaller in magnitude, but more signiﬁcant than in the
full sample model. Instead, the coeﬃcient for price risk aversion is smaller in magnitude and less
signiﬁcant in the net seller than in the full sample.
In the ﬁrst step estimation there are only few diﬀerences between the full and net seller sample
models: the coeﬃcient for maize market price is not signiﬁcant in the full sample model, while
it becomes signiﬁcant and negatively correlated with the price risk aversion for the net seller
sub-sample. The other coeﬃcients of consumer market prices have the same sign and similar
magnitude in the net seller sub-group as in the full sample model.
The market participation dummy is not signiﬁcant, while the survey wave 2011-2012 dummy
is highly signiﬁcant in both models and larger in magnitude for the net sellers sub-group than
for the full sample. All other coeﬃcients reported in the ﬁrst-step estimation of the net seller
sub-sample model keep the same signiﬁcance and magnitude of the full sample estimation.
The results are as expected: indeed, the higher are the farm gate prices, the larger is the dietary
energy consumption of the farm household. In addition, income is less relevant for net sellers
than for the entire sample, because the former group harvest directly the crops on its land and
therefore it needs less income for satisfying its dietary needs.
In the same fashion, price risk aversion is less important for the net seller dietary energy con-
sumption, because they do not need to buy food on the market, if an adverse price shock occurs.
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The household price risk aversion grew in 2011-2012 - with the respect to the average of the for-
mer waves 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 - both for the net seller sub-group and for the full sample.
Such an increase is therefore indiﬀerent to the fact that a farm household is a net seller or a net
buyer, as the insigniﬁcance of the market participation dummy points out.
The result of the net seller subsample model provides evidence, that the net seller farm house-
holds become more risk averse, if they face adverse market conditions in the previous periods,
although they need less income to purchase crops on the market than net buyer families.
Conclusions
This study was able to answer the research question whether the occurrence of exogenous shocks
induces a change of price risk aversion over time and then how the time-varying risk aversion
parameter aﬀects production and consumption pattern by the farm households.
This research employs the risk aversion parameter introduced by (Bellemare et al., 2013b), which
takes into account not just the household psychological risk attitudes, but also the market im-
perfections and availability of institutions which facilitate risk-bearing (Mendola, 2007) (Janvry
et al., 1991). Nevertheless, unlike (Bellemare et al., 2013b) the paper develops a micro-founded
empirical model, where the risk aversion parameter is allowed to change over time and not just
across households. This empirical model is estimated within a two-stage structural approach,
which controls for the endogeneity between dietary energy consumption and risk aversion.
The study assesses the behaviour of the farm households, which consume and produce crops
at the same time. They are diﬀerent from standard consumers, because their production and
consumption decisions are interlinked. In particular, they can obtain proﬁt by selling their agri-
cultural output on the market or they can consume their own production (Taylor and Adelman,
2003). Unlike for standard consumers, budget for farm household is not ﬁxed, but endogenously
determined by positive farm proﬁt component which is to be added to negative elasticity between
price and consumer's demand (Mendola, 2007).
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the risk aversion parameter is not constant over
time and that households can become more risk averse, if they face adverse market conditions
in the previous periods.
Given the endogeneity of the risk aversion parameter, a set of instruments were selected, which
were proven to be exogenous and relevant.
Moreover, risk aversion parameter and income have a large and positive eﬀect on food security.
In particular, farm households make sure their food security in the medium term, since they
sell the crops, which have market potential and provide to them additional income, and they
consume the harvested crops without selling opportunities.
Indeed, the reduction of dietary energy consumption derived from the giving up the harvest for
sale is more than oﬀset by the rise of food purchasing power due to the larger proﬁts obtained.
Indeed, the elasticity of DEC with the respect to income is much higher in absolute value than
the one of DEC with respect to the rice farm gate price.
Instead, the determination of the risk aversion parameter is due to the building up of the ex-
pectations of the farm households. High market prices of crops like cassava, which have high
marketing potential, at time t-1 induce the expectation that their market prices and then their
farm gate prices will be high at time t as well. This expectation leads to the reduction of the risk
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aversion parameter. On the contrary, high market prices of crops like sweet potatoes or beans
with little commercialization has no strong impact on the risk aversion parameter.
Finally, the attendance of primary school by the household head reduces the psychological risk
aversion, while all other household features have just an impact on the strategy how households
employ the risk-bearing institutions. In particular, attendance of primary school reduces the
pscyhological risk aversion of the households, because it provides conﬁdence and skills to the
household heads to face some of the challenges, which there are in a risky environment.
The conclusions of the analysis are valid for the entire sample of net seller and net buyer farm
households. The risk aversion parameter changes over time both in the net seller sub-group and
in full sample, but price risk aversion is less relevant for food security in the former than in the
latter. Indeed, net sellers can more easily satisfy their dietary energy consumption, since they
harvest directly the crops.
Knowledge of the importance of the exogenous shocks for the determination of the time-varying
risk aversion parameter is useful for design of development policies. Finally, awareness of the key
contribution of the harvest sale on the market to the farm household food security could stress
the relevance of measures for the development of agricultural markets in developing countries
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Annex I
Mathematical derivation of the price risk aversion matrix
The following derivation is based on (Bellemare et al., 2013b) and (Bellemare et al., 2013a).
Consider a farm household, which can at the same time consume and produce each commodity j
and sell its marketable surplus MSj , i.e. the diﬀerence between the harvested and the consumed
amount of the crop j.
In each period the farm household maximizes its indirect utility function V (p; y) subject to the
budget constraint y, the level of which depends on the production and consumption decisions
taken under uncertainty by the household in the previous period. Indeed, at any time the
household optimizes its behaviour, by choosing the alternatives on the basis of a set of beliefs
about the probability that the commodity prices pj will reach a given level.
The price risk aversion matrix Aijt is deﬁned as the variation of the utility function V (p; y) due
to changes in the commodity prices pj and pi, net of the variation of the utility function V (p; y)
due to changes of the income y.
Ahj =
Vpipj
Vy
(12)
where Vpipj is the second derivative of the indirect utility function V (p; y) with respect to the
commodity prices pj and pi as well as Vy is the ﬁrst derivative of the indirect utility function
V (p; y) with respect to the income y.
The equation 12 can be expressed in matrix form as well:
A =

 1
Vy
266664
Vp1p1 Vp1p2 ::: ::: Vp1pk
Vp2p1 ::: ::: ::: :::
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
Vpkp1 ::: ::: ::: Vpkpk
377775 (13)
To derive an analytical form of Ahj , (Bellemare et al., 2013a) start from the indirect utility
function V (p; y).
The diagonal elements of the matrix in the equation 13 measure the direct impact of the variance
of the prices on the household utility function, holding everything constant, while the oﬀ-diagonal
elements represent the indirect eﬀect of the covariance between a given price and the other prices
on the household utility function, holding everything constant.
By applying the Roy's identity to the indirect utility function V (p; y), it is possible to obtain the
demand function MSj :
MSj =
Vpj
Vy
(14)
where Vpj is
@V
@pj
the ﬁrst derivative of the indirect utility function V (p; y) with respect to the
commodity price pj . Similarly,
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MSi =
Vpi
Vy
 ! Vpi = MSiVy (15)
By taking the second derivative of the equation 15 with respect to pj and applying the product
rule it is possible to obtain:
Vpipj = MSiVypj + Vy

@MSi
@pj

(16)
Similarly, by taking the second derivative of the equation 15 with respect to y and applying the
product rule it is possible to obtain:
Vpiy = MSiVyy + Vy

@MSi
@y

= Vypi (17)
The last equality is the result of the Young's theorem on the symmetry of second derivatives,
which can be applied because the following two requirements hold:
1. V (p; y) is a diﬀerentiable function over (p; y)
2. Cross-partial derivatives of V (p; y) exist and are continuous at all points on some open set
Replacing 17 in 16 the following equation is obtained:
Vpipj = MSi

MSjVyy + Vy

@MSj
@y

+ Vy

@MSi
@pj

(18)
Then,
Vpipj = MSiMSjVyy +MSiVy

@MSj
@y

+ Vy

@MSi
@pj

(19)
After the ﬁrst term in the right hand side of the equation 19 is multiplied by

Vyy
Vyy

, the second
term by

Mjy
Mjy

and the third term by

Mjpj
Mjpj

, it is possible to obtain:
Vpipj = MSiMSjVyy

Vyy
Vyy

+MSiVy

@MSj
@y

Mjy
Mjy

+ Vy

@MSi
@pj

MSjpj
MSjpj

(20)
Since the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coeﬃcient R =  
h
Vyy

y
Vy
i
, the income elasticity of mar-
ketable surplus of commodity j, j =
h
@MSj
@y

y
Mj
i
, and the cross-price elasticity between the
marketable surplus of the crops i and j, ij =
h
@MSi
@pj

pj
MSi
i
, the equation 20 becomes:
Vpipj =  

MSiMSjRVy
y

+

MSiVyjMSj
y

+

MSiVyij
pj

(21)
157
Then, MSiVy is multiplied out from the equation 21:
Vpipj = MSiVy

 MSjR
y

+

jMSj
y

+

ij
pj

(22)
After the ﬁrst and the second term of the right hand side is multiplied by

pj
pj

and by multiplying
out

1
pj

it is possible to obtain:
Vpipj =
MSiVy
pj
[ Rj + jj + ij ] (23)
Then,
Vpipj =
MSiVy
pj
[j (j  R) + ij ] (24)
By introducing the equation 24 in the equation 12, which deﬁnes the price risk aversion matrix
Ahj , the following result is obtained:
Ahj =
Vpipj
Vy
=
MSi
pj
[j (j  R) + ij ] (25)
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Annex II
Mathematical derivation of the model
For simplicity's sake, the optimization problem described in the equation 1 is solved for just two
crops, Maize and Cassava, and the ﬁnal result is later extended to the case of N crops6. Let's
now assume that consumption can be described by a Cobb-Douglas function as follows:
U(MSMA;t;MSCA;t) = MS

MA;tMS
1 
CA;t (26)
where MSMA;t is the marketable surplus of maize, MSCA;t is the marketable surplus of cas-
sava and  is the standard Cobb-Douglas parameter. Eﬃciency is reached when the following
condition is satisﬁed:
PPMA
PPCA
= MRSMSCA;t;MSMA;t (27)
@U=@MSMA;t
@U=@MSCA;t
=
MS 1MA;tMS
1 
CA;t
MSMA;t(1  )MS
1  1
CA;t
(28)
PPMA
PPCA
=

(1  )
MSCA;t
MSMA;t
(29)
MSCA;t =
(1  )

PPMA
PPCA
MSMA;t (30)
Given the usual budget constraint:
PPMAMSMA;t + P
P
CAMSCA;t = Yt (31)
By plugging the equation 30 into equation 31, it is possible to obtain the following result:
PPMAMSMA;t + P
P
CA
(1  )

PPMA
PPCA
MSMA;t = Yt (32)

1 +

(1  )


PPMAMSMA;t = Yt (33)
1

PMAPMSMA;t = Yt (34)
MSMA;t =
Yt
PPMA
(35)
A similar exercise can be performed with respect to cassava in order to obtain indirect utility
function:
MSCA;t =
(1  )Yt
PPCA
(36)
It is possible to derive indirect utility function V (PCMA; P
C
CA; Yt; Ahj) by introducing optimal
6For readers' convenience, the index h is omitted, but it should be taken into account that an obser-
vation for each household h is provided
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marketable surplus, equations 35 and 36, into direct utility function, equation 26 (Mas-Colell
et al., 1995, 50-60):
V (PPMA; P
P
CA; Yt; Aijt) = Aijt

Yt
PPMA
 (1  )Yt
PPCA

1 
(37)
V (PPMA; P
P
CA; Yt; Aijt) = AijtY


PPMA
(1  )
PPCA

1 
(38)
Then taking the logarithm the following equation yields:
lnV (PPMA; P
C
CA; Y; Aijt) = ln
"
AijtY


PPMA
(1  )
PPCA

1 
#
(39)
lnV (PPMA; P
P
CA; Y; Aijt) = c   lnP
P
MA   (1  ) lnP
P
CA + lnY + lnAijt (40)
where c =  ln+ (1  ) ln (1  )
Finally, the equation 40 can be generalized to a farm household optimization problem over N
crops, as shown in the equation 6.
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Figure 1: Monthly Real Food Price Index [2002-2004=100] (FAO, 2016)
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Table 1: Acronyms and Abbreviations
Symbol Meaning
UGX Ugandan Shilling
MAFAP-FAO Monitoring and Analysing Food and Agricultural Policies - Food and
Agriculture Organization
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
WFP World Food Programme
LSMS-ISA Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated Surveys on
Agriculture
DEC Dietary Energy Consumption
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
FGLS Feasible Generalized Least Square
IV Instrumental Variable
U(.) Direct utility function
V(.) Indirect utility function
MSjt Marketable Surplus of the crop j
PPjt Farm gate price of the crop j
PCj Market price of the crop j
Aijt Price risk aversion parameter (Bellemare et al., 2013b)
jt =

PPjtMSjt
Yt

Budget share of marketable surplus of commodity j
j Income elasticity of marketable surplus of commodity j
R Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
ij Cross-price elasticity between
the marketable surplus of the crops i and j
j Cobb-Douglas parameter
Yt Full income (Becker, 1965)
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Table 2: Dummy variables
Dummy variable Meaning
Dummy= 1 Dummy= 0
Literacy Household head
is literate
Household head
is not literate
Attendance
of the primary school
Household head
attended primary school
Household head did not
attend primary school
Attendance
of secondary school
Household head
attended secondary school
Household head did not
attend secondary school
Gender Male Female
Survey Wave 2011-2012 2009-2010 or
2010-2011
Table 3: Lagrange Multiplier test - two-ways eﬀectsa
H0 individual and time eﬀects are not signiﬁcant
Test type Breusch,
Pagan
Honda King and
Wu
Gourieroux, Holly,
and Monfort
Asymptotic
distribution
Chi square Normal Normal Chi square
Test statistics 722.63 18.304 -0.45717 721.67
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
a Plantains Market price was not included as instruments in the IV regression
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Table 4: Wu-Hausman test: Instrumental variable estimator vs. OLSa
H0 Both instrumental variable and OLS estimators
are consistent, but OLS is more eﬃcient
Ha OLS estimator is inconsistent, while instrumental
variable estimator is consistent
Panel type Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Test statistics 286.755 244.92***
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
a Plantains Market price was not included as instruments in the IV regression
Table 5: Hausman test: Fixed Eﬀect vs. Random Eﬀect
H0 Both Random and Fixed Eﬀect estimators are
consistent, but Random Eﬀect is more eﬃcient
Ha Random Eﬀect estimators is inconsistent, while
Fixed Eﬀect is consistent
Panel type Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Estimation
Methodology
IV
Standard
Panel
IV Panel
GLS
IV
Standard
Panel
IV Panel GLS
Test statistics 21.874 52.257 4.4771 46.947
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
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Table 6: Sargan-Hansen test: Overidentifying restrictionsa
H0 Joint exogeneity of all instruments
(joint validity of all overidentifying restrictions)
Ha At least one istrument is endogenous
Panel type Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Instruments
speciﬁcation
with
Plantains Market
Pricet 1
without
Plantains Market
Pricet 1
without
Plantains Market
Pricet 1
without
Plantains Market
Pricet 1
Test statistics 275.53 6.228 175.92 7.236
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
a The instruments chosen are Beans Market price, Cassava Market price, Maize Market price, Rice
Market price, Sweet potatoes Market price, Household size, Number Children, Number Sons, Number
Daughters, Literacy (dummy), Attendance Any school (dummy), Attendance Secondary School (dummy),
Head male, Head Age and Wave 2011-2012 (dummy). Plantains Market price was included in the ﬁrst,
but not in the second test.
Table 7: Test for weak instrumentsa;b (Stock and Yogo, 2005)
H0: Instruments are weak
Endogenous variables Test statistics
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Plantains Farm Gate Price 22.179 16.514
Beans Farm Gate Price 99.623 85.747
Cassava Farm Gate Price 421.557 380.901
Maize Farm Gate Price 124.821 115.233
Rice Farm Gate Price 33.535 32.715
Sweet potatoes Farm Gate Price 597.631 554.695
Income 189.561 185.243
Price Risk Aversion 57.707 51.854
Number observations N=3284 households
T= 1 - 3 time periods
N=2491 households
T= 3 time periods
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
a all variables are in natural logarithm and the farm gate price are expressed in Ugandan Shilling (UGX) per
Kilogram
b Plantains Market price was not included as instruments in the IV regression
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Table 8: FGLS Regressiona
Independent variables Dependent Variable: Dietary
Energy Consumption
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Plantains Farm Gate Priceb  0:051
(0:0125)
 0:051
(0:0128)
Beans Farm Gate Priceb  0:047
(0:0078)
 0:047
(0:008)
Cassava Farm Gate Priceb  0:073
(0:0078)
 0:073
(0:008)
Maize Farm Gate Priceb  0:03
(0:009)
 0:03
(0:009)
Rice Farm Gate Priceb  0:008
(0:021)
 0:008
(0:022)
Sweet potatoes Farm Gate Priceb  0:072
(0:0083)
 0:072
(0:0085)
Income 0:44
(0:015)
0:44
(0:015)
Price Risk Aversion 0:18
(0:015)
0:18
(0:015)
Number observations N=3284 households
T= 1 - 3 time periods
N=2491 households
T= 3 time periods
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
a: all variables are in natural logarithm and the farm gate price are expressed in Ugandan Shilling (UGX) per Kilogram
b: the coeﬃcients of the farm gate prices are multiplied by (-1), following the derivation of the theoretical model in equation 6
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Table 9: Second Stage Instrumental Variable Regressiona
(Full sample: net sellers & net buyers)
Independent variables Dependent Variable:
Dietary Energy Consumption
Unbalanced Panel
Fixed Eﬀect
Balanced Panel
Fixed Eﬀect
Balanced Panel
Random Eﬀect
Plantains Farm Gate Price  0:43
(0:42)
 0:43
(0:42)
0:051
(0:28)
Beans Farm Gate Price  0:17
(0:09)
 0:17
(0:09)
 0:44
(0:12)
Cassava Farm Gate Price  0:015
(0:049)
 0:015
(0:049)
0:13
(0:12)
Maize Farm Gate Price  0:123
(0:127)
 0:123
(0:127)
 0:052
(0:123)
Rice Farm Gate Price  0:50
(0:195)
 0:50
(0:195)
 0:122
(0:52)
Sweet potatoes Farm Gate Price  0:0477
(0:048)
 0:0477
(0:048)
 0:084
(0:06)
Income 0:642
(0:27)
0:642
(0:27)
0:56
(0:25)
Price Risk Aversion 0:45
(0:133)
0:45
(0:133)
0:51
(0:21)
Intercept Not included Not included  3:45
3:195
Number observations N=3284 households
T= 1 - 3 time periods
N=2491 households
T= 3 time periods
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05, p < 0:1
a: all variables are in natural logarithm and the farm gate price are expressed in Ugandan Shilling (UGX) per Kilogram
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Table 10: First Stage Fixed Eﬀect Instrumental Variable Regressiona
(Full sample: net sellers & net buyers)
Independent variables Dependent Variable: Price Risk Aversion
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Beans Market Price (t-1) 0:014
(0:021)
0:014
(0:021)
Cassava Market Price (t-1)  0:13
(0:024)
 0:13
(0:024)
Maize Market Price (t-1)  0:033
(0:021)
 0:033
(0:021)
Rice Market Price (t-1) 0:0125
(0:024)
0:0125
(0:024)
Sweet Potatoes Market Price (t-1) 0:048
(0:024)
0:048
(0:024)
Household Size  0:076
(0:036)
 0:076
(0:036)
Number Children 0:023
(0:029)
0:023
(0:029)
Number Daughters  0:041
(0:044)
 0:041
(0:044)
Literacy (dummy) 0:37
(0:13)
0:37
(0:13)
Attendance Primary School (dummy)  0:32
(0:14)
 0:32
(0:14)
Attendance Secondary School (dummy)  0:006
(0:11)
 0:006
(0:11)
Head Gender (Male=1) 0:133
(0:21)
0:133
(0:21)
Head Age  0:0022
(0:001)
 0:0022
(0:001)
Wave 2011-2012 (dummy) 0:87
(0:11)
0:87
(0:11)
Number observations N=3284 households
T= 1 - 3 time periods
N=2491 households
T= 3 time periods
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05,
0
p < 0:1
a: all variables are in natural logarithm and the market prices are expressed in Ugandan Shilling (UGX) per
Kilogram
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Table 11: Second Stage Fixed Eﬀect Variable Regressiona
(Net seller sub-sample)
Independent variables Dependent Variable:
Dietary Energy Consumption
Unbalanced panel
Fixed eﬀect
Balanced panel
Fixed eﬀect
Plantains Farm Gate Price 0:044 0:043
(0:085) (0:085)
Beans Farm Gate Price 0:32 0:32
(0:084) (0:084)
Cassava Farm Gate Price 0:057 0:057
(0:047) (0:047)
Maize Farm Gate Price 0:22 0:22
(0:087) (0:087)
Rice Farm Gate Price 0:59 0:59
(0:19) (0:19)
Sweet potatoes Farm Gate Price 0:088 0:088
(0:043) (0:043)
Income 0:56 0:56
(0:16) (0:16)
Price Risk aversion 0:30 0:30
(0:12) (0:12)
Number observations N=3284 households
T= 1 - 3 time periods
N=2491 households
T= 3 time periods
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05, p < 0:1
a: all variables are in natural logarithm and the farm gate price are expressed in Ugandan Shilling (UGX) per Kilogram
169
Table 12: First Stage Fixed Eﬀect Variable Regressiona
(Net seller sub-sample)
Independent variables Dependent Variable:
Price Risk Aversion
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Beans Market price (t-1) 0:012 0:012
(0:021) (0:021)
Cassava Market price (t-1)  0:132 -0.132
(0:024) (0:024)
Maize Market price (t-1)  0:043  0:043
(0:022) (0:022)
Rice Market price (t-1) 0:015 0:015
(0:024) (0:024)
Sweet potatoes Market price (t-1) 0:049 0:049
(0:024) (0:024)
Household size  0:085  0:085
(0:036) (0:036)
Number Children 0:025 0:025
(0:029) (0:029)
Number Daughters  0:039  0:039
(0:044) (0:044)
Literacy (dummy) 0:360 0:360
(0:128) (0:128)
Attendance Primary School (dummy)  0:366  0:366
(0:144) (0:144)
Attendance Secondary School (dummy) 0:005 0:005
(0:108) (0:108)
Head Gender (Male=1) 0:177 0:177
(0:211) (0:211)
Head Age  0:002  0:002
(0:001) (0:001)
Wave 2011-2012 (dummy) 0:959 0:959
(0:111) (0:111)
Market Participation (Net Seller=1) 0:095 0:095
(0:085) (0:085)
Number observations N=3284 households
T= 1 - 3 time periods
N=2491 households
T= 3 time periods
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05,
0
p < 0:1
a: all variables are in natural logarithm and the market prices are expressed in Ugandan Shilling (UGX) per
Kilogram
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Table 13: Psychological Risk Aversion Regression (Fixed Eﬀect)
Independent variables Dependent Variable:
Psychological risk aversion
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
Household children number: 1-5 0:02 0:01
(0:12) (0:13)
Household children number: 5-10 0:05 0:05
(0:12) (0:12)
Household children number: 10-15  0:01  0:01
(0:22) (0:22)
Household size: 1-10 membersa 0:04 0:04
(0:06) (0:06)
Household size: 20-33 membersa  0:15  0:15
(0:21) (0:21)
Household daughters number: 1-3a 0:00 0:00
(0:06) (0:07)
Household daughters number: 6-9a 0:14 0:14
(0:18) (0:19)
Head Gender (Male=1) 0:06 0:07
(0:05) (0:05)
Household head: age < 18a  0:05  0:04
(0:09) (0:09)
Household head: age 18-45a  0:11  0:12
(0:09) (0:10)
Household head: age 45-75a  0:11  0:12
(0:10) (0:11)
Wave 2011-2012 (dummy) 0:11 0:11
(0:14) (0:14)
Literacy (dummy) 0:26 0:26
(0:12) (0:12)
Attendance Primary school (dummy)  0:34  0:35
(0:15) (0:15)
Attendance Secondary School (dummy)  0:06  0:06
(0:09) (0:10)
Number observations 2057 1988
p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05
a: these variables are categorical: therefore, the coeﬃcient should be interpreted as diﬀerential with respect to the reference
category. The reference category was omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity. In particular, the reference cateogry for household
size is a number of members between 10 and 20; for the number of daughters is a number between 3 and 6; for the age of the head,
when he or she is over 75 years
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Epilogue  
 
In this Ph.D. thesis the topic of vertical and spatial price transmission was dealt with from the three 
different points of view: 
1. In the first essay the impact of geographical dispersion on vertical price transmission along the 
Uganda coffee value chain was assessed. By building upon (Sexton, 1990), the essay brings an 
original contribution to the literature, since (Sexton, 1990) employs a single spatial price gap 
equation instead of a system of well-founded behavioural equations in agricultural markets, 
which is indeed a major improvement delivered by this essay. Moreover, in this analysis the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique is employed for empirical analysis, while (Sexton, 
1990) develops just a theoretical model and it is not interested to do any econometric exercise. 
In particular, evidence was provided, that there is room for local oligopsony, because traders 
exploit their market power and overcharge transport and transaction costs to farmers. Indeed, 
farmers are not able to skip traders in the value chain, because a significant information 
asymmetry is prevailing in the market. 
2. In the second essay the short-term impact of price insulating policies on spatial price 
transmission of maize, rice and wheat in Cameroon, Kenya and Tanzania in the period 2005-
2015 is assessed. This empirical analysis provides different results than previous literature 
like, inter alia, (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012b) and (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012c) because it 
estimates the impact of tariff and non-tariff trade policies on spatial price transmission in the 
agricultural markets not on yearly, but on monthly data. Employment of monthly data allows 
assessing more precisely short-lived movements of the analysed series, which could disappear 
because of aggregation bias at lower yearly frequency. The main results of the analysis is that 
trade policies were able to insulate the country from the price shocks on the international 
markets during the food price spike crisis, when this protection was mostly needed. 
3. In the third essay it is assessed whether the occurrence of exogenous shocks induces a change 
of price risk aversion over time and then how the time-varying risk aversion parameter affects 
production and consumption pattern by the farm households. The results of the empirical 
analysis suggest that the risk aversion parameter is not constant over time and that households 
can become more risk averse, if they face adverse market conditions in the previous periods. 
Furthermore, this paper provides evidence that peasants do not aim just at need satisfaction, 
but they behave in an optimal way and make sure their food security in the medium term. 
Indeed, they prefer to increase their income instead of directly consuming the harvested crop, 
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because the reduction of dietary energy consumption derived from the giving up the harvest 
for sale is more than offset by the rise of food purchasing power due to the larger profits 
obtained. 
 
All these research questions are very relevant from a scientific and policy-related perspective. The 
three essays extend and improve previous literature as well as they provide important and innovative 
contribution to the understanding of the mechanisms of spatial and vertical price transmission.  
Although a significant effort was made to deal in a rigorous and comprehensive way with the main 
analytical issues, this Ph.D. thesis was not able to address all research questions, which the complexity 
of spatial and vertical price transmission within the agricultural markets suggested. 
For instance, an interesting question could concern how the availability of credit affects the 
production, consumption and investment decisions taken by the economic actors, who operate within 
the agricultural value chain. The impact analysis of price insulating policies on spatial price 
transmission within a general equilibrium model could also provide innovative evidence. Finally, the 
identification of the psychological factors of farmer price risk aversion as well as the connection 
between risk, credit and saving could lead to major results.  
Such research questions are left to further work, given the limited availability of space and time for the 
achievement of this Ph.D. thesis. 
 
 
